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Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-94-024
Friday
4 February 1994

Daily Report
Central Eurasia

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Caucasus People's Confederation on Yeltsin Georgia Visit

MK0302161594 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 3 Feb 94 p 2

[Unattributed report under the "Non-Stop" rubric: "Yeltsin's Visit to Tbilisi May End in Georgia's Occupation"]

[Text] Volunteers of the Caucasus People's Confederation [CPC] will immediately come to the rescue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia if the upcoming Russian-Georgian agreement exacerbates the situation there, Ali Aliyev, chairman of the CPC parliament, told your MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS correspondent. According to Aliyev, last year formations of the Abkhaz and "confederate" forces were mightily armed thanks to captured Georgian armored vehicles and heavy artillery. Last year, Captain 1st Rank Aliyev said, we had the military and moral potential enough to advance through half of Georgia and to reach Kutaisi.

The South Ossetian parliament asked the Russian Federation Council not to ratify the agreement until the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict is resolved.

Yeltsin Warned Duma May Not Ratify Georgia Treaty

LD0302203994 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 3 Feb 94

[By correspondent A. Yaroshevskiy; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Today the leaders of all groups in the lower chamber of the Russian Parliament and its chairmen sent a letter to Boris Yeltsin containing a warning, to the effect that the Russo-Georgian friendship treaty may not be ratified by the State Duma. The main reason for apprehension is a possible destabilization of the situation in the Caucasus, associated with signing the treaty.

[Yaroshevskiy] Konstantin Zatulin, chairman of the State Duma's Committee for CIS Affairs and Links With Compatriots, has just ended a news conference, at which he acquainted journalists with the committee's statement on the Russo-Georgian treaty. Essentially the first serious non-acceptance of a presidential decision by Duma deputies was occasioned mainly by worries about exacerbating the conflicts in the Caucasus and the siting of Russian military bases in Georgia.

Incidentally, Zatulin acknowledged that some information on the subject leaked from the mass media, specifically from Russian TV's political observer Nikolay Svanidze, yesterday. Evidently, in a week's time, on Thursday, the State Duma will debate Russo-Georgian relations, whatever the outcome of the talks between Yeltsin and Shevardnadze.

[Zatulin] The State Duma cannot, has no right, and I think from a moral and ethical point of view, ought not to instruct the president of the Russian Federation as to where he goes or when.

Duma Committee Position Viewed

LD0302203494 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1740 GMT 3 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Text] Moscow, 3 Feb—In the opinion of the members of the State Duma's Committee for CIS affairs and links with fellow countrymen, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Georgia and Russia, which was signed today in Tbilisi, contains a whole range of provisions destabilizing the situation in the Caucasus. This is noted in a statement from the committee made public by its chairman Konstantin Zatulin at a news conference in Moscow.

The document notes: There are no grounds to trust the capability of the Georgian side to guarantee that the weapons will be handled carefully or that the treaty's stipulation on not transferring them to third parties will be strictly fulfilled.

Small Group Supports Treaty

LD0402101794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0854 GMT 4 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kiznetsov]

[Text] Moscow February 4 TASS—A tiny group in the Russian State Duma, which had split from the pro-Yeltsin Russia's Choice bloc, opposed the statement of leaders of all factions who warned the Russian president they may not ratify the Russian-Georgian treaty which he signed on Thursday.

The "Union of December 12" group, which was not even been registered because of tiny membership, issued a statement on Friday welcoming the treaty and characterising it as "a timely and politically justified action capable of averting several negative tendencies, including the search by Georgia for new allies among its neighbours which can result in the loss of Russian influence in the region".

The faction criticised other lawmakers for their attitude to the treaty.

On Wendesday leaders of all factions of the State Duma, including Yegor Gaydar, expressed concern over the military aspect of the Russian-Georgian treaty and warned they may not ratify it.

"The provisions of the treaty envisaging, in particular, a further agreement on assisting Georgia in creating its armed forces, in arming them and providing for them weapons, military equipment and technologies can, as we believe, detsabilise the situation in the Caucasus and become a barrier for the ratification of the treaty by the State Duma", they said in a letter to the president signed by speaker Ivan Rybkin.

Yeltsin, in his turn, said that the treaty will not be submitted for parliament ratification until Georgia settles the conflicts in its two self-styled regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Grachev Welcomes Georgia Accord on Military Cooperation

LD0402040794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2014 GMT 3 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[Text] Moscow February 3 TASS—Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev has welcomed Russian-Georgian agreements on military cooperation signed during President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Georgia on Thursday [3 February].

In an exclusive interview with ITAR-TASS, Grachev described as one of the main results of the visit the signing of a protocol of intent to set up Russian military bases in Georgia. Under the protocol, Russia will establish three military bases in this Caucasian republic—in Vazeani, Akhalkalaki and Batumi—by July 1, 1994. They will be staffed mostly with land and Air Force troops.

Aleksandr Galkin, head of the Russian delegation to the talks with Georgia, said that Georgia wants Russian troops to stay in the republic after 1995 when an agreement on their presence in Georgia expires.

Galkin said that Russian military presence in Georgia is indispensable for ensuring stabilisation of the situation, protecting the rights of the Russian-speaking population and providing assistance to Georgia to establish its own armed forces.

The agreement on Russian military bases in Georgia has been signed for ten years. After that it can be prolonged by mutual consent. The number of troops and weapons at the bases will be specified by a special working group later. However, Grachev believes that Russia should keep up to 23,000 troops in the Transcaucasia, including two thirds of them in Georgia.

The sides also agreed that Russia will train military specialists for Georgia. According to Galkin, georgia will need at least five years to establish its own armed forces.

Officials Praise Friendship Treaty

LD0402095294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0843 GMT 4 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow February 4 TASS—President Boris Yeltsin's almost lightning-fast visit to the Georgian Republic has yielded mutually advantageous and long-ranging solutions to political, economic and other problems in relations between Russia and Georgia. The many-days-long efforts of politicians and diplomats from the two countries were rounded off by the signing of the Russo-Georgian Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation. They had to display much persistence in their effort to restore the traditional ties of friendship between the two countries in spite of the destructive upheavals of past years and contrary to the speculations of enemies of the treaty.

The leaders and foreign ministries of the two countries have exerted titanic efforts in this direction over the past few weeks. Assessing the results of their work, Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev stressed during a recent meeting with leaders of the North Caucasian republics that it was neither in the interests of Russia, nor of each nation of the North Caucasian region to have next to them a state torn asunder by internal strife, plunged into an economic chaos and crime. In his opinion, the treaty is a key to stability in the entire southern region of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This is perhaps the briefest answer to the question: What will the treaty give Russia and the Caucasian peoples?

"The treaty is primarily important politically for Russia," ITAR-TASS was told by member of the Russian Presidential Council Emil Pain, "because it is wrong to adhere to two criteria at a time in politics: If you are an advocate of Russia's integrity, you must be also an advocate of the integrity of neighbouring states". Moreover, the current summit talks have shown that the treaty gives Russia several purely pragmatic advantages: Access to ports, establishment of military bases, maintenance of a military-strategic status quo, which is of common importance for all the CIS nations.

Along with the treaty, which lays a solid legal foundation for the entire complex of relations between the two states, Russia and Georgia have also signed more than twenty other documents. They have also exchanged views on problems linked with bilateral cooperation, settlement of conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on key international problems and on the situation in the transcaucasian region as a whole.

"The Russian side," President Yeltsin stressed, "stands for a cardinal improvement of relations with Georgia in all spheres, for the quickest possible restoration of ruptured economic, cultural, and spiritual contacts, for rapprochement and integration. Russia proceeds from the need to honour Georgia's territorial integrity and to guarantee fully the interests of Abkhazia and South Ossetia."

"The documents signed in Tbilisi and the results of the summit talks will contribute to the strengthening of cooperation not only between our two countries, but among all the nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States, too," Eduard Shevardnadze, head of the Georgian state, told a press conference in Tbilisi. "The importance of President Yeltsin's visit transcends the limits of Georgian-Russian relations. Their normalisation is closely linked with the settlement of all the outstanding problems in the Caucasian and Black Sea region, with the achievement of peace and stability there."

Asked whether the negotiations touched on Georgia's inclusion in the rouble zone, President Yeltsin told the press conference that it was decided to set up working teams to examine all the "pros" and "cons" concerning both Georgia and Russia. Journalists put another "difficult question" to Yeltsin: What do you think about the State Duma's attitude to the signed treaty? The president did not rule out discussions, because "any international treaty is subject to debate". "Nevertheless," he said, "I am sure that members of the State Duma will positively approach this full-scale treaty with the independent Republic of Georgia".

Troop Withdrawal Talks With Estonia Continue

Official Views 'Humiliating' Proposals

LD0302130594 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1800 GMT 2 Feb 94

[Text] Vasiliy Svirin, leader of the Russian delegation at the Estonian-Russian talks, the latest round of which ended today, said that Russia intends to link the issue of Russian military pensioners rigidly with the troop withdrawal. According to Svirin, Estonia demands that the majority of the servicemen who retired after 20 August 1991 should leave when the army leaves, even if they have no accommodation in Russia. The remaining military pensioners must apply to Estonian authorities for residence permits. At the same time they are required to give a signed declaration saying that they have no arms at home and do not intend to obtain any. Retired servicemen must also promise not to join any military formations nor endanger the state of Estonia through their actions.

Svirin stated that such requirements are humiliating.

According to Svirin, the Russian side expected to reach an agreement on the citizenship issue, but the Estonian delegation refused discussion on the matter.

Envoy to Talks Comments

MK0302132094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 3 Feb 94 p 2

[Dmitriy Zhdannikov report under the "Russia-Estonia" rubric: "Talks Coincide With Tartu Agreement Anniversary. Russian Side Prefers To Forget About It"]

[Text] The winding up of the 16th round of Russian-Estonian talks coincided with another anniversary of the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Vasiliy Svirin, who leads the Russian delegation to talks with Estonia, remarked that the sides completely forgot the date in the course of the tense two-week work: "As far as we are concerned, that treaty has died a natural death."

The Russian diplomat advised that the work on 1 and 2 February centered on the four [as published] main problems of bilateral relations: the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Estonia, social protection for Russian military pensioners who live in the Baltic republic, and border and economic questions. The Russian side had planned to turn over to its Estonian counterparts a complete schedule for the withdrawal of troops until 31 August 1994, but seeing that the Estonians had completely blocked the question of military pensioners' rights, it did not find it possible to make such a step. Mr. Svirin confirmed the statement by Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin to the effect that Russia had never linked the problem of its troop withdrawal from Baltic territory with the position of the Russian-speaking civilian population. He remarked, however, that the problems of upholding the rights of servicemen and retired servicemen had always been regarded as part of the troop withdrawal questions. "The conduct of the Estonian Government may entail considerable repercussions because it actually deals with the deportation of military pensioners," he said. For example, leaders of this Baltic country demand that all military men retired after 20 August 1991 should leave the republic's territory before 31 August 1994. The remaining 9,000 pensioners (35,000 together with their families) are only granted the right to seek residence permits while the Estonian side advanced such humiliating, according to the Russian diplomat, requirements as nonparticipation in armed formations and not having been implicated in cooperation with foreign intelligence services. The package of border questions, Vasiliy Svirin declared, had been also blocked by the Estonian side.

The Russian delegation once again underlined, during the latest round of talks, that Estonian claims to a number of rayons in Pskov Oblast were hopeless. Vasiliy Svirin remarked that Estonia is still refusing to demarcate the land borders: "Russia will probably have to do this unilaterally," he warned.

Lack of Withdrawal Plan Noted

WS0302154694 Tallinn BNS in English 0809 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Tallinn, Feb 02, BNS—The refusal of the Russian negotiators to present a timetable for the withdrawal of troops Estonian at the intergovernmental talks on Wednesday [2 Wednesday] was named as "surprising" by the Estonian Foreign Ministry.

In its comments on the results of the negotiations released late Wednesday, the ministry notes, that the surprise comes since a timetable "has been repeatedly promised by Russian spokesmen and was even mentioned in Russian President Boris Yeltsin's recent letter to Estonian President Lennart Meri".

"Since Estonia has fundamentally accepted the August 31, 1994 final date offered by the Russians, the logical and necessary next step was for Russia to produce a detailed timetable," - Estonian Foreign Minister Juri Luik was quoted by the ministry as saying. Luik is now in Brussels, where he is to sign the Partnership for Peace agreement Thursday.

"Estonia still expects Russia to live up to the international obligations it accepted by signing the Final Document of the Helsinki Summit in July 1992, requiring the early, orderly and complete withdrawal of foreign military forces from the territories of the Baltic states,"—the ministry notes,—"Although there can no longer be talk of an 'early' withdrawal, the pullout can still be completed completely, unconditionally and in an orderly fashion."

Estonia Sees 'Stumbling Block'

LD0302145294 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 3 Feb 94

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The next round of Russian-Estonian talks will take place in Tallinn on 1-2 March, Svirin, head of the Russian delegation, reported. Correspondent M. Sarbaa reports:

Military pensioners in Estonia are a stumbling block at the Russian-Estonian talks it was stated today at a news conference held at the Estonian Republic Embassy in Moscow on the outcome of the 16th round of Russian-Estonian talks which ended yesterday. Estonian Ambassador Juriy Kahn said that the Russian side had promised to provide a schedule of its troop withdrawal from Estonian by this round. The problem of military pensioners could delay the final withdrawal of troops set for 31 August of this year.

In point of fact, Estonia is demanding the deportation from the country of approximately 35,000 people, including family members of pensioners, to which, of course, Russia will never agree. Because of this, the issues of border demarcation, Estonia's debt and economic and trade cooperation remain unresolved.

Work at the talks was carried out by six groups which discussed a wide range of problems between Estonia and Russia.

Estonian Foreign Ministry Concerned

LD0302134894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1143 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] The Estonian Foreign Ministry expressed concern that during the Russian-Estonian talks in Moscow Russia did not present any schedule for its troops' withdrawal from Estonia.

It circulated a statement saying that "as the two parties have agreed upon the date of the complete withdrawal in principle (August 31, 1994), Estonia hopes that Russia would take urgent steps to implement this agreement.

During a press conference summing up the results of the talks, head of the Russian delegation Vassily Svirin stated that Russia had drafted a schedule, but did not pass it to Estonia "because Estonia's irreconcilable position hampered the coordination of documents on the protection of the retired Russian servicemen and their families living in Estonia.

The statement also says that the Estonian government "demonstrated good will and approved the decree defining the procedure for obtaining residence permits by retired foreign servicemen and their families."

The Estonian Foreign Ministry emphasized that the government was motivated by a humane attitude to the individuals who find it difficult to return to their homeland because Russia did not create proper conditions for this, despite its moral and juridical obligations.

The Estonian Foreign Ministry qualified the actions of its government as a "brave step," because "the Russian troops are still located in Estonia, while their strength, including the number of retired servicemen, far exceeds the strength of the Estonian defence forces."

As many as 2,500 Russian servicemen still stay in Estonia. The Estonian Defense Forces have about the same number of personnel, plus about 2,000 border guards. Estonia's voluntary defense organization "Kaitseliit" has about 6,000 men.

There are about 11,000 retired Russian servicemen living in Estonia.

Russia Urged To Step Up Withdrawal

LD0302190094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1505 GMT 3 Feb 94

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: Reports by Diplomatic Correspondents Dmitriy Voskoboynikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy, and others]

[Text] Tallinn understnds the difficulties Russia is experiencing in connection with its troops withdrawal from Estonia. That is why it agrees to the time for withdrawal fixed by the Russian side (before August 31st, 1994: Interfax note), and does not insist on an earlier date, Estonia's Ambassador to Russia, Yuriy Kahn, told a news conference given on Thursday after the latest round of bilateral talks.

The Estonian side, he said, has only one wish: that Russia step up the withdrawal of units stationed in the center of Tallinn which are in direct proximity to the building of Estonia's parliament.

The diplomat expressed surprise at the Russian delegation's refusal to present a schedule for troops withdrawal on the grounds that the problem of Russian military retirees in Estonia remains unresolved. According to him, earlier the two sides agreed "to resort to no linkages, and discuss every issue separately."

"This road leads to a deadlock. Linkages can only turn the negotiating process into bargaining," he said.

According to the ambassador, those in the Russian military who retired after the time when Estonia gained its independence (August 20th, 1991: Interfax's note) must leave Estonia together with the withdrawing troops.

"It's odd that Russia has not granted these people any legal or social guarantees. It seems to have decided to leave them in Estonia's care. These people fought for Russia, and such an attitude to them on the part of Moscow is inadmissible," he said.

With reference to the package of "border issues" Kahn noted that Russia "seems to have begun to understand that the administrative line fixed by Stalin cannot serve as a state border between the two countries."

"When determining our border we continue to be guided by the peace treaty signed with Russia in Tartu (in 1920: Interfax note), and we believe that Moscow has territorial claims to us, not vice versa," Kahn said.

According to the ambassador, a meeting should be organized between the Russian and Estonian presidents "so as to reach serious solutions."

"Unfortunately, Russia's Foreign Ministry believes that all issues should be tentatively coordinated between lower-level officials, after which the presidents will only sign the documents already drafted. We do not share this approach," the diplomat said.

Troop Withdrawal Agreement Close

WS0302185294 Tallinn BNS in English 1614 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Moscow, Feb 03, BNS—The delegations of Estonia and Russia at the 16th round of intergovernmental talks almost completely approved the draft agreement on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia.

Estonia at the latest round of talks for the first time formally accepted Russia's proposal to pull its troops from the country by Aug. 31, said the Estonian Ambassador to Russia, Juri Kahn.

He said the only issue on which the parties had failed to reach a final agreement was that of paying compensation. The topic has to be settled at the level of heads of state.

Russia has said it would agree to call a summit meeting of the two countries' leaders only after Estonia provides social welfare guarantees for the retired Russian military under the conditions set by Russia.

Kahn quoted Russian officials as saying their side would not present a detailed timetable for the withdrawal of units from Estonia until the two countries have agreed on the issue of social welfare guarantees for the military who retired after Aug. 20, 1991.

The ambassador said this latest stance was causing bewilderment to Estonia, as the countries earlier had agreed to solve any problems one at a time without linking them to one another.

Kahn dismissed Russia's allegations of Estonia's unwillingness to resolve the border issue as groundless. "Russia's wish to establish the border along the line where its border guards now stand is unacceptable for Estonia," he said. He added that Estonia on many occasions had sought taking international law as basis for discussion of the border issue.

The next round of Estonian-Russian talks is to be held at the beginning of March. It is possible that Estonian Foreign Minister Juri Luik will meet Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitali Churkin in the meantime, Kahn added.

Negotiations End Without Agreement

WS0302205494 Tallinn ETA in English 1900 GMT 3 Feb 94

["ETA News Release"]

[Text] Tallinn, February 3—No agreements were concluded in the 16th round of Estonian-Russian inter-state negotiations on February 1 and 2 in Moscow, Ago Tiiman, secretary of the Estonian delegation and head of the military working group told a news conference on Thursday [3 February], while Rein Helme, head of the parliament's defence committee claims Russia intends to drag on the negotiations deliberately.

Tiiman said that the round discussed traditional issues of military, economic, border and humanitarian spheres. The military group dealt as usually with agreements on Russian troop withdrawal, retired military social security measures and dismantling of nuclear training base at Paldiski.

Tiiman said that the agreement of withdrawal of forces was principally ready, only bilateral compensations demands had to be still decided upon. All other articles of the agreement were coordinated, including the troop pullout deadline of August 31, 1994, which should not be touched upon any more.

As it was announced yesterday Russia did not present a detailed timetable of withdrawal of its forces from Estonia, as it had repeatedly promised. The fact that the Russian delegation failed to present the timetable proved that "our eastern neighbour searched pretext to drag on the negotiations," head of Riigikogu [parliament] state defence committee Rein Helme told ETA on Thursday. Vassili Svirin, the chief Russian negotiator said Russia did not present the timetable because of Estonia's rejection of a Moscow proposal on retired military social guarantees. Helme said that the argument was a "searched pretext", showing that Russia used its responsibilities before its citizens to "shake Estonian political stability" and Russia was not interested in successful finishing of the negotiations.

Tiiman said that the agreement on military pensioners social securities was in a difficult situation although all questions that did not demand changes in the other side's laws were solved. Russia pays (military) retirement fees to 10,570 persons residing in Estonia, 850 of whom are reserve officers, Tiiman said, adding that he doubted Vassili Svirin's words that former military personnel officers who are 55 or 60 years old at present were no danger to Estonian security.

Tiiman said that the last round of negotiations was, however, not to be regarded as an entire failure. Work has been most constructive on the issue of liquidation of the Paldiski nuclear training base. The head of the Paldiski working group Mark Sinisoo told a press conference, on Thursday, that the Russian side had given its final consent to international experts participation at the dismantling of the nuclear reactors, stating, however, that no international or Estonian experts could be present at the dismantling before the "secret components" were taken out of Estonia. Russian delegation also said that by September 1 the whole infrastructure of Paldiski, still a Russian military town, will be handed over to Estonia.

Tiiman said that the greatest number of agreements were prepared in the economic working group, but Russia was not interested in concluding them, e.g. the investments' protection agreement was ready already in June 1993, but Russia "simply does not want to conclude it", the same being true about the question of dividing former USSR property. Tiiman said that all this pointed to an old Russian Supreme Soviet decision according to which Russia will not regulate economic questions with Estonia before all other demands i.e. concerning the retired military and humanitarian issues, were not fulfilled.

Yeltsin, Nazarbayev To Discuss Baykonur 11-12 Feb

LD0302204894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1807 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Russian and Kazakh negotiators ended the first round of their talks on drafting an agreement on the status of Baykonur and long term lease of the space launching station to Russia.

A senior official of the Russian Space Agency who had taken part in the talks told Interfax that "the two sides agreed to use the draft compiled by Russian experts as the basis for further negotiations."

A protocol was signed, listing the issues on which full agreement had been reached and those on which talks had to continue. In particular, no agreement has been reached on which country's legislation should apply in the station and which country's law enforcement agencies will police there and the town of Leninsk.

The official emphasized that the Kazakh negotiators needed more time to analyze the Russian offer of an amount to be paid for use of the launching pads.

He did not rule out the possibility that the talks would be continued in Almaty, the Kazakh capital.

Meanwhile, officials in the Kazakh embassy told Interfax that the status of Baykonur was likely to be discussed when the presidents of the two countries met in Moscow on February 11 and 12. Nursultan Nazarbayev will have a stopover in Moscow on his way to the U.S.

Talks on Baykonur End With No Result

LD0302194894 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1810 GMT 3 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Veronika Romanenkova and Semen Ivanov]

[Excerpt] Moscow, 3 Feb (ITAR-TASS)—Experts from Russia and Kazakhstan completed their consultations on the status and use of the Baykonur space launch site today with virtually no result. They merely adopted a protocol on the meeting, which stated a mutual wish of the two sides to hold another meeting in mid-February.

The Kazakh side did not submit any documents to be discussed during the consultations but focussed on criticizing the projects drawn up by the Russian delegation. According to some experts, this is the reason why the two sides failed to arrive at a compromise solution concerning Baykonur's future. [passage omitted]

Commander Denies Arms Being Supplied to Armenia

LD0302195994 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1910 GMT 3 Feb 94

[By ARMENPRESS correspondent Garri Kyufaryan for TASS]

[Text] Yerevan, 3 Feb—"Our location on the territory of Armenia has nothing to do with events in Nagorno-Karabakh," the commander of the group of Russian forces told an ARMENPRESS-TASS correspondent in Yerevan today. "We are carrying out tasks stipulated by the interstate treaty of the Russian Federation. Any rumors and speculation about additional supplies of weapons being sent from Russia to Armenia are unfounded, whatever source they may be coming from."

Shokhin Says Money Merging Package With Belarus Not Ready

LD0302221094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1807 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Russian Economics Minister Aleksandr Shokhin has said that the package of documents on the unification of the monetary systems of Russia and Belarus is not yet prepared, and that is why the unification agreement cannot be signed during Viktor Chernomyrdin's upcoming visit to Minsk.

The minister said he had learned of the premier's visit from the mass media and that he had never given his consent to signing the agreement. Shokhin recalled the fact that it was the prime minister who asked him to take up preparing the negotiations on the unification of the two countries' monetary systems.

Shokhin said the package of documents defining the procedure for the unification had not yet been prepared. He added that he had a meeting with one of Belarus' deputy prime ministers in Moscow last Friday. "We did not advertise this, but we detected a number of approaches to solving disputable issues. Now the task is to introduce the approaches into the text of an agreement," Shokhin was quoted as saying. With this aim in view, several Russian representatives left for Minsk for two to three days. "If the documents are to be, we must approve them at a government meeting," the minister pointed out. Only after this can the documents be signed, he added.

Zhirinovskiy Says Russia Used 'Secret Weapon' in Bosnia

BR0402100494 Paris LIBERATION in French 4 Feb 94 p 19

["S. Etr." report: "Serbian Secret Weapon, According to Zhirinovskiy"]

[Text] The "secret weapon" given to the Bosnian Serbs is apparently called Elipton and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the Russian extreme nationalist leader, on a visit to the former Yugoslavia until yesterday, states that it is not a joke: "Russian counterespionage officers used it on Wednesday against a Muslim military unit, killing 12 enemy soldiers. Their bodies bore no trace of firearm injury and the neighboring buildings were not damaged."

The Elipton apparently kills by some kind of ultrasound. The story may seem crazy and some close aides of Zhirinovskiy are playing down these remarks. But the latter insists and denounces skeptics and "all those who are afraid of the strength of his party and the new Russia." A section of the Serb press goes further, citing academicians with very grand-sounding titles who maintain that the principle behind this revolutionary weapon, capable of reversing the balance of forces with the West, is based on the work of Eugene Mathieu, a French mathematician of the last century.

Kokoshin, France's Leotard Discuss Military Cooperation

LD0302121994 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1045 GMT 3 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostankin]

[Text] Moscow, 3 Feb—This morning Andrey Kokoshin, first deputy defense minister of Russia, had a meeting with French Defense Minister Francois Leotard, who arrived in Moscow on an official visit on Wednesday. At the meeting Kokoshin said that "the Russian state leadership places great importance on the development of relations with France, including the military sphere. Our relations are being developed extremely carefully, incorporating both new realities and rich military traditions."

For his part, the French guest said that he was ready "to debate any security problems or crisis experienced by Russia." This is Francois Leotard's first official visit to Russia since his appointment to the post of the defense minister of France in spring 1993.

Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the general staff of the Russian Federation's Armed Forces, took part in the meeting, at which it was noted that close ties have recently formed between the two military departments. Army General Pavel Grachev, who visited France in January last year, signed an agreement on mutual contacts and, in particular, on exchanging military delegations, training Russian servicemen in France, and French servicemen in Russia. First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets and Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, who visited Paris last autumn and whom Francois Leotard is planning to meet in Moscow, signed then the Russian- French agreement on cooperation in dismantling Russian nuclear weapons and ensuring reliability and safety during their transportation.

Francois Leotard will visit the Moscow army high command school today, meet Pavel Grachev on Friday, and visit the Tula airborne division. A Russian-French intergovernmental agreement on military cooperation is expected to be signed on Friday.

Grachev, Leotard in Car Accident

AU0402100894 Paris AFP in English 0945 GMT 4 Feb 94

[Text] Moscow, Feb 4 (AFP)—An armoured Zil limousine carrying Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev and his visiting French counterpart Francois Leotard crashed into a truck on a icy road in Moscow Friday [4 February] but nobody was hurt.

The car hit a truck in icy conditions as the two defence chiefs were heading to Olabino to visi the Tamaskaya guard, an AFP correspondent in the motorcade said.

The front of the armoured Zil car was badly crushed. The ministers later transferred to another vehicle.

Burbulis in Tokyo, Comments on New Cabinet

OW0302091994 Tokyo KYODO in English 0907 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 3 KYODO—Former Russian presidential aide Gennadiy Burbulis on Thursday [3 February] conditioned cooperation with and support for Russia's new cabinet on its pursuit of political and economic reforms.

Burbulis, a member of the Russian State Duma, and head of the humanitarian and political center "Strategia," made the remark in an interview with KYODO NEWS SERVICE.

He also said reformists must pursue a "more realistic" course of reforms and acknowledge mistakes that have been made over the past two years resulting in bankruptcies and unemployment.

More emphasis must be placed on securing the livelihood of pensioners and other disadvantaged citizens, he said.

In an apparent barb at the new cabinet of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, Burbulis warned that the country's problems cannot be solved by such measures as excessive issuance of currency, which would fuel inflation, and reckless issuance of subsidies for state farms and industry.

He was speaking amid widespread speculation that market reforms are threatened by last month's cabinet shakeup and the departure of leading free marketeers Yegor Gaydar and Boris Fedorov, and Liberal Social Welfare Minister Ella Pamfilova.

Chernomyrdin has argued that the reshuffle was necessitated by the strong showing of ultranationalists and Communists in December's parliamentary elections.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin has vowed that reforms will continue but has largely distanced himself from the new cabinet.

Burbulis, who is a leader of Russia's Choice, the largest party in the lower house of the legislature, is visiting Tokyo as a member of the Russian delegation to a two-day trilateral forum between Russia, Japan and the United States on problems of security in the north Pacific, which ended Wednesday.

Meets Japanese Parliament Official

LD0302201894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1812 GMT 3 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Bantin]

[Text] Tokyo February 3 TASS—Takako Doi, chairwoman of the lower chamber of the Japanese Parliament, met Gennadiy Burbulis, deputy of Russia's State Duma, on Thursday [2 February]. The meeting is considered to be the first step toward establishing interparliamentary ties between the two countries.

Burbulis together with his American and Japanese counterparts participated in the trilateral forum on security in the north- Pacific region which closed here on Wednesday.

Burbulis emphasized the significance of his meeting with Takako Doi "from the point of view of a revival of the Russian Parliament's prestige and the authority of the Russian parliamentarians" in an interview with ITAR-TASS on Thursday.

According to him, Takako doi showed much interest in the process of forming the new Russian Parliament and emphasized that it was important to establish fruitful cooperation between the Russian and Japanese lawmakers as soon as possible.

She called on the Russian Parliament to resume the activities of the Russo-Japanese parliamentary committee which was suspended because of the dissolvement of the former Supreme Soviet.

Takako Doi expressed grave concern about the fact that the last transformations inside Russia's Government might result in curtailing the economic reforms. In response, Burbulis, who represents the "Russia's Choice" faction in the lower chamber of Russia's Parliament, said that the new Russian Constitution, which was adopted on December 12, 1993, had for the first time given the chance to secure political stability in the country.

"In no case shall we leave President Boris Yeltsin in isolation, without the indispensable support of the professionals who carried out the economic reforms," he emphasized.

In his opinion, joint work of President yeltsin and Premier Viktor chernomyrdin Is a sure guaranty of stability inside Russia.

"Boris Yeltsin has received enough powers to provide for a stable and competent system of government. As for Viktor Chernomyrdin, he has always demonstrated his ability to make strategic decisions which were in line with the course of economic reforms," he said.

"Today it should have been dangerous to let the union between the president and the chairman of goverment collapse," he emphasized.

Date for Japanese Foreign Minister's Visit Not Decided

LD0302150994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1317 GMT 3 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anna Melnikova]

[Text] Moscow February 3 TASS—The date of a visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Tsutomu Hata to Russia will be agreed upon after consultations between deputy foreign ministers of the two countries and meetings of a working group on peace treaty, scheduled for 21-22 February, a high ranking official of the Russian Foreign Ministry told ITAR-TASS on Thursday.

Hata was invited to Russia on an official visit in October 1993 when President Boris Yeltsin was in Japan.

Navy Willing To Help Protect Kuril Border Area

LD0302175194 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1407 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] The Navy is willing to give the coast guards the necessary assistance in protecting the South Kuril sector of Russia's border, a high-ranking naval official told Interfax.

Russian coast guards, he said, are considering several ways to strengthen the border in the area of the South Kuril Islands. "The Navy will support any of them and grant the necessary aid: speed boats, fuel and the like," he said.

As Interfax learned from the press bu[illegible] of Russia's frontier troops, no gross violations of F[illegible]'s sea border in the South Kuril direction have bee[illegible]stered since the end of January. "Several Japanese fishing vessels were noticed in the vicinity of Russia's territorial waters during the period in question, but they launched no illegal actions," said a member of the press bureau.

According to him, massive border violations in the South Kuril direction were noted between the 21st and the 24th of January, when Japanese fishing ships committed about one hundred violations of Russia's sea border.

"The coast guards, their patrol ships and helicopters are ready to prevent any violations of Russia's border," Interfax's interviewee pointed out.

Russia's position remains unchanged: we recognize the existence of a territorial dispute in our relations with Japan and are willing to discuss it, a senior Foreign Ministry official dealing with the "Japanese problems" told Interfax.

As he said, the territorial dispute will be discussed in Moscow on February 21st, when the Russian-Japanese group working on a peace treaty convenes for a session. The exchange of views will be continued on February 22nd, when bilateral working consultations presided over by Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister, Aleksandr Panov, and his Japanese counterpart, Hiroshi Fukuda, take place in Moscow.

According to the diplomat, the Russian side intends to discuss in detail the problem connected with the increasingly frequent violations of Russia's frontier by Japanese fishing vessels in the area of the four disputed South Kuril islands.

Details of Japanese Boats Violating Russian Waters

LD0402005394 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1352 GMT 3 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Bantin]

[Excerpts] Tokyo, 3 Feb—Colonel General Andrey Nikolayev, commander in chief of the Russian border troops, who is at present in Tokyo, today showed Russian journalists a video recorded by Russian border troops. It clearly shows about 10 Japanese fishing vessels out of a total of 130 fishing vessels which violated the Russian state border on 21 January this year. [passage omitted]

The video made by the Russian border troops left no doubts about the authenticity of the fact that the Japanese fishermen violated the Russian Federation state border. The video, made with the help of special equipment from a border troops' helicopter, clearly shows the registeration numbers and names of the vessels, in particular vessels with the numbers "H-K-2-20234" and "H-K-2-19082," and the schooners "Kosio-maru," "Tayio-maru," and "Nogisinko-maru." The video clearly shows the crews of two vessels covering the numbers of their schooners with improvised means in order to prevent the Russian border troops from recording the numbers.

Andrey Nikolayev pointed out in an interview with the ITAR-TASS correspondent that he is ready to hand over the video to the Japanese officials, including the leadership of the Directorate for Security at Sea, if he receives such a request. "If there is no such request then we will hand over the video to Russian Television on arrival in Moscow," he said.

It has become known to the ITAR-TASS correspondent that during the first, in Russian-Japanese relations, talks held today between the commander in chief of the Russian border troops and representatives of the Directorate for Security at Sea, the Japanese side was informed that the Russian border troops have a video which proves the violation of the Russian Federation border on 21 January by Japanese fishing vessels. Yet the Japanese border troops failed to ask for the video.

It remains completely unknown what other issues were discussed at Andrey Nikolayev's meeting with his Japanese colleagues. Informed sources have told the ITAR-TASS correspondent that the Japanese side insisted that there should be total confidentiality at the talks and that their contents should not be made public. According to sources, this is connected with the fact that Japan's attitude toward direct contacts with Russian border troops—a country with which Japan still does not have a peace treaty, and that means no state border—remains sufficiently painfully sensitive. [passage omitted]

Border Guards To 'Suppress' Violations in Far East

LD0302154094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1428 GMT 3 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Bantin]

[Text] Tokyo February 3 TASS—Russian border troops "will use in full measure the rights granted to then by Russian legislation" to suppress any violations of the border of the Russian Federation in the Far East, the Commander in Chief of the Russian Border Troops Andrey Nikolayev said in Tokyo today.

Nikolayev added that this also meant the use of firearms against transgressors if they failed to obey orders by border guards.

As concerns the mass violation of the Russian border near the southern Kuril Islands by Japanese shipping vessels on January 21 and 22, Nikolayev said that the transgression of the Russian border by 130 Japanese boats must have been preplanned. To all appearances, it was a reaction to the detention of a Japanese schooner under Captain Keinichi Noto by Russian coast guards in the same area at the end of November. Firearms were used after the Japanese captain declined to obey orders. He was wounded.

Nikolayev said Keinichi Noto will soon face trial by a Russian court which will decide on the fate of the captain and his schooner.

Soon after Captain Noto's schooner was detained, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded in a note to Moscow that the captain and two sailors, as well as the boat, be released. The two sailors returned to Japan in January.

Nikolayev stressed that the Russian border units in the Far East "will protect the state border in accordance with the principles defined by the Russian president and government".

"No one should have any doubts that we will firmly guard our country's economic interests," he said.

Foreign Policy Planning Consultations Begin in Tokyo

LD0302154594 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1430 GMT 3 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Varlamov]

[Text] Tokyo February 3 TASS—Two-day Russo-Japanese consultations on foreign policy planning at foreign department official level began in Tokyo today. In an interview with ITAR-TASS head of the Russian delegation, chief of the Russian Foreign Ministry Analysis and Prognosis Department Ednan Agayev said that the range of problems, which is being discussed at the meeting, embraces not only general tendencies of the foreign policy situation in the world, but also problems, concerning the development of Asia-Pacific region, in particular, the development of integration processes. According to him, the evolution of Russian and Japanese approaches towards ensuring regional security will also be an important topic for exchange of views.

Annual consultations on foreign policy planning between foreign ministries of the two country are being held since 1992 and have become a form of regular contacts between the two foreign departments. Consultations are held alternately in Moscow and Tokyo. They are serving as mutual exchange of information about questions, concerning the formation and development of foreign policies of the countries and also about the international situation.

Yeltsin Sends Greetings to U.S.-Russian Space Crew

LD0302174594 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1706 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Moscow, 3 Feb (ITAR-TASS)—Russian President Boris Yeltsin today sent greetings to the participants of the joint Russian-American space flight on the American space shuttle Discovery.

In his address circulated by the presidential press service, Boris Yeltsin says, among other things, that this space flight is not a routine event. For the first time a Russian national, Sergey Krikalev, joins an American space crew.

The Russian president says that the Russian space station Mir is soon to host an American astronaut. He says: "This is a prominent example of cooperation and partnership, which is being established and strengthened between our two countries and peoples. The relations between Russia and America are becoming increasingly based on trust. We are beginning to realize ever more clearly that we must unite our efforts in order to resolve complicated issues, both on the Earth and in space, for the benefit of our peoples and in the interest of all mankind."

The Russian president hopes the participants in the joint Russian-American space flight will complete their work successfully and return safely to their home planet.

Vorontsov's Appointment as Ambassador to U.S. Not Confirmed

MK0302134094 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 3 Feb 94 p 4

[International Department report: "Reshuffles at Russian Foreign Ministry. Russian Ambassador to U.S. Has Not Yet Been Appointed"]

[Text] SEGODNYA, citing "diplomatic sources," has reported that Yuliy Vorontsov, currently Russia's permanent representative at the United Nations, has been appointed Russia's new ambassador to Washington. Correspondingly, he has been replaced at the United Nations by Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. However, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Krylov, who is in charge of personnel policy, did not confirm this report yesterday to KOMMERSANT-DAILY's correspondent. Both Vorontsov and Lavrov, according to unofficial information received by KOMMERSANT-DAILY, may in fact be appointed to the aforementioned posts. Currently Sergey Lavrov is at UN headquarters in New York. KOMMERSANT-DAILY plans to publish an interview with him in the near future. KOMMERSANT-DAILY will follow up on the subject once corresponding presidential edicts are signed.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Holds News Briefing

Comments on Resolving DPRK Nuclear Issue

LD0302191094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1719 GMT 3 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Boris Krivoshey and Denis Perkin]

[Text] Moscow February 3 TASS—Possibilities of resolving the nuclear problem in North Korea have not exhausted and, therefore, it is necessary to continue discussing all questions at the negotiation table, Russian Deputy Foreign Ministry Spokesman Mikhail Demurin told a briefing held on Thursday [3 February].

Touching on the Russian side's participation in finding a solution to the nuclear problem in North Korea, Demurin said that Russia is working in three directions. It supports a dialogue between North Korea and the United States, North Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as North and South Koreas.

"It is fully possible to resolve the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Korean Peninsula by acting in these directions. The basis of the solution should be a strcit observance of obligations of the agreement on guarantees with the iaea by Pyongyang," the Russian deputy foreign ministry spokesman emphasised.

"Russia is for North Korea remaining faithful to the Nuclear Weapon Non-Proliferation Treaty, and we also underscore the need to put into action the joint declaration about denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by the North and South," Mikhail Demurin concluded.

Notes Ties Established With Macedonia

LD0302150194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1356 GMT 3 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Krivoshey]

[Text] Moscow February 3 TASS—The Russian Federation and the ex-Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia have established diplomatic relations on the level of ambassadors.

The establishment of full-scale diplomatic relations is not directed against interests of any other third state, and will contribute to maintaining friendly relations with all the countries of the region, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Mikhail Demurin told a briefing on Thursday [3 February].

It would also contribute to "promote stability in the Balkans as a whole", the diplomat stressed noting that Russia is ready to help solve problems between Athens and Skopje upon their request.

Comments on Council of Europe

LD0302150594 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1411 GMT 3 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Boris Krivoshey and Denis Perkin]

[Text] Moscow February 3 TASS—Seeking to build a united and democratic Europe, member states of the Council of Europe should show a constructive approach to the problem of admitting Russia to their organisation, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Mikhail Demurin said at a briefing today, following the recent statement of British Member of Parliament D. Atkinson at a recent session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

According to Demurin, the British MP rather unceremoniously linked the problem of Russia's joining the Council of Europe with the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of foreign states, specifically, Baltic countries. Atkinson's "ultimatum" was regarded by some mass media organs as the putting forward by the Council of Europe of additional conditions for Russia's admittance, which are hampering and making more difficult the settlement of the problem of Russia's membership, he said.

The Russian side hopes that Atkinson's statements reflect his own opinion and not the feelings that predominate in the Council of Europe. "This is the only way it should be, because the attempts to link artificially two entirely different problems are just senseless," the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed.

'Instability' Working Against Partnership for Peace

MK0302115094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 3 Feb 94 p 2

[Pavel Felgengauer report in the "Changes" column: "Partnership for Partnership's Sake. Political and Economic Instability in Russia Complicates Cooperation With the West"]

[Text] From the purely formal point of view, relations between the long-standing opponents in the "cold" war in Europe—the Soviet (now Russian) army and NATO—have changed substantially. Merely a few years ago, in 1989, the two gigantic groupings were confronting each other, ready to fight. In spite of all talk about "new" thinking, both sides continued to build up their military might, while the disturbances in the GDR, which preceded the fall of the Berlin wall, could, it seemed, have put both sides on the verge of a large war, just like during the earlier Berlin crises of 1949 and 1961.

Now the new Russia and NATO are "partners," almost allies, "for peace." Reciprocal official and working visits by military delegations have become so common that they do not arouse great interest. This week, for instance, German Army General von Ondarza, commander of NATO Allied Armed Forces in the Central European War Theater, arrived in Moscow. The visit, however, is of a fairly nostalgic character: this war theater as such does not exist any longer; von Ondarza is resigning while the prospects for the future of the hitherto most powerful NATO forces in Central Europe are quite dire—the enemy is gone, apparently for a long time, if not forever. At present the remnants of the combat effective units of the Russian troop grouping are being pulled out of Germany and all that will remain by spring will be the 6th Berlin Brigade, designed exclusively for military ceremonies, and some rear and special services. By August the withdrawal of the Russian troops will be completed.

Both NATO and the Russian Defense Ministry are now looking for a new raison d'etre for their coexistence on the same continent. General Kolesnikov, chief of the Russian General Staff, told General von Ondarza that "we are now studying with great interest the Partnership for Peace program: it contains some sound ideas." The text of an agreement on a program of cooperation between NATO and the Russian Federation Defense Ministry has been prepared and in fact is ready for signing. Russia is interested in closer interaction with NATO in the area of planning, organizing, preparing, and conducting peacekeeping operations and above all, in according the peacekeeping battalions—the 27th Motorized Rifle Division in the Dniester Region, a battalion in South Ossetia, and the 201st Motorized Rifle Division in Tajikistan—a more "reliable" international legal status (as UN or CSCE forces). NATO member states, however, concerned by the results of the 12 December elections and the danger of the "revival of Russian imperialism," do not intend to oblige Russia on this issue.

Generally, any practical moves toward implementing the Partnership for Peace program are unlikely any time soon. Primarily for economic reasons. True, joint command and staff exercises by the U.S. 3d Infantry Division and the Russian 27th "peacekeeping" Motorized Rifle Division of the Volga Military District have been planned for 1994 but the Russian Defense Ministry has no funds to conduct real joint maneuvers with NATO forces. The ministry has no funds even for official visits, although it has been flooded with invitations literally from all NATO countries. In the near future however economic problems will apparently not be the main ones.

The ministry is agitated by serious rumors about an early and inevitable drastic reorganization (resubordination of the General Staff directly to the president, and so forth) of the military department patterned after the reorganization of the Security Ministry last December. It seems that the Yeltsin administration is considering the third variant of the edict on reorganizing the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. In any event, the idea of "Partnership" today does not seem to be very topical.

NATO Commander Ends Visit to Moscow

LD0302220194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1910 GMT 3 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Vladimir Gondusov and Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow February 3 TASS—Commander-in-chief of NATO Forces in Central Europe General Henning von Ondarza ended his four-day visit to Moscow on Thursday [3 February].

Von Ondarza, 60, who is to retire in April 1994, expressed satisfaction with the results of his visit and confessed that he had always looked at the Soviet Union and its allies through "the gun sight." His visit has become possible due to the political thaw in relations between the east and west, he said.

In Moscow the general met with Vladimir Semenov, commander of the Russian land forces, Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the Russian General Staff, and other officials.

He welcomed Kolesnikov's words that "the General Staff of the Russian armed forces is studying the Partnership for Peace programme with interest. It contains good ideas. The practical realisation of this programme will speed up our rapprochement with the North-Atlantic Alliance."

The NATO general said NATO is ready to provide assistance to the peace-keeping forces of Russia and the CIS, including to train specialists for work in areas of inter-ethnic conflicts as observers.

Von Ondarza's visit was part of the Russia-NATO programme of military cooperation which envisages over 50 joint projects in 1994, including senior officer and expert exchanges, joint military manoeuvres and other events.

Gas Delivery Pact Signed With Germany

MK0302160094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 3 Feb 94 p 2

[Rustam Narzikulov report under the "Treaty" rubric: "Russia Wins One-Billion Contract. Eastern Germany Secures Russian Gas Supplies Till the Year 2014"]

[Text] The question of implementing the so-called Orenburg Agreement under which Russia is supposed to deliver annually 2.8 billion cubic meters of gas to eastern Germany seems to have been finally settled.

In the wake of the reunification of the eastern and western parts of the FRG, gas deliveries within the framework of the Orenburg Agreement remained a subject of fierce argument about terms of its fulfillment, which as a result took the form of the most serious conflict when on 15 January 1994 the sides failed to agree on the price of Russian gas.

On 20 January the conflict was squelched by raising prices, and the reconciliation process was continued by the signing in Leipzig on 31 January of a long-term contract between the eastern Germany company V NG and the trading house VIEKh [both firms as transliterated] (a joint enterprise of the Russian Gazprom and the German Wintershall).

The contract that entered into force on 1 February 1994 will run for 20 years. In accordance with the document, between 1994 and 1998 V NG will be getting 3.5 billion cubic meters of Russian gas (at a cost of nearly 1.25 billion Deutsche marks [DM] to the end consumer) annually, inclusive of the delivery of 2.8 billion cubic meters under the Orenburg Agreement. Beginning in 1999, the amount of deliveries under the VIEKh-V NG contract will be around 7 billion cubic meters a year (DM2.5 billion).

In addition to what it gets under the new contract, V NG will get from Russia every year 3.5 billion cubic meters directly from Gazprom.

The long-term treaty is supposed to rule out the repetition of conflict situations like the one that took place in mid-January. The contract designates V NG as the buyer of Russian gas, and a revision of prices is possible once the situation on the fuel market changes. The document is also supposed to put an end to uncertainties in eastern Germany's fuel market and better ensure the provision of energy supplies to that part of the FRG.

Ambassador to Luxembourg Appointed

MK0302152094 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 5, 30 Jan-6 Feb 94 (signed to press 1 Feb) p A2

[Unattributed report in the "Appointment" column]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] A reshuffle has occurred in Luxembourg. Aleksandr Glukhov, director of the European Department, has been appointed Russia's ambassador to that country. Author Chingiz Aytmatov, Russia's former envoy to the country, has received an offer from the Government of Kyrgyzstan to become ambassador to Brussels. The author, however, stated that his permanent residence is in Moscow and that he is in fact a citizen of Russia, while his artistic plans require his and his family's presence in Luxembourg. Apparently Aytmatov has obtained a residence permit to live in that country.

Silayev on Resignation as Envoy to EC

MK0302153094 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 5, 30 Jan-6 Feb 94 (signed to press 1 Feb) p A2

[Unattributed report in the "Resignation" column incorporating interview with Ivan Silayev, Russia's outgoing ambassador to the Council of Europe, in Brussels; date not given]

[Text] At the end of January Ivan Silayev, Russia's ambassador to the Council of Europe, tendered his resignation.

Democratic Russia's first prime minister, Silayev received the appointment to Brussels after handing over his government duties to Yegor Gaydar at the end of 1991. To be sure, Silayev's new post was a kind of honorary exile, but at the same time a sign of gratitude on the part of the president.

What is behind Ivan Silayev's resignation—dissatisfaction with his performance? another upcoming appointment? Our correspondent called the ambassador's office in Brussels:

[Silayev] I am not a diplomat and therefore from the very start of my work in this capacity I have regarded it as temporary. After all, before that I had worked for approximately 40 years in industry, which has remained my main sphere of interest. This is why when the president visited Brussels in December, I asked him to consider the possibility of replacing me. He promised to, although he said that he had no complaints to make about by work. At 1000 on 20 January, in Moscow, the president received me for a final conversation. I stated my case and he agreed. Therefore on 1 March I will return to Russia, and I am very happy about this. I am not hoping for any government posts; I would like to go back to the production sphere. Machine building and aviation industry—this is where I think my experience could be useful.

Political Issues

Only ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA Reporters To Attend Cabinet Meeting

LD0302141794 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1143 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] The journalists who gathered in the Russian government building on Thursday [3 February] to highlight the meeting of the Cabinet's presidium were told that from now on, only ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA reporters would be allowed to attend these meetings.

As we reported earlier, the post of this newspaper's director-general is occupied by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's former press secretary and advisor Pavel Gurin.

The government's spokesman told our correspondent, who was denied access to the presidium's first official meeting, like his colleagues from ITAR-TASS, RIA and other news agencies, that this instruction had been issued by Chief of the government's Staff Vladimir Kvasov.

He added that the results of the Cabinet's meetings would be highlighted during briefings to which reporters would be invited.

Our correspondent also reports that over the past two years this was the first time when the press was denied access to a Cabinet's meeting which did not deal with "closed" issues.

Further on Barring of Journalists

LD0402100794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0929 GMT 4 Feb 94

[Text] Moscow February 4 TASS—Head of the Russian Government's apparatus Vladimir Kvasov has admitted that he had issued a verbal order to bar journalists from the Thursday meeting of the Russian Government. An exception was made only to a representative of the newspaper ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA.

This action was reported by ITAR-TASS. It noted that correspondents of news agencies and the television were not allowed to attend a meeting of the Russian Government for the first time in the past two and a half years.

Dwelling on the motives behind this decision, Kvasov told the newspaper ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA: "The accreditation of journalists was all muddled up lately. Absolutely unknown people come to the Presidium. And then various assessments, views and critical remarks appeared in the press even before we began to discuss this or that problem. After all, a government meeting is not a show. It is serious, hard and responsible work".

Touching on ways to allow the mass media to objectively cover the work of the Russian Government, Kvasov noted: "We are ready to furnish them with all the necessary materials, but only after a final decision is made on the discussed problems."

Speaking about the February 3 meeting, Kvasov noted that "it continued for almost six hours, while some other meetings were even longer. And this time is sufficient for this or that minister to say quite a lot. Why must we disclose our kitchen. No other government permits this. Just try to come to such a meeting in France or Britain. This will, mildly speaking, evoke surprise."

Asked by the ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA whether journalists would henceforth be barred from meetings of the government's Presidium and whether this was fair, Kvasov stated:

"Whenever some restrictions are imposed, we are immediately accused of encroaching upon the freedom of speech. There is no such ban in the true sense of the word. We must merely put everything in proper order. Representatives of the ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA will be allowed to attend all the meetings, because it is a government publication. This refers also to ITAR-TASS. The other newspapers, the radio and the television will be allowed to attend such meetings in accordance with a newly endorsed list. But they will have limited access. The presence of representatives from these publications will depend on the agenda. We shall invite everybody to broader meetings, and only the ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA and ITAR-TASS To other sessons," Kvasov stressed. "The other publications will get all the necessary materials from the government's press service," he added.

Official Explains Decision

LD0302193494 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1315 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Today's meeting of the Russian Government presidium was accompanied by an unpleasant surprise for journalists. They were told that the press, with one exception, will no longer be admitted to these meetings. Here is what our observer, Valeriy Kiosa, says:

[Begin recording] [Kiosa] The decision by the Russian Government's chief of staff to bar the press—except for the government's own ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA—from these meetings also took the government's own press service by surprise. It had taken all the usual steps to ensure that journalists accredited with the government could get on with their normal work today.

So, how did the participants in the meeting react to this decision? Here is what economist Pavel Bunich thinks.

[Bunich] I don't think this is the right way of going about things. There are some individual issues which the press is not allowed to cover, and that is understandable.

[Kiosa] But those are classified subjects. Today's issue was agriculture.

[Bunich] No doubt there is some scandal here which they don't want to come out. The present situation in agriculture is the biggest scandal of all. We have come up against a brick wall. How can you bar the press from government meetings?

[Kiosa] Here is what Andrey Illarionov, head of the prime minister's analysis and planning group, says.

[Illarionov] I think this is absolutely intolerable. It undoubtedly closes off the most direct and clear channel of information by which the public and the mass media can learn about what the government is deciding and doing. Unquestionably this can only worsen relations between the government and the mass media.

[Kiosa] Naturally we were all interested to hear the views of Vladimir Kvasov, the Russian Government's chief of staff. Here is what he said.

[Kvasov] Work is done at government meetings. Therefore, the only elements of the media who will be allowed to attend these meetings are those which are accredited with us, so to speak. I am referring to ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, the government newspaper. All their correspondents will be admitted. Other representatives of the media will be admitted to the opening of these meetings so that they can take photographs. After the meetings are over, news conferences on the results will be held, if so wished. In other words, there will be plenty of objective information for the press and for the radio.

[Kiosa] You mentioned ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA. Will agencies like, for example, TASS—which is also regarded as an official government agency—be barred from the meetings?

[Kvasov] It all depends on what subjects are being discussed. Various different subjects are discussed at these meetings. If it's a question which interests a narrow circle of specialists, media access will of course be restricted. However, full information will be provided.

[Kiosa] The last point I would like to make is this: I am not of course disputing the government's right to decide for itself who will attend or not attend these meetings. However, I would emphasize that the moment which was chosen for this decision was not altogether auspicious, to put it mildly. As you know, many government actions are being sharply criticized at the moment. It was at this precise moment, when you might expect the government to have an interest in the fullest and most objective reporting of what it is really doing, that the government's chief of staff suddenly decided to bar journalists from the meetings—for good, or so it seems from his words. This is the first time such a thing has happened for two years, I stress. [end recording]

Decision To Bar Media 'Absurd'

PM0302172894 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Feb 94 p 1

[Report by Valeriy Vyzhutovich: "By Closing the Door to the Press the Government is Depriving Society of Information About its Work"]

[Text] A session of the Russian Cabinet of Ministers was held on 3 February in Government House on Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment. The following matters were considered: the economic conditions in which the agro-industrial complex will be functioning in 1994, meaures to maintain and develop small businesses, state mamagement of labor protection, progress in the implementation of decisions on overcoming the aftermath of the Ossetian-Ingush armed conflict, and also the government work schedule for the first and second quarters.

At that point IZVESTIYA is forced to conclude its account of the government session—the paper has no further details. The same goes for correspondents of other papers. Henceforth, on instructions from the head of the government apparatus, only the ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA representative will be allowed to attend Cabinet sessions.

The apparatus' denying journalists access to government news is big news in itself. As ITAR-TASS reported, for the first time in two and one-half years even news agency and television correspondents were barred from a Cabinet session. But we must be more precise: It is not the journalists, whom the government apparatus head probably does not respect, who have been deprived of information. No, it is society that is being starved of government information, its interest in the government having been whetted by the reshuffle and the perturbing statements by the premier.

Actually, that is probably the reason why the door was hastily and brusquely closed to Russian and foreign correspondents. Presumably, the kind of thing that another venerator of press freedom—Ruslan Khasbulatov—described as "attacks" and "subversive activity," advising the press "not to harbor any illusions about being a fourth power," will no longer seep through the narrow crack left for ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, the official government organ.

Were the questions submitted for government examination on 3 February secret? No, the press service spokesman who relieved journalists of their professional duties that day, did not refer to any secrecy. Which makes it all the more interesting. Even more interesting than before, when, whether approving of or cursing the government, citizens at least knew or could guess what to expect of it. Even more interesting, because at the moment few people have any idea what "nonmonetarist methods" of combatting inflation mean or how to reconcile the statement that handing out "preferential credits right, left, and center" is to stop, with the intention to issue them "selectively."

We will find out in the end, probably very soon. Closed doors, behind which government policy will apparently be conducted henceforth, are the most unreliable method of guarding against public and, as is the custom everywhere, critical attention to the work of the Cabinet of Ministers. This is confirmed by the absurd way the Council of Ministers has isolated itself from the press, a method borrowed from the practice of the unforgettable Politburo.

Gaydar Return to Cabinet Rumored

MK0302161094 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 3 Feb 94 p 2

[Unattributed report under the "Non-Stop" rubric: "Waiting for a Miracle"]

[Text] Gaydar's "third advent" may take place in the next two or three weeks. According to unofficial reports MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS has received from reliable sources, it turns out that the retiree may once again become first deputy prime minister and economy minister. Yegor Timurovich himself, however, said that for him this prospect was "big news."

Zorkin Views Problems Facing Constitutional Court

MK0302151094 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 5, 30 Jan-6 Feb 94 (signed to press 2 Feb) p A7

[Vladimir Orlov report under the "Court" rubric: "Valeriy Zorkin Wears Gown Again"]

[Excerpts] Former Constitutional Court Chairman Valeriy Zorkin has been fully reinstated in his rights as a judge—an equal among the 13. He himself assessed the event as "just and logical." [passage omitted]

There are currently three most painful questions before the "frozen" court. The first is about the time for being "thawed." This will probably not happen until two months from now, when a new law on the Constitutional Court has been passed (the text is ready and awaits its turn in the Duma). Second is the question of its chairman. Few people see in this post the current acting chairman, Nikolay Vitruk, who has lately proven himself a conformist. Valeriy Zorkin no longer aspires to fill the vacant chair. But it is hard to imagine an outsider [varyag] becoming chairman, although in the wings Andrey Makarov and Mikhail Fedotov are still being named. The president's obvious supporters—Nikolay Vitruk, Tamara Morshchakova, and Ernest Ametistov are so far in the minority. The third question is about by-elections. Under the new constitution, the number of judges should be increased to 19. All the "newcomers" should be nominated by the president and confirmed by the State Duma.

Valeriy Zorkin believes that the Constitutional Court still has a chance to "contribute to the restoration of a normal constitutional system." Talking with your MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent, Zorkin spoke for a "strong, capable authority." Asked if he implied a strong presidential authority, he replied: "Of course. Whatever they may say, I am a resolute advocate of a very strong presidential authority. With one reservation: in the existence of a strong parliament."

Valeriy Zorkin believes that the Court would be able to cooperate with the new legislative branch. As for the executive branch, "this is a delicate question, and I would prefer to skirt it." The ex-chairman now generally prefers to duck "purely political" questions: "This is no time today for showdowns. On the contrary, common grounds should be sought."

Information has leaked into the press of late that a "broad coalition of opposition non-radical forces" is being created and that Zorkin would probably come to lead this movement. He is not ready to confirm such reports: "When I read them, I was amazed. I am a judge so far, and I stay aloof from politics."

Counterintelligence Official Golushko Interviewed

PM0302130594 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Feb 94 First Edition pp 1, 6

[Interview with Colonel General Nikolay Golushko, director of Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service, by Valeriy Yakov; place and date not given: "Lubyanka in the Third Circle. Colonel General Nikolay Golushko, Director of Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service, Answers IZVESTIYA Special Correspondent Valeriy Yakov's Questions"]

[Text] This conversation had been repeatedly postponed, but the arguments presented by the Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS] were so convincing that I frequently had to agree with them. What indeed could you say when the president's edict abolishing the Ministry of Security came as a surprise to the actual ministry (at least that was what many of this department's high-ranking personnel said) and the structure of the new organization—the FCS—had to be developed virtually from scratch?

Despite having a host of formal reasons for canceling this, his first major interview in his new post, Nikolay Golushko finally named a specific time and the conversation went ahead.

It was a frosty morning, and dapper men filed from the subway to the main entrance of the new Lubyanka building in a hurry to start their working day and, judging by their numbers, personnel cuts are not yet over here.

After studying my editorial ID card and that of the photographer, the cheerful warrant officers at the entrance asked us to wait for General A. Izmodenov, the director's aide, to come down to get us. We went up to the fourth floor with him. There was a deserted corridor with the traditional carpet runner and locked doors on both sides bearing no name plates, just numbers. The general suddenly opened a door that was hardly different from the rest (apart from the fact that it was made of metal and covered in leather of a different color) and we found ourselves in a spacious reception room. The director's office, the windows of which look over the courtyard, seemed huge at first (when you worked out how many paces it is to the main desk), but N. Golushko was already halfway to greet us and our initial impression diminished.

There were a host of files of various colors on the desk. The aide moved some of them, the biggest ones, to one side. On the left there was a bank of telephones. The furniture and light fittings were not luxurious, but very good-quality and blended well with one another. You feel as if you are in an ordinary modern department (although not a poor one), but by no means inside a bureaucratic building with a scary past. The Russian flag stood on the corner of the desk and behind the director there was a picture of the president.

[Yakov] Nikolay Mikhaylovich, the Statute on the FCS has been adopted and approved by the president, but the crux of it is still unclear; are we to see it as a guide for action and is the Law on Federal Security Organs no longer valid?

[Golushko] The main content of the Statute on the FCS deals with the formation of a new centralized special service which, coupled with other existing structures, will have the duty of ensuring the country's state security. It is a question of creating this service in a radical, revolutionary way and top officials from the Security Council and the president's administration are involved in this work along with the leaders of components of the Federation.... The Statute defines the functional tasks of the FCS, which is transformed into a special service and will in effect cease to be a law enforcement organ.

Acording to the Statute, the task of the FCS is to work to expose, avert, and suppress intelligence-gathering and subversive activity by foreign special services and organizations and illegal encroachments on Russia's constitutional system, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and defense capability. The unified counterintelligence system incorporates territorial and regional organs in republics, krays, and oblasts and military counterintelligence organs in the Armed Forces, Border Guard Troops and Internal Troops, and other Russian Federation military formations. I would particularly like to stress that, according to the Statute, all FCS activity will be carried out strictly in accordance with the requirements of the Russian Constitution and the law—including the Laws On Security, On Organs of State Security, and On Operational-Investigative Activity.

[Yakov] Today are there any of your deputies or collegium members who are not members of these organs? What criteria do you use to certify them apart from the wide-ranging concepts of "sense of duty" and "loyalty to the motherland"? Has the presidential apparatus certified anyone?

[Golushko] The certification commission headed by O. Lobov is at work virtually every day from 1830 to 2200 or 2300 hours. Yu. Baturin, S. Kovalev, N. Medvedev, S. Stepashin, and others are on the commission. Standing orders have been formulated as well as the procedure for introducing the members of the leadership to the president. The commission has already approved the appointment of over 20 leadership personnel after conversations with them.

A commission has been set up to certify operational cadres, including at local level. All this involves more than just a formal examination of their CV's or personal affairs. Conversations are held with every staffer who is being considered for a leadership post. People who were tipped for top roles are eliminated. The criteria include the following: Job assessment, practical results over the last two years—since 1991—and any penalties or breaches of discipline. We see whether citizens have made any complaints about human rights violations by the person concerned. Our people's willingness to serve in any part of the country and work in the "hot spots" is also appreciated. After all, we have always had representatives of our central apparatus everywhere in addition to local personnel. Last year two of our staffers died in Tajikistan on an official tour of duty. Incidentally, Aleksandr Izmodenov, who met you, spent two months working in Abkhazia, cooperating with the special services, the leadership, and representatives of the Foreign Ministry, and performing tasks in Russia's interests. I could also cite many examples with regard to other regions.

[Yakov] Nonetheless, Nikolay Mikhaylovich, how will the new special service differ from the previous one if it still has the same people holding the same ranks and working in the same buildings with the same files, and the same agents?

[Golushko] What can I say? Only that the new generation of security organs in the new Russia is most likely still at school and studying at higher educational establishments.

We had a number of academy graduates, we have deployed 400 people. I think that these are the personnel responsible for the future. But an operational worker or a counterintelligence staffer, who generally has a knowledge of languages, does not drop out of the sky so easily.

I do not think it right today to reproach our personnel for the department's sins of old. They are not after all being certified for the first time. A considerable number of people were discharged after August 1991. The second phase occurred when the Ministry of Security was being set up, a fairly tough elimination policy was applied there too. Now yet another certification process is under way.

[Yakov] Some 45 percent of Ministry of Security personnel will be left out of the FCS and there is no guarantee that the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] or the tax police will want to take on your rejects. What does the future hold for them then, which structures will grow stronger with their experience—criminal or commercial structures, the parties of Zyuganov, Zhirinovskiy, or Barkashov?...

[Golushko] Every staffer's future is decided on an individual basis. Some will retire on a pension, others will go to the MVD, those with a knowledge of languages will go into foreign intelligence. The coming certification process should not be described as a "weeding-out process," much less should citizens of the united Russian state be divided into "them" and "us" according to party orientation.

We estimate that most professionals will continue working in new jobs in the interests of Russia. Our former colleagues' possible involvement in criminal structures can cause nothing but regret.

[Yakov] The experience of the last few years provides convincing evidence that coups d'etat and mass disturbances may be provoked not only by foreign special services, but also by Russian politicians. The Ministry of Security was unable to prevent the previous disturbances and coups, which department will now forecast and prevent such events?

[Golushko] In my view, one should not be so categorical in assessing security organs' activity to prevent what you call the "coups d'etat and mass disturbances" of the past few years. The law prohibited the Ministry of Security from operating in political parties and movements. However, top organs of power were constantly briefed on all anticonstitutional, extremist, and radical manifestations. Including on the "Barkashovites," long before the tragic events.

Today, in our view, one should not name a single organ that will engage in "forecasting and preventive work." The Commission for Public Security set up within the Ministry of Security can coordinate law enforcement organs and the special services, the FCS included, in order to perform similar tasks.

But political parties and movements must be monitored by the Justice Ministry, as envisaged by the Law on Public Associations (this pertains to the constant question of "political investigation").

[Yakov] Counterintelligence presupposes the existence of an enemy, whom your work is to "counter." But whereas previously any pioneer activist could have been called the enemy of the homeland, how will things stand now? Whom do you assume to be your enemies in distant foreign parts and will you have enemies in nearby foreign countries?

[Golushko] We are acting on a different principle and will not organize our work on territorial or any geographical grounds. Or on the basis of membership of a particular bloc. We will combat those special services that are conducting specific subversive activity against Russia.

[Yakov] What will you do with the NKVD, KGB, and Ministry of Security archives; what principle will you use to divide them up between the new special services?

[Golushko] A considerable proportion of the archive material has been declassified by a special commission—this includes material on the czar's family, Bulgakov, Sholokhov, Florenskiy, and Kozin. Systematic work is under way to transfer documents that have no bearing on counterintelligence to the Russian State Archive Service. There are plans for us to join other establishments in declassifying material on scientific and cultural figures during the totalitarian regime, on the state, religion, the Korean war, and so on. And, most importantly, to further review cases for rehabilitation.

[Yakov] There were only 19 investigators, conducting 400 cases, for the 60 vacancies in the Moscow Ministry of Security's Investigation Department. The vacancies and cases are now being transferred to the Prosecutor's Office, but investigators are refusing to transfer, what lies in store for these cases and the people under investigation?

[Golushko] Our special service is losing its role as a law enforcement organ, it is being stripped of investigation subunits, merely retaining inquiry functions [funktsii doznaniya]. Therefore around 2,000 criminal cases being worked on by the Ministry of Security (as of 18 January 58 cases, including eight criminal cases, had been transferred to the Moscow Prosecutor's Office, whereby 17 people had been arrested and it has been agreed to hand over another 220 cases) are being handed over to the General Prosecutor's Office and its organs at local level. To date 62 out of 76 FCS territorial organs have handed over material to the prosecutor's office. All military counterintelligence cases have been handed over. As for investigators, each will have an opportunity, if they so desire, to continue serving in the FCS after they have been certified.

[Yakov] What lies in store for your former agents? You cannot after all divide them up among the new services, it would probably be easier to put them on ice until better times come along?

[Golushko] Work with agents has of late been put on a legal footing. You probably know that a law was adopted allowing us to have confidential sources. It defined the rights and duties of citizens who cooperate with state security organs. I do not think that there will be any problem with them, especially since the size of the agent apparatus has been considerably reduced compared with the KGB.

[Yakov] So, the so-called operational reserve officers [ofitsery deystvuyushchego rezerva] will still be working under various "umbrellas"?

[Golushko] The institution of operational reserve officers or the practice of attaching [prikomandirovaniye] special service officers to ministries, departments, organizations, establishments, and firms is not our invention, but is used by all the world's special services—and fairly effectively at that. I can confidently say today that critical assessments of the attached personnel are fairly rare and are often an interpersonal thing. Our tactics for handling reserve officers and attached personnel will meet requirements and the tasks that the FCS can feasibly perform. Naturally, mindful of requests from heads of establishments, departments, and firms.

[Yakov] The Lubyanka complex, secret rendezvous, training centers, recreational bases, the Ministry of Security academy...—who will divide up this property belonging to the people, how, and between whom?

[Golushko] The president's edict has assigned the federal service crucial tasks, and the corresponding material, financial, and operational base will be needed to resolve them. What is more, the FCS safeguards the interests of intelligence personnel, border guards, and the protection service [sluzhba okhrany], and that is why we are not currently facing the question of dividing up the material base.

[Yakov] Sizeable expenditure is needed for the upkeep of this sizeable base and you probably already have estimates as to the FCS budget for 1994. Following the 46-percent cut in personnel, should we expect your budget to drop by roughly the same proportion compared with the Ministry of Security?

[Golushko] Of course. Spending on cadre pay will drop considerably.

[Yakov] What will be the resulting figure?

[Golushko] At the moment we do not have a budget and it is hard for me to give you a thorough answer. As far as January at least is concerned we were given funding in December based on the number of staff.

[Yakov] A good answer. I would even say a significant answer. Well then, could you be a little more specific and tell us how much a middle-ranking FCS staffer and the director are paid?

[Golushko] Let's ask now, just a minute. (He repeated the question down the intercom, probably to a financial expert. The following response came: "An operational worker at the center earns 156,598 rubles, but I did not make enquiries about the minister." Golushko laughed.—V.Ya.). Well then, that's what our pay is like. The director's pay is like that of any minister. Plus an allowance for rank and years of service.

[Yakov] Nikolay Mikhaylovich, your department recently made the surprise revelation to the press that last year alone the Ministry of Security arrested 20 spies and a number of top bosses were discharged following a Ministry of Security report on their contacts with foreign intelligence services. But no names were given although the press was very keen to know who these bosses were and the reason for their dismissal.

[Golushko] The former ministry of security did indeed expose a number of spies working for the foreign special services. A number of so-called "go-it-aloners" [initsiativniki] were also uncovered. Criminal proceedings have been instituted against some people and preventive-explanatory work carried out with others.

Where possible, we provide the newspapers with specific figures and information. I can tell you, for instance, that in January the FCS arrested a Russian citizen whose activity was doing damage comparable, from preliminary estimates, to that of the Penkovskiy or Tolkachev case. (Shortly before this conversation N.M. Golushko promised IZVESTIYA an exclusive chance to talk about this case. But during the conversation he regrettably confined himself to just a single sentence—V.Ya.)

We realize that journalists and readers need clear facts. But you must understand our position too, we can by no means talk about everything in the interests of the cause, secrets may be revealed in time.

[Yakov] Do you think that the FCS will be around for a long time or until the next election when our next leaders will start carving up the special services again, most likely in their own political interests rather than the interests of the state?

[Golushko] Sad as it is to admit, but your question does imply the corresponding answer. Although, as I have already told you, there is nothing bad per se in the special services being reorganized, and many highly developed countries are doing this mindful of the global geopolitical changes.

But let us not predict whether the FCS will be around for a long time or not. I think that everything will depend on how the service actually proves its effectiveness in defending the interests of the people and the Fatherland. And whether it will be "small change" in politicians' actions and "cops the flak" after they mess up.

[Yakov] Have you contemplated your possible retirement?

[Golushko] I see that as a natural process and I think that the time will nonetheless come in our country when a change of government will not be a supernatural event and the resignation of individual leaders will cease to appear a tragedy.

[Yakov] Thus I see that you are mentally prepared for that twist of fate. But what then—will you write your memoirs, take up political activity, set up an association to guard banks, go fishing?

[Golushko] I will not be setting up any associations. As for writing my memoirs, I have my memories. I know how state security organs work. I have personally been involved in operational work and in investigating a number of notorious cases, and I have been well acquainted with very famous people.... But I have not as yet made any specific plans in this direction, I am not in the mood.

[Yakov] Have you deliberately omitted fishing? I deliberately put that question to you in order to get some idea of what you are like outside work.

[Golushko] Outside work I used to prefer reading. I was familiar with and loved a great deal of poetry, in particular Pushkin and Yevtushenko. I don't have any particular passions apart from picking mushrooms. But I haven't seen any mushrooms for about two years now.

[Yakov] Nikolay Mikhaylovich, Zhirinovskiy once said that if he comes to power he will revive the KGB. If he does indeed come to power, how soon, in your view, will he be able to turn back the clock?

[Golushko] It is no longer possible to revive anything now, the things that have gone have disappeared never to return. But there could be completely new organs.

'Part Two' in Series Views Leadership Succession

PM0302160994 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 26 Jan 94 p2

["Part Two" of Natalya Kuzina series: "A Leader for Russia"]

[Text] **A Rival's Fate**

The story of how Aleksandr Rutskoy became an independent leader is not particularly original. But it is virtually identical to the rise of Yeltsin. Like Yeltsin, Rutskoy rose to prominence alongside the head of state. His policy was based on criticizing the president's entourage, but not the big man himself. In the same way, Yeltsin criticized the CPSU elite for a long time, while stressing that he and Gorbachev only differed with regard to reform tactics. The Army was also sympathetic to Rutskoy. According to one survey, he was supported by one-third of the officer corps. Not bad for a beginning.

Boris Yeltsin did not immediately win the sympathies of the military. Their friendship grew as resentment grew against Gorbachev, who unequivocally "betrayed" the Army: After the events in Vilnius, for example. Yeltsin, on the other hand, promised to show concern. It is clear from the fortunes of many of today's generals that he kept his promise after the Belovezhskaya Forest Agreement. But the number of dissatisfied military men is, of course, far greater. Rutskoy could perfectly well count on them to improve his rating.

Admittedly, he did not really have a ramified political structure to fulfill agitation and propaganda functions, if only along the lines of "Democratic Russia." The "Free Russia" People's Party (FRPP), only nominally headed by Rutskoy, was not noted for its organization. "Civic Union" hesitated to nominate him as its leader, and, moreover, was actively engaged in infighting.

The opposition's support was not so much unconditional as desperate. The hardliners still had not nominated a leader. Indeed, they could not. Only in propaganda folklore is it possible to firmly unite monarchists and communists. In real life they could only reach a compromise. Rutskoy proved to be the bridge they needed. But, as his popularity grew, these and many other factors moved into the background.

Two or three weeks before the tragic events at the White House, the "Public Opinion" Foundation carried out a survey to establish the degree of popular support for the various political blocs. The results were stunning. Particularly considering the election results. "Civic Union" emerged as the undisputed leader. It was even several steps ahead of "Democratic Russia" and "Russia's Choice." But, while placing a high degree of trust in "Civic Union," contrary to the true state of affairs, the population linked it to Rutskoy's name. On the other hand, at that time 71 percent of respondents were negative about Yeltsin's activity.

The conclusion is obvious: Aleksandr Rutskoy was very successfully ousting the Russian president from the public consciousness. If there had been simultaneous early elections, the idea of which was being actively discussed at the time, the result would have been predetermined. The events around the White House could not have come at a better time. One can understand the irritation of some radicals that Rutskoy did not shoot himself.

Was Rutskoy still a rival to Yeltsin? There are politicians who, thanks to their courageous behavior, have gone straight from jail into palace apartments. However, there are also those who have voluntarily left politics. But it is a fact that Rutskoy is not forgotten. According to the "Person-93" poll carried out by the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion, he confidently holds fourth place in the popularity ratings. His name largely helped V. Lipitskiy's victory in the election campaign. The FRPP, on the other hand—neatly blended into the "Future of Russia-New Names" bloc, which no one had ever heard of—suffered defeat. The FRPP now intends to take part in elections to local bodies of authority under its own identity and with Rutskoy's name.

However, was it worth Rutskoy's while to undertake such a dangerous venture as setting up an independent political party? After all, his fortunes could have turned out quite well. He was the first official in Russian history—and, according to the now abolished Constitution, the last—to be publicly declared as successor to the president. He had gained some popularity among the people, uttered a few words of criticism, and consequently distanced himself from Yeltsin, so all he had to do was sit patiently by, not thrust himself forward, and bide his time in order to smoothly make the transition to the president's chair.

Yes, but in that case the person would have to be a political sophisticate, rather than a military man like Rutskoy. Moreover, the traditional pattern of ascent is not in itself a guarantee of success. However the contender for the post of president may maneuver, whatever parties he may form, and whatever deals he may make even with the Army, he will nevertheless come up against the wall that is the elite. He could break through, of course. But that would require a revolution—even if it is a velvet revolution—or a military coup d'etat. A peaceful outcome is only possible in one case: If the contender reflects the interests of the elite.

Zhirinovskiy—A Shield For the Elite?

However paradoxical it may seem, Zhirinovskiy is exactly the candidate for president who plays entirely by the rules of the present elite. His views are its views. His interests are its interests, that is, the interests of big capital. That is the main point. Zhirinovskiy's criticism of the policy of reforms goes no further than criticizing its tactics. This kind of condemnation can be continued for a very long time with absolutely no harm to the policy itself.

As far as his bellicose plans are concerned, the "rush to the south," they are more a tribute to tradition. India attracted the attention of Peter I. Paul I could not restrain himself: He dispatched the Don Army to wage war on India, soon after which he was killed. The expedition ended there. The famous General Skobelev nurtured global ideas of uniting all the Slav lands....

Why should Zhirinovskiy not recall all this, and our elite as well? With its chameleon-like abilities, it is perfectly capable of speaking in a patriotic bass, even if it does concern such details as the color of television presenters' hair and eyes.

Incidentally, Zhirinovskiy himself understands perfectly well that, without the elite, he has no real road to power: Support for him is not so very great, which is why some extraordinary measures and Russia's desperate plight are needed. Is the lawyer's son capable of taking all this upon his shoulders?

The elite's position is no better: It has no one in reserve for the role of president. The opposition is breathing down its neck. On the other hand, Zhirinovskiy has taken his seat next to Yeltsin and Filatov for all to see. He has already done the elite quite a service by supporting the Constitution. In his own interests, of course. But it is ludicrous to expect altruism of a politician. Finally, no one before Zhirinovskiy has shown such staggering loyalty to power: to Gorbachev, the State Committee for the State of Emergency, Yeltsin himself, and even those in the White House. Having condemned the Lefortovo prisoners' opposition to Edict No. 1440, he now advocates releasing them. Zhirinovskiy treats power like a sacred cow, thereby guaranteeing the survival of the elite and its property in the event of his victory.

The process of adapting to each other's characters and interests is now under way. Zhirinovskiy impetuously demonstrates what he is capable of doing. The elite reflects. Zhirinovskiy says something coarse. The elite frowns in disdain. But it will also smile if it has to.

The Leader's Name Is Compromise

Of course it has been offensive to watch the new elite scheming against "outsiders" and trying to fashion a new leader for the last year or so. We can do little more than lament the fact that our elite is bad. But if we were to stage another revolution, we would get an elite no better than the last, and, moreover, with the same qualities and resources at its disposal. Why each successive reproduction should be distinguished by this permanency and how we can limit its growth is another matter. But the elite's job is to supply leaders great and small; intrigues cannot be avoided.

Another irritating feature is that a course rejected by society is being dictated to the incumbent president. Persistent efforts are being made to ensure that others continue this work. Not only various political institutions, such as the Army, are being approached for their support. History is also being brought into service. Lavishing praise on autocracy, attention is focused on the "strong hand" with which it so gloriously held Russia. However, the present power has forgotten the monarch's main concern: To try to achieve a balance between the passions of the elite and the people. History also teaches us that when the autocrat listed toward one side, the other side hatched conspiracies, rebelled, and sometimes carefully removed him or swept him aside.

Nothing has changed since then. The White House tragedy and the failure of reform stem from a disregard of experience. Having begun his political ascent from ruin, Yeltsin does not realize that the historical imperative has gone. The leader's task today is not to show superhuman qualities, but to master the art of compromise.

The theme of compromise is not new. From the moment it was formed, "Civic Union" reiterated the need for compromise in politics and the need to seek ways leading to accord. There is progress in this respect among some members of the opposition. Even the president has expressed a desire to cooperate with all forces in the Federal Assembly. It can be said that attempts are being made to get along with one another. The only exception in this is the main participant in the process, the ruling elite itself. So far, its backbone in the State Duma intends to demonstrate the principles of the noncontamination of the democratic ranks by the influence of extreme forces. Although, as is well known, the stance taken by extreme elements changes with time.

It is not just caprice, of course. These are the torments of Tantalus. After all, behind every compromise lies the need to moderate one's appetite in the consumption of power and make room for others in these very ranks.

But there is no going back. No less than 40 percent of the electorate in our country are romantics. The 40 percent who did not turn up to vote. The "left wing" and the "right wing" are in a hurry to enter them in their assets. A futile exercise. These people are not yours. Most of them say: "We do not trust anyone." So they are waiting.... They are waiting for the right person to come along. In a country which still has open wounds left by the destruction of a great state. They wait, scornfully observing the petty intrigues "above." They wait, with no future, soaring prices, and rocketing crime. They include a vast mass of people who know from experience how you have to go about begging for something. Where is the guarantee that this wave of desperation, fearlessness, and need will not one day surge through the country, sweeping aside everything in its path, to the impassioned appeals of the latest spokesman for the aspirations of the masses?

If the present elite is really an elite, its direct duty is to make room for others, cultivate a leader capable of balancing on the cutting edge of the interests of all strata of the population, and promote a figure on whom the main political forces will agree. Only then will they have to bury their vast talent—their ability to make our life hell.

If the elite does not do its duty, the time of noble heroes, the Minins and Pozharskiys of this world, will come. How do we know who they are? Where are they now: In the crowd jostling at the throne, on the barricades, on the firing lines of our divided country? There is no answer to these questions. These people will come like lightning, like a sword. When the time for compromise has run out. Or been let slip by arrogant rulers. When the country is not simply on the brink, but in the abyss.

Incidentally, Prince Pozharskiy was a Ryurikovich. With his services to the fatherland, he had every right to the throne. But, for the sake of peace in Russia, he spoke out in favor of Mikhail Romanov, a figure of compromise who suited the hostile boyar families.

To this day, historians cannot say with certainty where exactly this great man is buried. Moreover, doubts arose even during the reign of the Romanov dynasty.

Is this coincidence or the revenge of the elite: To wipe out every trace of an example offering the key to compromise?

Economic Issues

Shatalin on Reform Fund Economic Proposal

OW0302143394 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel and Orbita Networks in Russian 1945 GMT 31 Jan 94

[Studio interview with Stanislav Sergeyevich Shatalin, president of the International Reform Fund and academician secretary of the Russian Academy of Sciences Economics Department, by Sergey Lomakin; from the "Utro" program—live]

[Text] [Lomakin] Now as I warned you earlier, our guest is Stanislav Sergeyevich Shatalin, president of the International Reform Fund and academician secretary of the Russian Academy of Sciences Economics Department. The topic of our discussion, of course, is the report prepared by the Reform Fund and the Russian Academy of Sciences Economics Department, which is entitled "Social and Economic Transformation in Russia: The Contemporary Situation and New Approaches." As I understand it, it is an analysis of the past two years and a forecast for actions in the future.

[Shatalin] Yes, indeed, the report analyses what has happened during the past two years and makes the initial conclusions, that the tasks set by the government to reform our economy have not been fulfilled. I would like to be understood correctly. We—I mean myself, naturally, and my colleagues and work comrades—are all supporters of a market economy. These are not empty words and so I totally reject any labels in this regard. Problems about changing to a market economy do not exist. This must be understood once and for all. Nobody supports a retreat and there is no going back.

In this sense, as we see it, our report gives a fairly concentrated view of [words indistinct]. What do they consist of? We declare—or demand if you wish—that there needs to be a distinctive public agreement, a social agreement, between all levels of society on the social cost of the reforms. There must be parameters, such social indicators as living standards; spending on science, on health, on culture, on education; the employment level; and other parameters which any reformer in carrying out any policy, be it a monetary or nonmonetary or supramonetary policy, must not exceed. He must...

[Lomakin, interrupting] In other words, something must be immutable.

[Shatalin] Something needs to be like a wall which cannot be destroyed. It is a limit within the framework of which you have a right to act. Do everything else you want, reform the economy, but this is the boundary which cannot be crossed.

We consider that the people should be told honestly and frankly what will happen and when, without deceit, in a sober and calm way. I cannot say that we have said everything, but nevertheless we have outlined the main contours of economic development. We support the creation of a socially oriented economy. This is not demagoguery. This kind of economy was created by (Ludwig Herford) and economies of this kind exist in Europe and beyond. This is a highly efficient economy and in terms of its motivation and development vectors, so to speak, it is aimed at putting people at the forefront, at ensuring a social orientation and motivation. In other words, we would have an economy which clearly works to improve the standard of living and which organically combines economic efficiency and social justice.

It is extremely difficult to find a balance between these two facets. The world has searched for it as have entire civilizations. Europe, Sweden, Austria, France, and Great Britain are searching for it. And in this, everything depends on professionalism, not on ideological affiliations. Professionalism permits the fusion of economic efficiency with social justice. We support the idea of adequate government intervention, intervention which distinguishes between various spheres. The agrarian sector is one thing while financial and credit policy is another. Pricing policy is one thing while taxation issues are another. There are also foreign economic relations, and so forth. Adequate solutions must be found in various spheres and these are mechanisms of government regulation of the economy.

We oppose revolution. Enough. Whoever it is, I do not want to name any names now. I do not want to associate the reforms being carried out in Russia with any names. This is not the crux of the problem. The crux of the problem lies essentially in what we are doing. What we began doing in 1992 is, if you wish, a new revolution. Berdyayev, who I am very fond of, said that revolutions are never successful. The course of the economic revolution in Russia during the past two years shows that Russia's latest revolution has not been successful.

[Lomakin] Excuse me, I have to interrupt you since we do not have all that much time, but I have a question which I am simply obliged to ask you. I have the Saturday, 29 January issue of IZVESTIYA and its front page headline reads: Gorbachev Era Economic Advisers Propose Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin a New Life in the Old Style. It deals with your report, prepared by Stanislav Sergeyevich Shatalin, Abalkin, and Petrakov, but to put it mildly very little of your report comes through here. So this is the first criticism to be leveled at it. Have you published your report anywhere? Have you read this article?

[Shatalin] Yes, I have read it. My colleagues showed it to me today after their Sunday day off. It includes a lot of lies and distortions. It says that IZVESTIYA was the first to get this report. This is a lie. The first real copy of this report, not a manuscript of the report, was received by Russian Federation President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin on Friday, 28 January. Yesterday we sent this report to the Russian Government. The report was sent to the Federal Assembly and we plan to send it to all the papers, and so forth. I do not know how IZVESTIYA managed to get this report.

Moreover, you know, there is another unpleasant side to this. This kind of criticism immediately gives the discussion an unbusinesslike tone. After all, we are talking about problems which are vitally important to Russia and the people and this kind of criticism does not help a calm discussion of the problems. It creates a neo-Bolshevist tone. I would say that rather than write Gorbachev Era Economic Advisers Propose Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin a New Life in the Old Style, they should have written Enemies of the People Propose Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin a New Life in the Old Style. It would have given it more sting, right? It is understandable, because this kind of newspaper is already calling us enemies of the people.

Since you mention IZVESTIYA, I will add that previously I respected it very highly and the journalists and staff who work there too. You know that, unfortunately, now more and more newspapers...[pauses] I have forgotten its name. Previously it was DEN, now it is called POZAVCHERA [DAY BEFORE YESTERDAY], I cannot remember, or POSLEZAVTRA [DAY AFTER TOMORROW]. I cannot remember exactly. This does not do the paper any credit.

I do not know how my colleagues will react to this criticism, that is their problem. I am not at all surprised that certain names are being bandied around. The main thing is that this kind of statement is an obstacle to the real task.

[Lomakin] Stanislav Sergeyevich, would it not be better to wait until the specialists actually read the report and become familiar with it, until the president has familiarized himself with the report and the government and parliamentary deputies familiarize themselves with it, and then discuss it. I think that this would be the normal course of action.

[Shatalin] This is precisely what we expect. We are not monopolists. We write about this honestly. We do not have a monopoly on the truth and nobody else does. We support a really calm, professional discussion of this report without any political hysterics and, if there is anything sensible in it, that can promote the beginning of a real market reform of our economy, personally I would only be happy.

[Lomakin] I am sure that is exactly what will happen. Stanislav Sergeyevich Shatalin, academician and president of the International Reform Fund. Today we talked about the report which this fund, together with the Russian Academy of Sciences Economics Department, has presented to the top people in our state for discussion. Thank you.

[Shatalin] Thank you.

Military & Space Issues

Shaposhnikov on Appointment as Arms Sales Chief

MK0302145094 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 5, 30 Jan-6 Feb 94 (signed to press 2 Feb) p A14

[Interview with Air Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov by Aleksandr Zhilin, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI military commentator: "Weapons in Clean Hands"; place and date not given]

[Text] Under Boris Yeltsin's edict, Air Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov has been appointed the president's representative in Rosvooruzheniye [State Company for the Export and Import of Arms and Military Equipment].

This is Shaposhnikov's fourth appointment in the last three years. In 1991 he replaced Dmitriy Yazov as USSR defense minister; in 1992 he was appointed commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces; and since 1993 he has held the post of Russian Federation Security Council secretary. It is noteworthy that each time, Marshal Shaposhnikov has resigned at his own will.

Rosvooruzheniye was created under the Russian Federation president's edict of 18 November 1993. The company's main tasks are investments in military industrial complex enterprises, the export and import of military equipment of all types, creation of maintenance facilities and personnel training centers abroad, and so forth.

MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI's correspondent asked Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov to answer a few questions.

[Zhilin] There has been controversial reaction to your appointment. Some think that the president has entrusted this responsible post to you as a man not tainted by corruption. Others suppose that they are thus trying either to "buy" or "sell you out."

[Shaposhnikov] How can I be bought? If I was a careerist, I would not have voluntarily resigned my previous high positions. I have received numerous proposals to work in political and commercial foundations and organizations. But to me, state interests have first priority. Therefore I gratefully accepted the president's proposal, which I regard as his trust in me.

[Zhilin] Incidentally, about the post. Do you not see it as somewhat artificial? There is Rosvooruzheniye's head, General Samoylov, who is overseen by the government. Why then is there a need for a presidential representative?

[Shaposhnikov] In all countries engaged in exporting military equipment and arms this sphere of state activity is supervised personally by the president because it is so important and, I would say, sensitive. In this sphere, absolutely objective information is needed. I am ready to provide such information to the president, no matter what.

[Zhilin] What specifically will be your duties?

[Shaposhnikov] Arms export is a substantial revenue source which may not be ignored, especially under difficult economic and financial conditions. Together with the top Rosvooruzheniye executive we shall analyze the proposed deals from the viewpoint of their usefulness and profitability for Russia. We are to get a clear understanding of the situation on the world market, and calmly come to agreement with our partners in arms trade about Russia's place on this market. In a word, there will be plenty of work.

I shall try to do everything possible to make sure that Russia is not accused of unfair arms trading practices and that all the revenues are returned to the state treasury, not end up in the Western bank accounts of some dubious commercial structures.

'Irritation' at Grachev Seen Increasing

PM0302150594 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 3 Feb 94 p 2

["Own information" report: "Officer in Charge of Washbasins—There Is No Such Post in the Russian Defense Ministry at the Moment. But If You Went to School With Pavel Grachev It Might Be Invented for You"]

[Text] Sources in the Russian Federation Defense Ministry report that increasingly serious irritation at the minister's personnel policy is brewing among officers and generals in the military department. Photocopies of the biographical details of generals in Pavel Grachev's immediate entourage who have moved up the promotion ladder unusually swiftly for the military have been circulated in Russian Federation Defense Ministry directorates and departments and the General Staff in the past few days.

These generals include Lieutenant General Valeriy Lapshov, leader of the defense minister's administration, who was an ordinary senior officer in the General Staff Main Operations Directorate until 1991. He once studied in the same group as Grachev at the General Staff Academy. In fall of 1991 Grachev, who was then Shaposhnikov's deputy, took him under his wing, making him first a major general, and later a lieutenant general. It is confirmed that only Deputy Minister Valeriy Mironov, who at that time supervised personnel questions, objected to Lapshov acquiring the rank of colonel general. (He is not supervising them any more.) Today Lapshov occupies one of the key posts in the Defense Ministry: He largely controls whether a particular document or person reaches the minister. Among the senior officers in the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, Lapshov is known as a sociable man, an indispensable organizer of dinners for friends. It cannot be ruled out that this is precisely the reason why the equally sociable Pavel Grachev took a shine to him.

Major General Sergey Zdorikov, a career political worker recently appointed chief of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Directorate for Work With Personnel, was also a student in the same group as Grachev and Lapshov at the General Staff Academy. According to the recollections of his fellow students, he was renowned as an extremely undisciplined student and persistent truant. Now he is the head teacher in the Russian Army.

Dmitriy Kharchenko was also a student in the same group as Grachev, Lapshov, and Zdorikov. After the General Staff Academy, he was in command of a supernumerary [zashtatnyy] division near Nizhniy Novgorod for a short time, and then became chief of the General Staff International Treaty Directorate. He has neither a legal nor a diplomatic education, but he quickly obtained the post of lieutenant general and moved up to deputy chief of the General Staff, although it would appear that the post of chief of an ordinary General Staff directorate does not merit this promotion. The military department suspects that the explanation is quite simple: Kharchenko managed to become part of Grachev's family—their children married. It is now planned that Kharchenko's directorate will be given main directorate status, and he himself will be awarded the rank of colonel general.

Gennadiy Ivanov also studied together with Grachev, Lapshov, Zdorikov, and Kharchenko at the General Staff Academy. Before studying at the academy, he headed a group at an operational-strategic research center, now abolished in view of the fact that it was completely useless. According to his classmates' opinions, he was no genius, but, following Grachev's appointment as defense minister, the latter took Colonel Ivanov under his wing—and made him first chief of group and then chief of the Directorate for Military Organizational Development and Reform. This directorate was dubbed "Directorate for the Rising and Setting of the Sun" at the Defense Ministry. Within a short time Ivanov became lieutenant general and today is in charge of all questions connected with the reform of the Army. Everyone has the right to judge for themselves the results of his work.

Major General Vladimir Nikitin, chief of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Administrative Directorate, alas, did not go to school with Grachev, Lapshov, Zdorikov, Kharchenko, and Ivanov. Maybe that is why, having entered the Main Personnel Directorate as an ordinary civilian employee, he only reached the rank of major over a period of a number of years. However, the events of August 1991 were his hour of triumph—after spending three days in the "White House," Nikitin was invited to join the State-Legal Administration under the Russian Federation president. There, within a year, he became a major general (although, as his fellow workers joke, before he received his general's shoulder boards, he had never been in command of any larger troop grouping than a couple of typists), and returned to the Defense Ministry to head the Administrative Directorate.

People in the Defense Ministry recall that after Shaposhnikov's unruly democracy, Grachev's arrival here was greeted with enthusiasm. And at first, relying on comrades from Afghanistan, from Gromov and Mironov to the late Dubynin, he really was able to establish some kind of order and restore the practically lost command and control of both the troops and the apparatus. However, in time, some of his former friends distanced themselves from the minister, some were moved aside, and the posts of the closest advisers were occupied by other, more convenient people. That, according to one high-ranking Defense Ministry staffer, is Pavel Grachev's tragedy.

...The list of the defense minister's current entourage runs to more than one page. Reading the service records of the closest people, some people get exasperated and indignant, while others just laugh. However, in our opinion, it is more alarming that increasing numbers of professional servicemen, coming up against such cases, get fed up and leave the apparatus of the military department. The question "Whom are we serving?" is being asked behind the scenes increasingly frequently in the Defense Ministry and the General Staff. The technical elite—the purchasing directorates of the Defense Ministry: the Defense Ministry Main Rocket and Artillery Directorate, the Main Armored Directorate, the GATU [expansion unknown], and the 12th Main Directorate, and the chemical troops...—are being gradually left without work. The Army is being deprived of the most important thing—military intellect, which, despite the not entirely groundless jokes of the man in the street, did nevertheless exist. What are we getting in return?

Senior Officer on Army Problems; Grachev Criticized

LD0302165494 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1336 GMT 3 Feb 94

[From the "Panorama" program]

[Text] We are going to talk about Army problems. The point is that figures from secret Defense Ministry documents, published by the press in Moscow recently, have made us focus on all these issues again.

Let me recall some of these data: only 51 percent of the Armed Forces personnel and only one division in each military district are capable of waging combat operations. Only 20 percent of tanks currently at the army's disposal can be regarded as combat-ready and there are only a few Navy warships that are capable of complying with the Navy regulations governing the procedure of putting a warship in a state of full combat readiness.

Replying to Mayak correspondent Yuriy Selivanov's questions, Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed, commander of the 14th Russian Army, deployed in the Dniester region, confirmed these depressing data in a short interview.

[Begin recording] [Selivanov] The first question for Aleksandr Ivanovich is connected with his appraisal of the current state of the Russian Armed Forces and the military reform under way in these forces.

[Lebed] The Army has been pushed up a blind alley, carved up, and had mud flung at it, and this was a lengthy and systematic process. At long last it is as though they saw the light, not completely, but, nevertheless, they did see the light and it is as though they started to be more receptive to the Army and its problems; pay was raised and some half-hearted attempts to build housing got off the ground. As for the breakup, they did it fast, but to restore all this and put things to rights, well, time is needed here.

[Selivanov] The second question: Independent states have existed on the former USSR's territory for two years and they have been setting up their own armies for two years. If at all possible, could you sum up the results of these military developments in the independent CIS states?

[Lebed] I would not like them to take offense at what I say, but this signifies the Army's collapse: They destroyed what did exist and proved incapable themselves of preserving what existed before, with all the shortcomings—and shortcomings did exist, I am not saying they did not. They did not do anything positive, just put the finishing touches to the process of destruction and went about it with joy, as it were, getting rid of Russians, getting rid of all those who dared to think differently. This is a state of collapse—there is no army. What does exist are these decrepit forces of these apanage principalities, equipped with rusty tanks and combat vehicles, weapons that are not ready to do battle and so on. Well, this is my view now. [end recording]

Despite this whole unpropitious climate that now prevails, Russia has gained almost as many generals as was the case in the entire and huge Soviet Union, in all its 15 republics. However, if today's article in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA is anything to go by, it is the Russian Ministry of Defense—Minister Pavel Grachev and his retinue —that need to be blamed here. Quite a few pages would be needed to list this retinue.

Reading the service records of the closest bigwigs, some people get indignant and angry, while others simply laugh loudly. However, an ever more serious irritation at the minister's personnel policy is coming to a head, if one takes the officer corps of the Ministry of Defense as a whole. Photocopies of biographies of generals from Pavel Grachev's entourage, generals who, as far as the army is concerned, climbed the service ladder unusually fast, have recently been circulated and are being circulated in the Russian Defense Ministry's and the General Staff's directorates and departments. However, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA says that what is really alarming is the fact that, having encountered instances such as these, more and more military professionals are beginning not to give a damn about anything and are leaving the Army altogether.

Thus, the Army is being deprived of the main thing—the military intellect which, despite the not entirely unjustified jokes among the public, did, nevertheless, exist in it.

Working Group Considers Long-Term Weapons Program

PM0302140594 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Feb 94 p 1

["Own Information" report under the "News" rubric: "Session of Council on Military-Technical Policy"]

[Text] Moscow—A session of the working group of the Council on Military-Technical Policy under the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense has been held at the Ministry of Defense under the chairmanship of First Deputy Minister Andrey Kokoshin. Major defense industry scientists, experts, and representatives of military science took part in the session.

In accordance with the Security Council decision "On Programs To Develop and Manufacture Promising Types of Weapons and Military Hardware" dated 19 January 1994, an amplified draft of a long-term weapons program was examined.

Latest Military Vehicles Displayed

PM0302133594 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1435 GMT 28 Jan 94

[By Igor Krondo; from the "Military Courier" program]

[Text] [Krondo] The first phase of Russia's motor vehicle championship has taken place in Moscow Oblast's Bronnitsy. For the first time in the history of motor vehicle sport there was a display of military motor vehicles and technical servicing facilities, mobile workshops, and heavy traction vehicles with which the Russian Army is being equipped. Alongside the well-known two-, three-, and four-axled Mustang-class KamAZ trucks which won prizes in the 1992 Paris-Dakar Rally, new vehicles were also on display. They included high all-terrain capability wheeled and tracked GAZ-47 and GAZ-47-04 vehicles designed to carry personnel and light arms. It is planned to equip the mobile forces which are currently being formed with these vehicles.

Heavy traction vehicles also demonstrated their capabilities. They can easily haul a tank or a strategic missile complex from a battlefield, or out of crater, ravine, or bog. The pride of our military motor vehicle industry is of course the Vityaz range of double-unit tracked vehicles with a loading capacity of 10, 20, or 30 tonnes. Marshes, bogs, and quicksands are no threat to them.

They easily cope with muddy roads in spring and fall and snowdrifts in winter, and are able to float across rivers and lakes.

[N.A. Zazulin, chief of the Russian Defense Ministry Main Motor Vehicle Directorate] I can claim with utmost confidence that the Vityaz, which comes in the 10-, 20-, and 30-tonne version, is unparalleled in the world. Swedes, Canadians, and others have shown great interest in this equipment. Honestly, these machines are unique.

Mission Control Blamed for Soyuz-Mir 'Incident'

LD0402102194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0857 GMT 4 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Veronika Romanenkova]

[Text] Moscow February 4 TASS—The January 14 incident, which occurred when Vasiliy Tsibliyev and Aleksandr Serebrov on board Soyuz TM-17 spaceship flew over the Mir orbital station, was described by Serebrov in an ITAR-TASS interview on Thursday, as "normal" and the one which was to be expected. The spaceship "touched" the station because "methods for maneuvers had not been optimised on the ground". "Nothing would have happened if methods suggested by us were used", he said.

A special commission inquired into the incident. It has become known from reliable sources that a draft decision has already been prepared and will be signed in the coming days.

Serebrov believes that the blame for the incident is expected to be laid on the cosmonauts, whereas only one member of the commission met him to get first-hand information.

In the opinion of a number of experts, the psychological aspect should be also taken into account because Tsibliyev and Serebrov were due to return to the earth way back in November but had their space mission extended by almost two months (in all, they stayed in orbit for 197 days) owing to difficulties in the timely supply of booster rockets. It was literally at the last moment that the cosmonauts got an assignment to fly over the station and photograph it.

"The value the orbital complex has grown very much of late. Besides, it will be actively used to implement a Mir-Shuttle international programme. Therefore it is necessary to be very careful to rule out such incidents in the future," Viktor Legostayev, deputy chief designer of the Energia scientific and production amalgamation, told ITAR-TASS, emphasising that the station, which has been in orbit since 1986, is very reliable and withstood not only the contact but also a recent meteoric shower.

Nevertheless, Tsibliyev's and Serebrov's work in orbit was cited by space sector chiefs who attended a ceremonial meeting marking the cosmonauts' return to earth. The chiefs thanked the crew of the 14th main expeditlion for the succesful accomplishment of all research and experiements and congratulated them on being decorated with high state awards.

Tsibliyev will be 40 and Serebrov will be 50 later this month.

Federal Assembly

Shokhin Addresses Federation Council

LD0302152694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1443 GMT 3 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[Text] Moscow February 3 TASS—Russian Economics Minister Aleksandr Shokhin today informed the Council of the Federation, the upper chamber of the Russian parliament, on the government's plans concerning the budget, taxes, crediting, and the agricultural policy.

This item on the council's agenda has triggered rather keen debates. The council wanted the prime minister to personally deliver a report on the government's policy and to answer their questions.

Speaker of the Council of the Federation Vladimir Shumeyko told the MPs that Premier Chernomyrdin was expected to chair a meeting of the government today and then fly to Minsk. This triggered a heated discussion and the speaker was asked to begin "immediate talks" with the head of the Russian Government. It was moved to delete the item from the agenda if the premier refused to deliver the report. The government was blamed of disrespect for the upper chamber of the parliament.

Chairman of the Karelian Supreme Soviet Viktor Stepanov urged his colleagues "not to stir up passions around the government" and to hear the economics minister's information, as proposed by the government, and then, possessing concrete data, to hear a report by the prime minister himself. After several futile votes, the deputies decided by a roll-call vote to meet Chernomyrdin at any time suiting him today.

The discussion was interrupted by the arrival of Shokhin, who took the floor and informed the deputies on the government's plans. He stressed that the main trend of the budget policy would be to toughen financial discipline. The high rates of inflation during the past month "is not a result of the government's January policy, but of earlier decisions, and also of the political situation in mid-January, provoked by growing inflation".

The economics minister recalled that it was necessary to complete the privatisation process before July 1st, and to think over the next stage of privatisation, over the "effective use of joint-stock property".

In the sphere of social policy, the government plans to check the dropping living standards and to stabilise them. It is necessary to render effective support to concrete sections of the population. Shokhin admitted that the scope of latent unemployment was sufficiently large, noting that it was impermissible to stop enterprises in several sectors of the economy.

Touching on the problem of the rouble zone, the minister stressed that the merger of the currencies of cis countries should not be detrimental to Russia. He noted that firm negotiations were being conducted with Belarus, "marked by sufficiently comprehensive and tough quantitative demands".

The upper chamber of the Russian parliament took note of the minister's information.

Calls For Tough Fiscal Policy

LD0302172994 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1407 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Speaking in the Federation Council on Thursday, the Economics Minister Aleksandr Shokhin said that the Cabinet intends to pursue a rather tough fiscal policy.

He reported plans to pay 3 Tn rubles over the first four months of the year towards the state debt to enterprises, this is only one-third of the state's total debt.

According to his forecast, inflation would mount at a rate of under 20% over 8 months of this year. In January, inflation growth was about 25%, which the minister blamed largely on last year's decisions to index amortization deductions and raise a number of tariffs, as well as on inflationary expectations.

By the end of the year, inflation is to be curbed "down to 7-9% and may be down to 3-5%," Shokhin said.

In his words, the government will pursue a tough fiscal line, will oblige enterprises to account for all their expenses, and will provide funds only for concrete projects. The minister believes that this could keep taxes under control.

He spoke in favor of selective structural policy and remarked that over the 10 days as economics minister he could not be proud of the fact that centralized funds had not been spent where they might have done the best good.

In regard to social security, Shokhin stressed the need for effective help to the poor. He recognized as fair the IMF's criticism of Russia for its neglect of social security.

He spoke in favour of fixing an official unemployment limit. Official statistics put the number of unemployed at 1 Mn, but by other estimates, there are 4 Mn without work plus 4 Mn unregistered jobless.

On economic cooperation with CIS countries, Shokhin wished that cooperation with them to be closer "but not at the expense of our interests." In his words, negotiations are still under way with Belarus on how to integrate the monetary systems of the two countries. This mechanism, he said, is to be ready by the week-end.

Although Russia has a positive balance of trade with its CIS partners, Shokhin spoke with anxiety about the flow of capital out of Russia. He voiced hope that better legislation could return this money to Russia. In foreign trade, the government will continue the course toward liberalization, including the reduction of a number of quotas and the abolition of export tariffs.

Shokhin on the whole rejected the proposals carried in the report on the social and economic situation in Russia, drawn up by three noted economists Leonid Abalkin, Nikolai Petrakov, and Stanislav Shatalin. The paper "is appealing from the point of view of what should not be done," Shokhin said. But the proposals are too general by nature, he added.

The Economics Ministry will formulate a more detailed view on the report after its discussion by the ministry's board next week, Shokhin said.

Procedural Commission Chairman Approved

LD0302221294 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1807 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] At its session today, the Federation Council (upper chamber of the Russian parliament) approved the candidacy of Yevgeniy Krestyaninov as chairman of the parliamentary commission for procedural matters.

The parliamentarians also adopted an address to the president and the prime minister devoted to the situation in agriculture.

The address points out that "the unilateral approach to carrying out agrarian reforms, reduced to restructuring ownership of land, privatization and reorganization of collective farms and state-owned farms" led to a fall of agricultural output of 65-70% over the last two years against the average annual level in 1986-1990.

State programs for constructing homes, gas, electricity and hot water installations, building roads and developing the telephone network in the country have been curbed.

Due to the inadequate increase of prices of manufactured goods against agricultural products, virtually all farms went bankrupt. As a result, Russians have to consume less domestic agricultural products against the background of growing imports of foreign goods at the expense of destroying Russia's agriculture.

Members of the Federation Council called on the government to consider a complex of agricultural issues at its next session. It is extremely necessary that real aid to agriculture be rendered until the beginning of field work in the spring.

The session also passed a resolution demarcating the new border between the Ivanovo and Nizhnyy Novgorod regions.

According to the decision to send a Federation Council commission to the area of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict, the session formed a group of 4 deputies.

The session also approved a document regulating the implementation of the law "On guarantees and compensation for persons working and residing in the northern most regions of Russia and regions with similar adverse climate conditions." The document points to the need to strictly observe the privileges for the regions' residents envisioned during the preparation of the budget. The Federation Council will hold parliamentary hearings to look into the issue this March. A number of parliamentary committees will use their results as the basis for developing a draft law on the issue.

Chernomyrdin No-Show Indicates 'Lack of Respect'

PM0302170694 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Feb 94 First Edition p 1

[Aleksandra Lugovskaya report: "Senators Demand Premier's Appearance"]

[Text] V. Chernomyrdin's expected speech in the Federation Council did not take place 3 February.

The prime minister's refusal to come and give information about government policy was regarded by the senators not only as a lack of respect for the upper house of parliament but also as a political gesture.

It was maybe the first time the deputies had used such harsh terms in demanding that V. Shumeyko explain why the meeting was shelved. In response the speaker cited the most diverse arguments. Specifically, that without a discussion of this question at a special government session Chernomyrdin's speech would be of an unofficial nature and would reflect his personal viewpoint. That a session of the Cabinet of Ministers Presidium had begun on the morning of 3 February. In addition, it was learned that the premier is flying to Minsk in the evening while O. Soskovets, his first deputy, is in Georgia. And that Economy Minister A. Shokhin will speak in the Federation Council.

Shumeyko reminded all his colleagues that it is his job as speaker to conduct sessions and keep order, not to deliver the premier there.

But Shumeyko's arguments merely added fuel to the fire: Even sterner words followed from the microphones—about the Federation Council's role and place in Russia's political life. For example, a deputy from Udmurtia said that he is not greatly concerned by what is happening in Belarus—right now there is a crisis situation in his own Udmurtia and in Russia as a whole: "We want to know our government's actions in the next few days."

After a heated debate the senators again instructed the speaker to hold talks with the premier and to inform him during the recess of the house's insistent wish to see him on the Federation Council platform on 3 February.

Federation Council To Resume 18 Feb

LD0302230194 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1939 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] At its evening session today, the Federation Council discussed the status of its deputies and issues related to the maintenance of their activities. The deputies decided to return to the consideration of their status later, since the State Duma had not yet passed the law "On the status of the deputy of the Federal Assembly."

The session approved the structure of the chamber's staff and set their salaries equal to those of government support staff. Each deputy will have an unlimited number of assistants and manage a fund equal to 80 minimum salaries plus guaranteed bonuses and compensations to pay their salaries out of.

The Federation Council scheduled its next session for February 18.

The draft agenda of the next meeting includes discussing the findings of the council's commission in the area of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict, approving the composition of parliamentary committees, looking into the results of the activities by the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly and passing a plan of legislative activities. The Federation Council also plans to invite Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on the same day.

As was announced before, Russian President Boris Yeltsin is expected to make his annual address to the Federal Assembly on social and economic policies on February 18.

Federation Council Seen Sluggish, Bound To Divide

MK0302113094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 3 Feb 94 p 2

[Vladimir Todres report in the "Federation Council" column: "The Senate 'Has Not Yet Bestirred Itself.' The Local Authorities Will Not Miss Their Chance in Any Event"]

[Text] Here is the first impression from the second session of the Federation Council: compared to the previous one, where Vladimir Shumeyko just barely made it into the speaker's chair, giving out alluring promises on behalf of the president, now everything is moving slowly and sluggishly.

It was thought that the upper house would immediately "show its teeth" to the president, the government, and the capital in general. Instead the senate began to spend hours discussing internal rules of procedures. The apparatus officers consider this as evidence of "serious and careful work of true parliamentarians." Nonetheless, they had to approve the decision on Boris Yeltsin's edict on the state of emergency in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict zone without actually seeing the document: It was not even circulated. The famous proponents of autonomy, Yakutia President Mikhail Nikolayev and his Bashkir counterpart Murtaza Rakhimov, have not attended the high meeting for two days. Karelian leader Viktor Stepanov did not arrive at all. "We have not as yet bestirred ourselves," Boris Yeltsin's perennial opponent, Aman Tuleyev, admitted.

The general mood of the senators themselves was summed up in a remark by Novosibirsk governor Ivan Indink: "When are we finally going to get down to business? I am talking about the economy and the tax system." Irkutsk administration chief Yuriy Nozhikov added "questions of resources and export" to this list. Federation Council members are making no secret that in demanding a meeting with Premier Chernomyrdin, they seek to understand not so much the present situation in the economy as the intentions of the government and how far it is ready to yield to pressure from the provinces.

As Omsk Oblast governor Leonid Polezhayev admitted, the deputies' "abilities to protect local interests" would be greatly expanded by the creation of their regional associations. "Territorial factions," however, are in no particular hurry to emerge. So far there is only Eduard Rossel, who told SEGODNYA that 14 senators and 32 Duma members have joined the Urals Deputies Association he is setting up, while the Urals Economic Association has created within its framework a "foundation for sociopolitical studies," allocating it the requisite funds. The foundation, according to Rossel, will be responsible for "coordinating draft laws not only among the deputies but also those Urals enterprises that will be affected by these draft laws."

Other regions are in no hurry to unite. Even Irkutsk governor Yuriy Nozhikov and his Khabarovsk colleague Viktor Ishayev, who have actually proclaimed a "financial state of emergency" in their regions and stopped remitting taxes to the federal budget, prefer to meet with Viktor Chernomyrdin separately.

According to Mr. Nozhikov, the first watershed in the senate will be between the regional bosses and the few "dispossessed" deputies: "Unlike us, they are not responsible for the regions and therefore will start seeking a stable position in Moscow. This will be the fifth column of the central authority."

As for the local authorities, they are apparently bound to divide: the interests of kray and oblast bosses still differ substantially from the wishes of the ethnic autonomy bosses. Only after that will come the time of "territorial factions." It is important that these divisions will not weaken but actually strengthen the senate: It is all the easier to promote one's interests. the more conspicuous they are.

The Federation Council leadership has assured that Viktor Chernomyrdin will make a speech today.

State Duma Session Opens; Agenda Outlined

LD0402091194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0809 GMT 4 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow February 4 TASS—A regular plenary meeting of the State Duma, the lower chamber of the Russian parliament, opened here today.

According to the preliminary agenda, handed out to MPs before the meeting, the Duma is to hear an information [as received] on decisions adopted by the chamber's council, a report of the Mandate Commission on changes in the composition of the State Duma, and also to discuss a bill "on the publication and entry into force of federal constitutional laws, federal laws, and acts of the two chambers of the Federal Assembly", and a draft resolution to "ensure the work of the State Duma".

The Duma is also expected to endorse the composition of its delegation to a meeting of the Council of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly, scheduled to meet in St. Petersburg from February 8-9.

The agenda also includes the so-called "government hour", during which the Duma is expected to hear a report by Central Bank Chairman Viktor Gerashchenko and newly-appointed Finance Minister Sergey Dubinin on ways to settle the crisis of non-payments.

It is not ruled out that the MPs will also hear several political statements by parliamentary factions. This item also figures in the Duma's parliamentary agenda.

Aleksandr Yakovlev, the Russian president's plenipotentiary representative to the Federal Assembly (parliament), will be presented to the MPs today.

Duma To Consider Yeltsin Warning on Constitution

LD0402095094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0931 GMT 4 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow February 4 TASS—The Russian State Duma will discuss the address of the Russian president, in which he warned lawmakers against violating the Constitution, while adopting the permanent procedural rules, speaker Ivan Rybkin told the lower chamber on Friday. The discussion is scheduled for next week.

Boris Yeltsin sent an address to both chambers of the Russian parliament reminding them that, according to the Constitution, decisions are considered adopted if they receive support of more than a half of the total constitutionally-envisaged number of deputies.

However, while adopting interim procedural rules, lawmakers interpreted the notion of the "total number of deputies" as the total number of elected lawmakers, although several seats are still vacant in each of the chambers.

The president requested the deputies "to bring the interim rules in accordance with the Constitution".

Duma Postpones Debate on Amnesty Edict

LD0302133894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1143 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] The State Duma's Council, comprising its Chairman, his deputies, and the factions leaders, has decided to put off the presidential amnesty decree indefinitely. The earlier-set discussion date was Friday, February 4.

The amnesty declaration was prompted by the adoption of Russia's Constitution on December 12, 1993. According to the basic law, the right to declare amnesty rests with the Duma, the Lower House of the Federal Assembly, parliament in Russia.

Drafted by the Russian President's State Management Department, the decree provides for pardoning certain categories of prisoners, World War Two veterans and women included.

No faction has unequivocally supported the decree. Yegor Gaydar, the leader of "Russia's Choice," has suggested in an interview with Interfax that amnesty should be carried out in line with specific penal code clauses rather than categories of prisoners.

At a news-conference a week ago, the LDP faction's leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy reiterated his faction's call for freeing all political convicts and those jailed for economic mismanagement as of March 1985. "What Russia's president wants to do at this time is to pardon criminals," he stressed.

The faction of communists and agrarians intend to press for the release of all those charged for complicity in the events of August 1991 and October 1993.

Duma Economic Chairman Urges Tax Cuts

MK0302120094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 3 Feb 94 p 3

[Dmitriy Volkov report under the "Policy" rubric: "Society Will Choose Between Spontaneous Pricing and Administrative Measures. The Final Decision Rests With the Executive Branch"]

[Text] Sergey Glazyev, chairman of the State Duma's Economic Policy Committee, said yesterday in a press conference that he expects the government to work out a single program of anticrisis measures. Differences at the Council of Ministers are "a common thing," but they should be resolved "within the government," he said. At the same time, the Duma is in no way intent on "imposing on the government its approach" to adjusting economic policy. Parliamentary hearings on the economic situation and anticrisis measures in Russia, which have been scheduled for 10 February, will apparently provide the stage for competition among a number of draft programs.

Mr. Glazyev said that he fully understood Boris Fedorov's statement that he did not know "nonmonetarist methods of fighting inflation." "A finance minister does not have other levers but monetarist ones," he said, "but if Boris Fedorov were an industry minister," he would have taken into account the need to pursue structural policy and to provide government support.

Mr. Glazyev said also that the struggle of industrial sectors' representatives for raising customs tariffs was going on at the Council of Ministers. In his words, "as a result of the hyperinflation of the last two years and the artificial propping up of the ruble exchange rate in the past six months," Russian products have become uncompetitive even in the fuel sector.

According to Mr. Glazyev, "specialists and the industrial establishment have been particularly dismayed by the excessive tax burden placed on the current incomes" of enterprises. "A fairly chaotic tax system impedes the government's actions and destimulates production," he said. The approach being worked out by his committee will apparently call for cutting corporate taxes and increasing rent payments.

Sergey Glazyev is considered an advocate of the state's active intervention in economic processes in Russia. Among other things, his committee plans to submit to the State Duma draft laws on indicative planning, on managing government-owned enterprises, and so forth, and also to get around to devising approaches to Russia's pricing problems. Mr. Glazyev believes that "society has to choose" one alternative: either spontaneous pricing or an administrative regulation of prices.

In the first case, Sergey Glazyev said, it is necessary to carry out a regular general indexation, including budget revenues, expenditures, and the amounts of centralized credits. But we should take into account that in current conditions the period of "galloping inflation" may last "fairly long."

If an approach calling for administrative price regulation gains the upper hand, "prices in various sectors will have to be temporarily frozen, profitability limits established, and state subsidies introduced." Administrative methods, however, may turn out to be ineffective owing to "a lack of administrators in the conditions of a very loose executive discipline," Mr. Glazyev said. In any event, despite his own reference to society, Mr. Glazyev divulged that "the final decision rests with the government."

This confidence in the current government displayed by a moderate reformer, an advocate of structural policy and the reintegration of the economy by setting up financial-industrial groups, may be easily attributed to the similarity between his concepts and the ideas of specialists who drew up economic documents in the "post-Gaydar" government. What is disconcerting, however, is Mr. Glazyev's remark about a lack of possibilities for normal administration in Russia. It is unlikely that he meant lackluster or corrupt bureaucrats. To all appearances, the issue is the functional unpreparedness of the Russian administrative system for influencing economic processes in an efficient and rational way.

This means that monetarist declarations, made in order to regain the West's confidence, will also remain a "paper dragon" for the domestic industry, and structural policy will boil down to sectoral lobbying motivated not by the selection of promising industries, but by the struggle for survival among managers who have access to government offices. In Mr. Glazyev's words, economic activity in Russia comes down and, admittedly, will continue to come down, to the reallocation of state resources.

Duma Defense Committee Begins Outlining Plans

PM0302153194 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Feb 94 p 3

[Vladimir Yermolin report: "'Military Package' Laws in Line for Clarification. State Duma Defense Committee Starts Work"]

[Text] On Tuesday [1 February] a session of the State Duma Defense Committee was held at which the main areas of the committee's activity, its structure, and the plan of its work for February were discussed. A final decision on the main issues was postponed until Thursday.

In this case, the postponement is due to the sheer volume of questions under discussion—basically, the main issue revolves around conceptual approaches toward legal support for Army reforms. Three main directions have been defined in the committee's work—in the sphere of defense security, regulation of the Armed Forces' activity, and social protection for servicemen. Let us not go into detail for the time being, let us note merely that the parliamentarians proceeded from the formula proposed by Committee Deputy Chairman Aleksandr Piskunov that they should first of all plan what the Duma absolutely must do during its allotted two years. The priorities included an analysis of the Russian Federation president's annual message about the state of the country and preparation of conclusions regarding the part dealing with defense, work on the defense sections of the federal budget, amendments to the Russian Federation laws "On Defense" and "On Military Service Obligation and Military Service" in accordance with the new Russian Federation Constitution and the experience of the implementation of these laws, and also a whole range of problems to do with social support for servicemen and military pensioners.

The plan for February includes work to clarify the laws in the "military package," hearings into the state of preparation and implementation of the START I Treaty, and hearings into the prospects for the ratification of START II. New draft laws include "On States of Emergency," "On the Sale of Released Ministry of Defense Assets and Military Property," and "On Martial Law." The Army's mobilization readiness, the troops' morale, and a number of other questions also fall within the committee's purview.

Party bloc disagreements did take place, but Committee Chairman Sergey Yushenkov, like, incidentally, the other committee members, did not wish to aggravate relations. Everyone agreed that it was necessary to dispense with the organizational prelude and get down to actual lawmaking as soon as possible. Admittedly, a hitch nevertheless occurred when Yevgeniy Loginov, representative of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (and Yushenkov's deputy) started talking about the need first and foremost to define a position with regard to the military doctrine, the present provisions of which, in his view, suit specific political imperatives but not Russia's strategic interests. Supported by his party colleague Georgiy Lukava, he proposed that the committee members agree with the claim of the Geopolitics Committee to be the highest authority in the expert analysis of draft laws affecting the state's strategic interests. However, there was no polemic, because every committee has the right to state its opinions about a particular matter, and as far as the military doctrine is concerned, at some time or another they will have to come back to it anyway in their work on the Russian Federation president's annual message.

Duma Defense Committee Chief Interviewed

PM0202172394 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Feb 94 p 2

[Interview with Sergey Yushenkov, head of State Duma defense committee, by Oleg Odnokolenko; place and date of interview not given: "Sergey Yushenkov: Defense Should Not Be Subject of Political Quarrels"]

[Text] Sergey Nikolayevich Yushenkov was born in Tver Oblast in 1950. he graduated from the Novosibirsk Higher Military Political College and the Military-Political Academy. He is a colonel and candidate of philosophical sciences. In 1990 he was elected a Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic people's deputy. Since 1992 he ha been first deputy leader of the Russian Federation Federal Information Center. He now heads the State Duma defense committee.

[Odnokolenko] Sergey Nikolayevich, you are now quite a well known figure. Nonetheless his public statements give a very superficial idea of a man's inner world. What do you live by, what are your world view and ideals?

[Yushenkov] The answer to that question is a lengthy one. My views have undergone a quite substantial evolution. There was a time when I, like many people in our country, was carried away by communist ideas. Actually, even now I consider it true to assert that the comprehensive development of each person is an essential condition for the comprehensive development of all. It is another matter that it was considerably later that I discovered that this idea is not actually a communist one but rather a general human one. That became clear when I was able to read other books, not only the recommended ones, on history and philosophy.

Actually, the process of my reassessment of values was not that simple or rapid. Back at the Novosibirsk higher military-political college my comrades and I reached the conclusion that something completely different from what was written in the textbooks was being implemented in the country in practice. And we tried to create—this was in the second year—a "genuine Marxist-Leninist party." We even held several secret sessions with all the attributes appropriate in such cases.

In general it must be said that at that time secret organizations were a kind of epidemic. And specifically in military-political colleges. These organizations appeared at the Leningrad and Donetsk colleges and other humanitarian higher education establishments. As a result many boys were put in prison. We avoided that fate. Why? To be honest, we were frightened and took no further steps. But that is not the only reason. Even then we realized that there was nothing left to "perfect." The documents which we had drafted in secret with great exertion could be categorized as communist or rather social democratic.

[Odnokolenko] How big was your organization?

[Yushenkov] Big enough—about 15 people. What surprises me pleasantly to this day is that there were no traitors among us. That means we knew how to choose friends and even now we are pleased to meet. Incidentally, we dissolved our secret organization on a sufficiently plausible pretext: We said we still did not know much so we could not assess correctly what was happening in the country. It was decided that each of us must enter the academy because only there was broader access to the sources of knowledge possible.

That was somewhat naive, of course, but what else could be expected from young boys?

[Odnokolenko] But later you not only graduated from the military-political academy but also taught in it. Incidentally, what course did you read?

[Yushenkov] I read logic and dialectical and historical materialism but mostly dialectical materialism.

[Odnokolenko] How was a teacher preaching democratic convictions received in the political academy?

[Yushenkov] When I, for one, read lectures and said that we needed a multiparty system and private ownership for every possible reason, initially this generated keen hostility not only with the party commission but also with the students themselves. But later, when proof and references to the classic Marxist writers had been cited the tone of our talks changed. Of course, it was mainly creative people who entered the military-political academy, although they were adepts of communist ideology. If there was a need to investigate something, they would go to the roots, to the essence.... Only the most slow-witted resisted the obvious.

[Odnokolenko] Consequently we should not be surprised that it was from the military-political academy and other political and humanitarian higher educational establishments that there emerged people who were the first to criticize their own convictions?

[Yushenkov] Take the church. In which milieu did heresy first arise? Among the adepts of religion. There is nothing surprising in that. Who could know the true situation better than "its own people?"

[Odnokolenko] Nonetheless, when, at what time, did you finally burn your bridges, so to speak, and switch to the democratic camp?

[Yushenkov] In about 1987, after I had defended my dissertation, I began to engage actively in a study of the informal movement in the country. Just in case I thought up a "cover" for myself—I said I was collecting material for my doctor's thesis. But in fact I was meeting with likeminded people and testing the accuracy of my views.

[Odnokolenko] Which democratic leader of the time most influenced your views?

[Yushenkov] I am not one of those whose convictions can easily be influenced. I have never blindly followed any authority. Most often I made decisions for myself and made my way independently. Not under anyone's influence but under the influence of the conditions which had actually taken shape in the country.

But of course there was some influence. But not only personal. Do you remember what items were published at the time in newspapers and journals? How many disputes there were? Even the academy named for Lenin resembled a beehive that had been stirred up....

[Odnokolenko] Now all that is in the past. Big changes have occurred in your fate—you have become chairman of the State Duma defense committee. Incidentally, how do you see the defense committee in this scenario?

[Yushenkov] It seems to me that this is one of the committees in which an excessively politicized nature should not predominate. First of all the defense committee should accord with its main function—being concerned for the legal backup for the country's defense and legislative guarantees for the rights of servicemen and their families. Naturally the approval of the defense budget is also the committee's responsibility. That is perhaps the main thing right now.

[Odnokolenko] What is the disposition of political forces in the committee right now?

[Yushenkov] The committee has been joined by representatives of the Liberal Democratic Party, "Russia's Choice," the Communist Party, the Agrarian Party, "Women of Russia," and so forth. But to judge from the first sessions I hope that such a broad spectrum of political priorities will not have an adverse effect on our work. Since, as we can already see, everyone is well aware that defense should not be the subject of political disputes.

[Odnokolenko] What about the legacy bequeathed to us from the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet committee for questions of defense and security? Will it be suitable?

[Yushenkov] We treat with respect the activity of our predecessors and will try to retain continuity. Especially as Aleksandr Piskunov, who was deputy chairman in the former committee, has become my deputy. In brief, the good things worked out by our predecessors will be retained without fail. And the developments which they did not manage to implement and which are of value we shall try to implement, but with regard to the new conditions.

[Odnokolenko] But on the other hand not all legislative acts on military questions which your predecessors launched have proved workable.

[Yushenkov] That is true. So one of our priority tasks is to carry out an "inventory" of all laws, to investigate which articles are not working, and to decide what to do: Whether to back up these articles with the relevant life support mechanism or whether to alter them. It is entirely possible that they were adopted as it were in the abstract, in isolation from reality. In brief, we must investigate.

[Odnokolenko] I realize the question is probably premature, but anyway: Perhaps the present defense committee already has its own legislative proposals?

[Yushenkov] Yes, it does have such proposals. They are mainly connected with putting a more thorough legal basis under the reform of the Army.

[Odnokolenko] So much is said about the Army, and what is said is so diverse, that it is time to specify what content you personally put into this term?

[Yushenkov] The Army should become a professional army. That is already axiomatic. But the Army's transition to a professional basis should be implemented with a consideration for the real economic situation. Otherwise we will simply fail and our plans will remain only plans.

[Odnokolenko] As far as I remember, previously parliament did not always find a common language with the Defense Ministry. It was particularly difficult at first. Now everything is starting from the beginning....

[Yushenkov] Life is a complex thing and the future will show how our relations with the military department take shape. But the fact that from the very first sessions of the committee they have been attended by a Defense Ministry representative instills the confidence and hope that there will be productive collaboration, and we do not want it any other way. It is simply mad to work any other way.

[Odnokolenko] Yes, but in my opinion the problem is more complex. After all, you will have to check your positions not only with the Defense Ministry but also with specific state structures. Moreover, you will have to take someone's side on vexed issues.

[Yushenkov] In my view the parliamentary defense committee should not be a kind of lobbying instrument for the Armed Forces. But nor are we opponents of the military department. We have a common interest—the country's defense capability. Therefore, I stress once again, in reality we have one path left—the path of agreement and collaboration. Which, incidentally, does not rule out and in no way impedes the separation of functions.

[Odnokolenko] Although our talk has not been on an economic subject, we can hardly avoid this problem. Why do you believe the democrats have not managed to completely fulfill their economic commitments to society?

[Yushenkov] That is the eternal problem of the failure of aims and the results of activity to coincide. If everything were to coincide ideally there would be no problem. But that is never what happens.

[Odnokolenko] But perhaps it has all come out this way because the democrats lacked cohesion and purpose? For instance, when they came to power the bolsheviks—unless, of course, the sources lie—worked more harmoniously and selflessly.

[Yushenkov] That is probably not the point. The democrats in general do not know how to wield power. That is both their merit and their shortcoming. It was not for nothing that Churchill said that democracy is the worst form of government but man has not yet thought up anything better.

That means there is one thing left—we must learn how to govern.

Human Rights Commissioner Interviewed

PM0402095594 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Feb 94 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Sergey Kovalev, Russian Federation Human Rights Commissioner, by Andrey Sharapov; place and date not given, under the rubric "At the State Duma": "Vocation—Defender of the People"]

[Text] The office of the people's representative or, as it is now known throughout the world, the "ombudsman," was introduced in Scandinavia at the end of the last century and in other countries after that. The ombudsman is empowered to examine complaints by citizens and formulate recommendations for the resolution of disputes. In the context of Russia's law reform the State Duma has appointed Sergey Kovalev, the well known defender of rights, to be the Russian Federation commissioner for human rights.

From our files. Sergey Adamovich Kovalev was born in 1930. He graduated from Moscow State University's Biology Department in 1954, is a specialist in cell membranes, and has published around 70 scientific works. He began his public activity with the defense of genetics and articles against Lysenko's doctrines. He was an active participant in the dissident movement in the sixties and seventies. In 1974 he was sentenced to seven years for political activity and after serving that sentence he was exiled to Kolyma for three years and spent the following three years under surveillance in Kalinin. In 1990 he became a Russian Federation people's deputy and chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Human Rights Committee. He is now chairman of the Russian President's Human Rights Commission on a voluntary basis.

[Kovalev] It is very important that the ombudsman or the commissioner for human rights, as it says in the new Russian Federation Constitution, has no executive powers [vlastnyye polnomochiya]. However, state organs are obliged to examine his recommendations on complaints of human rights violations. The prestige of this service derives from the thoroughness of its investigation and the well balanced nature of its conclusions. Perhaps the only element which needs to be introduced into the law to enhance the effectiveness of our work is a norm on the right to publish our recommendations and the obligation of state institutions to give a public explanation of their response if they disagree with our conclusions. This guarantee of publicity will help society to understand the most complex conflicts between people and the state.

The new service is designed to protect human rights primarily against the state in the form of a specific official or a whole department. It is not a rival to the court or the prosecutor's office. The philosophy of this institution is to seek peaceful solutions in disputes between the citizen and the state, the gradual development of relations of trust between them, and accordingly the enhancement of the prestige of the agency [vlast] which has been created to guarantee the rights of the individual. I believe that for Russia the introduction of the service of the people's defender is especially timely.

[Sharapov] Might it not be that there will be an endless stream of complainants coming to you as they used to go and see "Kalinin, the sage of all the people"?

[Kovalev] That is inevitable although there are various devices to filter such streams. One, which I admit I do not like very much, is that of exhausting the other means first, in other words, this service is the court of last resort when all the others have been tried. I believe that given our bureaucracy this is not the best way. The urgency and social significance of the dispute may be important criteria although such parameters are difficult to formalize.

In some countries there are "specialist ombudsmen" on ecology, army matters, and so forth. Perhaps such a system will one day take root in Russia, too. However, it is important to understand that human rights are a federal prerogative and the commissioner for human rights must operate at federal level. You will agree that it would be absurd if there were different norms in this sphere in the different oblasts of Russia with each demanding its own ombudsman. However, this does not mean that in the Russian regions there will be no representatives of the service of the commissioner for human rights.

[Sharapov] Is it really the case that anyone who has a grievance against the authorities, including people in detention centers, can appeal to you?

[Kovalev] Prisoners traditionally form a considerable proportion of those who appeal for justice. It goes without saying that all statements will be examined. I believe that if the essence of a case is set out clearly and concisely all the necessary papers will be demanded when our service examines the case.

There are extensive areas of human rights which still seem to be in the shadows as far as social consciousness is concerned. For example, the rights of Russian citizens outside its borders. Our Human Rights Commission together with the Foreign Ministry is now drafting proposals to resolve this problem. There are sometimes the most unexpected clashes in the human rights sphere. For example, one Russian Federation Supreme Soviet budget virtually empowered local organs of power to levy a payment for education on citizens leaving Russia. The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Human Rights Committee had simply overlooked this little gem which is contrary to all international norms. I think that the Russian Federation human rights cpmmissioner's service will consider the whole range of problems of the protection of rights in Russia.

[Sharapov] But for work to begin it seems that the State Duma must adopt a law on the service of the Russian Federation commissioner for human rights?

[Kovalev] Yes, and this would be a constitutional law needing the vote of two-thirds of the deputies for adoption. The ratification of the office of the human rights commissioner by the country's representative organ emphasizes the origin of this office which, I repeat, is independent of the authorities. The president can and must have consultants in the human rights sphere although our service is designed primarily to protect people from abuses by state officials or structures. Of course the office of the human rights commissioner presupposes the cessation of party and other political activity, especially activity as a deputy.

The situation in the Duma today is complex and it will not be easy to get the law through. However, the factional structure of the Duma may make it possible and already is making it possible to reach agreement on the most diverse questions. I hope that this factor, together with the ombudsman's lack of executive powers, will reconcile deputies. Especially since they are the people's representatives and our service is designed to protect the rights of the people.

Kozyrev on Foreign Ministry-Parliament Links

PM0302140794 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Feb 94 First Edition pp 1,6

[Article by Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev under "Position" rubric: "Foreign Policy and the Russian Parliament"]

[Text] P.A. Stolypin is responsible for an idea which reflects the essence of the problem of Russia's foreign policy today surprisingly accurately: "If the state has healthy and strong roots, then believe me, the words of the Russian Government will sound completely different to Europe and the whole world."

Our diplomacy needs a strong home front now as never before. A major step has been taken toward this—the adoption of the Constitution. The election of the parliament may also create preconditions for strengthening Russian statehood, and consequently for putting foreign policy opportunities and the work of the past two years into practice, and for completing the arsenal of the Russian state's diplomacy.

Continuation of Partnership or "Imperial" Impasse?

The main result of the implementation of the president's foreign policy is the fact that at a turning point in its history, in the face of the collapse of the communist system and the disintegration of the USSR, Russia has not found itself in the position of a social outcast on the international arena, as was the case in 1917.

The fact that we managed to avoid the worst—a repetition of the Yugoslav tragedy on the territory of a nuclear superpower—happened because we did not take the "imperial" path, we did not start trying to restore a union state by force or redraw the borders. We also rejected appeals of the opposite sort—to distance ourselves from the problems of the former Union altogether and withdraw into isolation. A difficult path, but ultimately the only sensible one, was chosen—to consistently develop the post-Soviet area by developing the CIS. Today, despite all the difficulties of the formation of the Commonwealth, it is proving possible to move gradually toward closer cooperation in politics and resolve old and new problems in a civilized way within its framework.

Are there ways of more effectively protecting our interests in nearby foreign parts? In any case, our diplomacy is constantly seeking them out. But only within the framework of a principled choice in favor of advancing national interests via partnership rather than confrontation, and via direct observance of international law. To betray this choice for the sake of attempts to realize the myth of "reviving the empire" by force, not to mention delirious ideas about a "dash toward the warm seas," would mean once again setting yourself in confrontation with the whole world, and returning to the "besieged fortress" policy. This would mean transforming foreign policy from an important source of help in implementing reforms into a superfluous load aggravating the country's already serious internal problems, and indeed capable of sinking the country altogether.

Clearly, such adventurism would immediately and acutely complicate the situation of Russians in the former Union republics, and a new wave of refugees would inundate Russia. Maybe that is what supporters of the "imperial" policy need in order to obtain a pretext for "restoring order" in Russia itself?

Meanwhile, the interests of our compatriots in the former republics can only be ensured if internationally recognized standards in the sphere of human rights and the rights of ethnic minorities are observed throughout the area of the former USSR. With this aim in mind we have already concluded dozens of bilateral and multilateral agreements with our CIS partners. It was on our initiative that the Declaration on International Commitments in the Sphere of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms was adopted in the CIS, and the Commission for Human Rights set up. We take a tough line on any violations of the lawful interests of our fellow countrymen, and we invite international organizations and partners in other foreign countries to participate in the work of defending them.

However, it must be admitted that at the political level our understanding of the acuteness of the problems of the Russian-speaking population is being transformed too slowly and with too much difficulty into the creation of effective mechanisms for solving them.

Which direction we will move in—toward fascism or, conversely, toward stability and democracy in our society—will depend largely on how responsible and far-sighted our parliamentarians are with regard to the problem of the Russian-speaking population. We have to start with ourselves. And obviously not with irresponsible statements insulting the honor of entire nations and provoking discrimination against the Russian-speaking minority, but with setting an example of a consistent battle against chauvinism and ethnic hatred. For example, the Federal Assembly could express itself in one form or another in support of the **Declaration on**

Aggressive Nationalism, Racism, Chauvinism, Xenophobia, and Anti-Semitism, adopted on Russia's initiative by the foreign ministers of CSCE member states in December of last year. This would be a good signal both internally and externally.

For the first time in Russia's history it has neither immediate nor even potential military adversaries. This creates the preconditions for a significant reduction in the burden of defense expenditure, which is particularly important at the initial, most complex phase of economic reforms.

However, threats of a new type have appeared which demand the strengthening of democratic statehood, the creation of economic, effective, and mobile armed forces. I refer to local conflicts, particularly in the CIS, the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and international terrorism.

We are already resolving many tasks concerning the prevention and settlement of armed conflicts near our borders with the help of the United Nations and the CSCE. We are seeking the expansion of aid to the Russian peacekeeping effort on the part of the world community on the basis of the reality of Russia's special interests and responsibility. Neither we nor our partners in the CIS can accept the "residual principle" which the United Nations still espouses in allocating the organization's resources for peacekeeping aims in the Commonwealth.

But these efforts of ours can be effective only if they given society's firm support. Extremist appeals to either abandon everything and pull out of the conflict zones in the CIS, or else "establish order" by force do damage to both Russia's actual peacekeeping mission and also to the world community's perception of our aims in the nearby foreign countries.

Russia is reaching the level of mature partnership with the leading democratic states of the world. This is directly enshrined in very important documents concluded with the FRG, France, Britain, the United States, Sweden, Denmark, and a number of other states.

Thanks to partnership relations with the West, we have entered key world economic organizations. Although the rate of cooperation falls short of what we would desire, we have nevertheless recently received soft loans to the tune of $2.5 billion from the IMF alone, and preferential credits to the tune of $0.6 billion from the World Bank. It is time to proceed further without artificial delays.

Russian foreign policy has saved the country from falling into the abyss of international financial bankruptcy, on the brink of which the former Soviet Union stood. We have received a 10-year deferment from the Paris Club on payments due for 1992-1993 on the former USSR's foreign debt totaling $15 billion. The London Club has granted us a five-year deferment on the sum of $3 billion.

It is specifically the new nature of relations with the West that permits us to defend Russia's lawful interests in the sphere of security, the economy, trade, and so on, increasingly actively. Amid political tension, this would be even more difficult.

We are striving for Russia's political interests to be taken into account as well. A typical example is the recent adoption by NATO countries of the "Partnership for Peace" concept instead of the immediate extension of NATO membership to the borders of the CIS. Cooperation between Russia and the United States helped to achieve the trilateral agreement on the full elimination of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

The mechanism of new ties with the West is still far from being perfect. So far no "consultation reflex" has yet been developed, which would ensure timely consideration of mutual interests in an uninterrupted fashion. In a number of situations—Tajikistan, Georgia, and Yugoslavia—we have had to exert a lot of effort to ensure Russia's position and the understanding and assistance of the United Nations and the CSCE. We are proposing to the "Big Seven" and other leading powers that a strategy of mature partnership of a long-term nature be coordinated.

It is equally ridiculous to set the rapprochement with the West against the development of Russia's relations with Eastern states, and with the development of its relations with CIS countries. On the contrary, a serious positive potential in mutual relations with the great Asian powers—China, India, and Japan—is being created. Diplomacy has "discovered" new partners for Russian business, including in the sphere of military-technical cooperation—South Korea, ASEAN, and the states of the Persian Gulf.

Obviously Russia's attractiveness both for the West and for the East depends in many respects on the stability and predictability of our internal situation. No one will invest in a country where there is great uncertainty. The sooner we adopt laws which meet the needs of the market economy, the faster will be the rate and volume of the trade and economic cooperation with foreign countries that is so vital to us today.

Diplomacy Needs Support From the Legislators

In foreign policy matters, the stance that the Federal Assembly occupies will to a great extent determine the face that Russia shows to the world—the face of the unpredictable "sick man" of Europe and Asia, or that of a great Eurasian power and a responsible and reliable partner.

The Foreign Ministry sees the Federal Assembly as a state institution capable of ensuring, within the limits of its competence, a reliable legal base for our foreign policy, and assisting the government in implementing laws affecting Russia's interests and in complying with international treaties. We are also hoping for constructive dialogue on the best paths our activities should take.

The Supreme Soviet also had the chance to become a serious state institution, but, unfortunately, it was not taken up. The Foreign Ministry unfailingly strove for cooperation. During the initial phase of the Supreme Soviet's work, this was to some paid off. However, as its confrontation with the executive grew, the discussion of foreign policy questions increasingly turned into a settling of ideological scores. Unfortunately, even today, side by side with the pseudopatriotic extremism, it not been possible to eliminate the lingering bombast, personal arrogance, and unprincipled compromises which are being passed off as centrism. Both as a State Duma deputy and as a minister I will not make concessions to those who want to push Russian diplomacy onto the track of imperial "anti-Western" or aggressively nationalist policy which would inevitably lead the country to a catastrophe. At the same time, I am prepared to cooperate with any critics or political trends in the interests of patriotic, open, and professional foreign policy.

What could constitute a responsible foreign policy agenda for the new parliament?

First of all, the ratification of around 60 treaties that the Supreme Soviet did not examine. These include major ones such as the START II Treaty, and agreements on legal aid and military and economic cooperation with CIS countries.

Second, the adoption of laws providing for the efficient work of Russia's foreign policy mechanism. This means a law on the Russian Federation's international treaties, a law on the diplomatic service, and the Consular Regulations. We are also counting on constructive consultations during the preparation of the president's decisions on appointing Russian ambassadors and representatives at international organizations (in accordance with Article 83 of the Russian Federation Constitution).

Third, the adoption of laws providing backup for Russia's foreign economic ties, such as a law on the continental shelf and the economic zone, and a law on the export of weapons and military hardware.

Fourth, the elaboration of new laws or the amendment of existing ones in the humanitarian sphere. The section on dual citizenship in the Law on Citizenship must be brought into line with the new Constitution.

The creation of a statewide program of support for the Russian-speaking population in CIS countries is particularly urgent. Our compatriots' rights will only be reliably ensured when their economic future is guaranteed and the conditions for maintaining their native language and culture are created.

The scale of this problem means that the efforts of the Foreign Ministry or the immigration service alone are insufficient. A special department is needed which would shoulder the entire set of questions concerning the protection of the rights and interests of our compatriots in nearby and more distant foreign countries.

Fifth, the creation of legislation ensuring Russia's participation in peacekeeping activity, including at UN, CSCE, and CIS level. It is time to define the legal basis for the presence of Russia's troops abroad, on a treaty basis, of course, and in line with the principle of [military] bases.

Sixth, the parliament could, in accordance with the Constitution, support the desire of the Russian regions to make use of the advantages of cooperation with other states. Institutions for regional cooperation in the Black Sea, Baltic, and Barents-Euro-Arctic regions have been created with Russia's active participation. It is high time for there to be analogous structures in the Far East for ties with the PRC and Japan.

At the same time, legal frameworks for regional foreign activity are needed, as well as a clear-cut division of prerogatives and functions with federal organs in the interests of the state's unity. After all, the more powerful Russia is as an international partner, the more profitable it will be for its regions to conduct business abroad too.

Seventh, parliamentary ties. Regular day-to-day, rather than ostentatious, work with the parliamentarians, particularly with our neighbors, can supplement the foreign policy work of the president and the government, first and foremost in protecting the rights of millions of our compatriots in former Soviet republics. The status of foreigners in Russia should also be brought into line with international standards, by adopting a relevant law for this purpose.

Today we are investing the prestige of the president's foreign policy in the present and future of Russia as a great power. The entire gamut of the new opportunities for cooperation which have been accumulated at political level must be placed at the service of resolving our internal problems, primarily economic ones. This is a statewide task. National interests, rather than narrow party interests, should serve as the guideline here. In resolving this task, parliamentarians will have a reliable ally in diplomacy.

Regional Affairs

North Ossetia Situation Reportedly Stabilizing

LD0402135794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1229 GMT 4 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Shanayev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz February 4 TASS—The situation in North Ossetia, where the state of emergency has been prolonged by Russian President Boris Yeltsin's decree for another two months, is stabilizing.

According to military sources, no clashes on ethnic grounds have been reported in more than 24 hours. Russia's peace keepers jointly with local law enforcement agencies are maintaining the state of emergency.

North Ossetian Parliament Chairman Yuriy Biragov today presided over a session of the republic's commission on restructuring the bodies of state authority and local government in line with the Russian president's decree.

Commission members discussed reforms in the republic, the structure of the future parliament and elections to local self government agencies. Its proposals will be submitted to the republic's parliament for consideration.

Chechnya Prepared To Help Stabilize Caucasus

LD0402142094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1151 GMT 4 Feb 94

[Text] Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev said that secession of North Caucasus from Russia was a real threat. He emphasized in an interview with INTERFAX that this was likely to happen unless Russia ceased to use force and blackmail and started to use diplomacy and negotiations in its relations with the mountain nations.

He thinks that Russia is encouraged in its ill-conceived North Caucasian policy by "certain quarters in the West who want Russia to disintegrate and lose statehood."

Dudayev believes that the abundance of weapons and uncontrolled militias had contributed to making the region unmanageable. This situation affects Russia itself.

He said that "weapons are moving from the Caucasus into the depths of Russia where armed fascist and nationalist bands are formed."

In Dudayev's view, "this complicated situation is likely to aggravate, making a new Caucasian war possible. Those in the Russian leadership who play into the hands of the West and lead Russia to a collapse while making a lot of noise about keeping it united and indivisible have a significant role to play in this process."

He said that Chechnya was prepared to look, jointly with Russia, for ways to stabilize the Caucasus.

'Terrorist' Ultimatum on Yakutsk Expires

LD0402110594 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1026 GMT 4 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Moscow February 4 TASS—The Siberian city of Yakutsk is heavily guarded on Friday as an ultimatum to explode its major infrastructure facilites received from an unknown terrorist group expires.

A group called "Retribution", of which nobody had ever heard in Yakutsk, demanded to be paid 500,000 US dollars and 500 million rubles threatening to explode life-supporting facilities of the city.

The Russian Interior Ministry told TASS that police in Yakutsk believe the threat is just a bluff; however, army experts joined police in a search for explosives. Special headquarters were created to monitor the situation and reinforced police units are patrolling the city.

Everything was quiet in Yakutsk as for 18.00 hours local time, Mayor Aleksey Tomtosov told TASS by telephone adding that all important objects are heavily guarded.

Rostov Leaders' Decision on Elections Protested

PM0402114794 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Feb 94 First Edition p 2

[Report by Vadim Ogurtsov: "'Don's Choice' Protests"]

[Text] The inner soviet and administration of the Don have adopted a decision on elections to representative bodies of state power in Rostov Oblast and organs of local self-government. But the "Russia's Choice" territorial bloc, which calls itself "Don's Choice" here, has very strongly protested the Statutes on Elections to the Legislative Assembly, approved by an oblast inner soviet decision. In the first place, State Duma deputy B. Titenko and other members of the bloc's regional political council stressed at a press conference, the inner soviet "adopted" this document after the new Russian Constitition depriving the old structure of its last juridical rights and powers had come into effect. According to the political council, the situation is not remedied by the "invitation to representatives of parties and movements," which was essentially a variation on "nationwide discussion." The Soviet's decision and confirmation followed as before.

The blatant breach of the principle of separation of powers, since the "statutes," even at local level, do not allow a deputy's duties to be combined with work in the executive organs of power, is described as the second flaw.

Vladimir Oblast Approves Duma Statutes

PM0402100794 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Feb 94 First Edition p 2

[Report by Yuriy Shatalov: "Vladimir Preparations"]

[Text] Vladimir Oblast Administration Chief Yu. Vlasov has approved statutes for an Oblast Duma and elections to it.

The draft of this document was first discussed in detail at an oblast assembly of representatives of various parties, movements, and other public organizations, and also power structures. There were major objections from assembly participants to the administration's proposal to elect 17 deputies to the future Duma who would work on a permanent basis. In that case, the opponents claimed, not all Vladimir Oblast rayons would be represented in it, not to mention the fact that it would have to operate without standing commissions. But, apparently, the representative body henceforth will operate without standing commissions, since the final version of the statutes on the Oblast Duma provides for 21 deputies.

The original draft statutes on elections also underwent significant changes. Now someone wishing to register as a candidate in an electoral district requires not three but only two percent of voters' signatures in his favor. According to the statutes, groups of voters, public associations, and individuals are entitled to nominate a candidate.

Navy Denies Kronshtadt Base To Be Relocated

PM0302152194 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Feb 94 First Edition p 2

[Sergey Krayukhin report: "Kronshtadt Remains Russian Naval Base"]

[Excerpts] A report on an "Ostankino" television and radio company program and in other organs of the mass media stated that during B.N. Yeltsin's visit to St. Petersburg the Russian Federation president and the city Mayor A. Sobchak discussed the future prospects for turning Kronshtadt into a free economic zone and in this connection the naval base's relocation. [passage omitted]

Editorial note: On the basis of information from sources within the Russian Navy Main Staff, IZVESTIYA has been informed that as yet no specific decision has been made concerning Kronshtadt. Relocating this naval base really does require enormous resources which nobody has appropriated, and nobody has produced a plan to set up a base in another location. Such an order has not been given. Kronshtadt will remain a Russian naval base for a long time to come.

Kamchatka Militia Commander on Recruitment

OW0302143694 Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy Radio Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy Network in Russian 1830 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Report on interview with Yuriy Alekseyevich Bondazhevskiy, internal troops unit commander, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given; from the "Kamchatka News" program]

[Text] The new recruits for the special motorized units of the internal troops were sworn in on 23 January. The soldiers will begin independent patrols on the streets of the oblast center from the middle of February. Our correspondent is discussing the manpower acquisition problems with the unit commander, Yuriy Bondazhevskiy.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent] Yuriy Alekseyevich, I know that the personnel situation is quite strained at the moment; what is the situation in your unit? How is the recruiting progressing? In recent times, there has been no one left to serve.

[Bondazhevskiy] That is a fact; 1993 has been a difficult year in respect of personnel and in fact we have only been at 50 percent strength. Currently, the situation is significantly better and the units are 96 percent manned. The situation with contract manpower acquisition is a bit more complicated. However, there are a number of objective reasons for this, the first of which is housing conditions.

Despite the internal troops manpower acquisition principle that they are to be from outside the territory and are to serve for three or four years, it has become fashionable to serve in the area where one lives, which is a gross breach of the statute on internal troops. If we take the 1992-93 figures, practically 90 percent of the unit was comprised of local servicemen. At present, 56 percent of the young recruits from the 1993 fall call up come from the Petropavlovsk city and Kamchatka Oblast Voyenkomats [Military Commissariat].

We see a solution to this situation in the following: carry out an exchange of personnel with other similar units located in the Far East. That is, the basic task, namely, guarding public order suffers because the majority of local servicemen are serving in local units. Use of local manpower leaves its mark, which is evident if we compare 1992 with 1991. Despite the number of personnel remaining the same there was a change in their quality, due to local content—service effectiveness and quality of service declined substantially.

[Correspondent] The presence of militiamen on duty on the streets is not noticeable at present, yet you say that units are 96 percent up to strength.

[Bondazhevskiy] Yes, the fall-intake recruits are undergoing their basic training course. It is almost completed and in the course of the next two or three days they will be doing their examinations. Subsequently, they will be allocated to units where they will begin their independent duties. [end recording]

International Affairs

Kravchuk Urges Supreme Council To Ratify START I

LD0302165594 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0800 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Address by President Leonid Kravchuk at the Supreme Council session in Kiev—live]

[Text] Esteemed Ivan Stepanovych, esteemed people's deputies! The issues that have been submitted for your consideration are of an exceptionally important significance. Without exaggeration, the future of Ukraine as an independent state depends to a large extent on the decision you will adopt today. As you know, on 18 November 1993, the Supreme Council of Ukraine adopted a resolution on the ratification of the START Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol with certain reservations. Among other things, it also contained an instruction to the president of Ukraine and the government to hold appropriate negotiations between interested states and international organizations with the aim of due protection of both Ukraine's security and its material interests, which would open the possibilities of the START I treaty entering into force and would initiate the process of genuine nuclear disarmament in the world.

You are aware of the world's reaction to the adopted resolution. After this decision of the Supreme Council, Ukraine stood before the threat of full isolation, and the negative image that our state earned because of this, began to intensify to a level that opened the possibility of imposing more than just economic forms of pressure.

In the present economic crisis situation, this has already concealed a threat to the very existence of the Ukrainian state. It is precisely to avoid this danger that, in accordance with my instruction, trilateral negotiations were held with the United States and Russia, with the aim of justly resolving the problems of nuclear weapons, to drag Ukraine away from the interminable conflicts with Russia and the world community, and to concentrate our international efforts on the creation of favorable external conditions for carrying out deep reforms in Ukraine's economy.

The statement and appendix signed in Moscow, even though they are not international agreements, define the political obligations of the three presidents within the framework of compromise reached between the three states in resolving the problems of nuclear weapons that Ukraine inherited from the former USSR. The text of the statement and the appendix are proof of the realization of Ukraine's strategic policy in acquiring nonnuclear status that was defined in the declaration on state sovereignty, in Supreme Council statements on Ukraine's nonnuclear status, and parliamentary resolutions on additional measures to guarantee that Ukraine acquires nonnuclear status. None of the resolutions adopted by the Supreme Council has cast doubt on this policy.

In particular, the accords achieved in Moscow envisage—after the START I Treaty comes into force and Ukraine accedes to the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty]—the granting to Ukraine of guarantees for its national security, which include pledges regarding confirmation, concerning Ukraine, of its independence, sovereignty and existing borders, and refraining from threats of force or the use of force or measures of economic pressure.

The next thing envisaged is the pledge by the United States of America to grant Ukraine the appropriate funds for the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, with the possibility of increasing the volume of such assistance in the future.

The withdrawal of all nuclear warheads from Ukraine to Russia for their dismantlement is envisaged with the concurrent granting of compensation in the form of deliveries of fuel assemblies to Ukraine for its nuclear power engineering requirements.

Apart from that, and this is of especial political significance, it was confirmed that Ukraine, the United States, and Russia will cooperate between themselves as equal partners, and that relations between them should be developed on principles of respect for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of each state. The United States also stated its readiness to render assistance to Ukraine in creating a market economy in Ukraine.

Some people say that the text of the statement does not fully correspond to the reservations formulated by the Supreme Council because it supposedly departs from specific figures of limitations regarding elimination of warheads and carriers [nosiyi] fixed in Point 6 of the 17 November resolution.

But this same article says that this same point makes it possible to destroy nuclear weapons in excess of the established limitations. That is, the executive power received the authority to agree on the dismantlement of warheads, the process (?of destruction) of which should take place in compliance with procedures, which have not been established by the START I Treaty.

That is, the point is that we strove to carry out those maximum possibilities laid down in the Supreme Council resolution, but naturally certain compromises are inevitable in these cases. Thus, the tripartite statement and the appendix to it, and also their implementation, in our opinion, and this is true, meet the demands set forth in the resolution of the Supreme Council of Ukraine of 18 November 1993.

I emphasize, the principle reservations, principle reservations by the Supreme Council have been carried out by the executive power. This is a reply to our just doubts and the reservations with regard to the resolution by our Supreme Council. In connection with this, I introduced a proposal through a legislative initiative in accordance with Article 103 of the Ukrainian Constitution, on the removal of the reservations contained in the Supreme Council resolutions dated 18 November 1993 regarding Article 5 of the Lisbon Protocol, and Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

It seems that the issue of the need for Ukraine to accede to the NPT that was at the center of attention not only here in Ukraine, but also in the whole international community, should be obvious and understood by everyone who lives in the real world. This corresponds to Ukraine's long-term national interests, including the interests of guaranteeing our national security. It is true that some either consciously or subconsciously are twisting the facts, attempting to prove that Ukraine could become a nuclear state; that because of this its security would supposedly increase and its importance in international relations would grow, and that we could defend our independence, territorial integrity, and the future flourishing of the Ukrainian people with nuclear weapons. I repeat, data about the real state of affairs demonstrate that it is simply impossible to defend this thesis if one knows and listens and take these realities into account.

The situation for our military men, leading scientists and nuclear workers, and other experts who are involved with this affair is absolutely clear. I remind you of some irrefutable facts. First, the nuclear button, i.e. the entire command infrastructure necessary for the targeting and launching of missiles is located, as before, in Moscow. Nobody, and this must be taken into account, will allow us to take over this control without unforeseen consequences as some people naively suggest. Such actions could only provoke the emergence of an acute military danger for Ukraine. I repeat, it will not protect Ukraine's security, but will provoke the emergence of a danger.

Since nuclear weapons located in Ukraine are not controlled by us, they cannot play the role of a factor restraining a potential aggressor. They cannot. As it is known, strategic missiles that are on combat duty in Ukraine today are a threat only to the United States. And it seems that everyone understands it is not preparing to attack us. But there is also a danger for us through the dangerous condition of the missiles because of the lack of supplies of vital components, first of all from Russia. Beginning from this year, the guarantee period, not only of combat capability, but simply of safe storage of a considerable number of warheads, is being terminated. In 1995 this process will take on a catastrophic nature. Specific calculations and data are proof of this. But the moment that the nuclear warhead guarantee period is exhausted, it becomes a danger for others and a danger for us, i.e. for those on whose territory they are based. Such nuclear warheads must be taken away to be dismantled and reprocessed since, as you know, we do not have the appropriate factories. But the weapons' manufacturers are in Russia. If we do not do this, then there could be a danger of a new tragedy, this is a reality. I think that it is a great responsibility for us all. Through our Defense Ministry, I received an appropriate decision from the chief designers of the nuclear warheads. I would like you to know about this and probably there is now no need to conceal it from the Ukrainian people.

Now I will read this in the original. In connection with the fact that the service life of certain warheads expired, we moved them out [of Ukraine] at the end of December to be dismantled. Designers provide us with the following data: [switches to Russian] I inform you about the decision by the chief designers, developers of nuclear warheads, coordinated with the interdepartmental commission of the Ministry of Nuclear Power Engineering and the Ministry of Defense of Russia, on the results of the defect-finding inspection [defektatsiya] of the three combat units whose term of technical servicing expired and which were delivered from Ukraine.

During the visual inspection of the combat units, the commission members found corrosive products on the surfaces of the uranium parts that are the source of heightened toxic and radiological danger. Proceeding from the results of the work done by the commission, the chief designers arrived at a conclusion that the violation of the rules of technical servicing of nuclear warheads leads to the emergence of irreversible processes of aging in them, to the changes in physical and chemical properties of dangerously explosive and radioactive materials. The above phenomena increase the danger during the nuclear warheads' dismantling. Further use and storage of these warheads aggravates the processes taking place in them, which may lead to the formation of dangerously explosive mixtures within their hermetic capacities. [back to Ukrainian]

Here is such a piece of information. I would like to tell you that my consultations with relevant scientific institutions in Ukraine and the scientists who are involved in this, confirm this assessment and this danger.

So, the nuclear weapons inherited by Ukraine from the former USSR not only cannot be used to support Ukraine's security, but are a threat to it. We do not have the appropriate scientific nor the manufacturing infrastructure—for which tens of billions of dollars are needed—to independently manufacture new nuclear weapons, nor do we have a place where such weapons could be tested. I hope that the majority of people and people's deputies of Ukraine had the possibility to see and hear the opinions of leading Ukrainian scientists on this issue, which was on Ukrainian television. If we cannot be a true nuclear state and gain something positive from this, then why not accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, along with the other 180 world states?

Why should we insist on preserving the situation as it is, whereas at the meetings between the president or other leaders of Ukraine and world leaders, or at the diplomatic talks, or at any other meetings, those with ordinary people and the mass media, they always begin the talk with one and the same thing: People just do not understand why we are insisting on exactly such a stand.

Though some people believe that the world's concern about Ukraine's attitude toward nuclear weapons is for the benefit of Ukraine, that this adds to our state's authority. Well, at this point they somehow forget that before the signing of the trilateral statement, Ukraine had increasingly often been placed in one group of states that have an unequivocally negative reputation throughout the world. I felt this personally, and the foreign minister who was taking part, as they say, from the Rome to the Brussels meetings, and who is present here, will have a chance to share his impressions with you.

The fact that the problem of nuclear arms stationed in Ukraine remained in suspense had, until recently, been one of the main obstacles in the way toward a full-blooded development of mutually advantageous cooperation with foreign countries. After the Supreme Council had adopted the resolution on the START ratification, they were emphasizing it straightforwardly and unequivocally at all levels, that until Ukraine ratified the Lisbon Protocol in full volume and joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the rendering of effective aid toward building a market economy would be just impossible.

Moreover, it was difficult to hope for a normal attitude toward us on the part of many countries of the world. They say that this is the dictate. One can agree with this. We, they say, must show our protest. But to do this we should act in compliance with the obligations that we assumed and not ruin the situation that took shape.

Ukraine now is being accused of something very serious: If we do not act in accordance with the position we announced earlier, we are stopping further world disarmament. START II comes under threat, and it is this for which Ukraine is being accused. Although the state of our economy and the possibility of reforming it depends in the first instance on us—and this is true—without support from international financial institutions, leading Western states, and not only with money but also with experience, private investments, and the granting of access to their markets, we will not manage. Certainly we would not be able to do without the Russian market.

Can we really expect the development of normal, I stress, normal relations with Russia without deciding this painful problem? If someone thinks we can then he is deeply mistaken.

In this connection, I would like to say this: It is exactly now that we have almost managed to completely reach an understanding of our problems, the main one of which being the readiness to assist us in the complicated matter of reforming the economy on the part of leading Western countries and international institutions. Our nearest neighbors' attitude to us is also different now. Just now, we have received a statement on behalf of the chairman of the European Union, saying that the trilateral accords, reached in Moscow, open the way for the development of full-scale, fruitful relations and cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union. During his stay in Kiev, U.S. President Bill Clinton assured us that the United States had made use of their ability to influence leading international financial organizations in order to provide the assistance we need.

The delegation that held negotiations in Washington last week reports that we have already seen a fundamental change in the attitude toward Ukraine of both the United States and the international community, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. They are ready to provide our state with considerable financial and technological assistance and credit. A mechanism has been initiated to realize this assistance in all-sided economic cooperation. The details of this are known to you, I hope, from the joint statement that has been made public. These, strictly speaking, are some of the first reactions and proposals. I am sure there will be others that will be no less serious.

Everything will now depend on us alone and our readiness to make use of this moment and these possibilities, and to unite in performing our most important task today, which task, in my view, is to curb the crisis trends in our economy and carry out serious reforms in the direction of creating a democratic state and a socially-oriented market economy.

I would once again like to emphasize this: Today, the future of Ukraine as an independent, influential and—in the future—a prosperous European state, does not depend on nuclear weapons. The former USSR had more than enough of them, but however, did not come to its rescue. The future of Ukraine depends on the economic well-being and social stability of our society. If we do overcome the current economic crisis, we will be able to safeguard our independence and inviolability of our borders. Nor will we—once again with the help from international organizations—allow anyone to interfere in our internal affairs.

I think the time has come—and a decisive time it is too—for every one of us present in this hall, to once and for all understand that in order to make a realistic policy, really aimed to protect our vital national interests and those of all ordinary people, one should first of all conscientiously look to reality, weigh up the possibilities, and finally be ready to take serious and responsible decisions. I am (?more than) convinced that it is exactly this decision that Ukraine needs to make today.

Thank you for your attention.

Answers Questions on START Treaty

LD0302215994 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1130 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Question and answer session with President Leonid Kravchuk by deputies, following speech on nuclear issues at the Supreme Council session in Kiev—live]

[Text] [Dorohuntsov] Esteemed Leonid Makarovych, I know that you signed the statement and an appendix to this statement, which is not very simple and is not very easy for Ukraine. I believe that you were forced to do so. That was a political decision which will have very important consequences for Ukraine, and you have probably assessed these consequences. I support your stand and I will vote in its favor. Unfortunately, I believe that we do not have an alternative.

However, I have the following question for you. As is known, our disarmament—the technical details are up to specialists and we are not specialists—requires significant expenditures. What will Ukraine's share—if there is no possibility to express it in absolute figures—of these expenditures be, and what will the share of the so-called world community be? This is a very serious question for us. I think here we could do our best to take as much as possible; unfortunately, it is not us who make these decisions unilaterally. So, I would only like you to express your opinion on this matter. In addition, it would possibly be good if this brief discussion of ours is broadcast in full. Thanks for your reply.

[Kravchuk] True, when a resolution is being adopted in this hall, or some law, we try to write down in it our maximum needs and our maximum benefits, and this can be understood. And when the law or some resolution is implemented, and when more than one country—and here three or four countries are involved—compromises are inevitable, otherwise one would never adopt anything. Not to adopt a decision at a time when there is a Supreme Council resolution and to drive this problem into a blind corner would mean extremely grave consequences and a threat to the security of Ukraine, and not only Ukraine.

I underscore that I was guided by the reservations, which is the main thing. Second, in order for you to understand, I was guided not by the pressure which was applied and which always exists, but by the realities facing Ukraine. And the realities, which I have already told you about, are these: Today Ukraine cannot safely maintain and service the nuclear weapons which we inherited. These weapons are becoming obsolete and pose a threat to us. If one fails to understand this, the rest is derivative. If we act appropriately, others will adopt an appropriate attitude toward us. As far as specific expenditures are concerned, relevant calculations are already available. Both the United States and the European community already say that the financial aid figures for dismantling the nuclear weapons will be doubled.

Second [as heard], the warheads will be dismantled in Russia, and Ukraine will be compensated for them according to world prices, less the expenditure for their dismantling.

The next steps connected with silos and launcher vehicles will be agreed upon on the basis of other agreements to be worked out on the basis of the resolution. This is because there are problems here. We cannot blow up the silos because they are located in densely populated areas. However, these issues will be stipulated in other agreements. Today the talk is about the fundamental decisions and about those fundamental decisions which the Supreme Council reservations dealt with, and we are trying to implement them.

[Yakheyeva] Tetyana Yakheyeva, Electoral District No. 438. First, I have a procedural comment to make on the president's legislative initiative. This probably relates to the lawyers that he consulted. Leonid Makarovych said that he submitted to the Supreme Council a draft resolution on the accession of Ukraine to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The treaty itself, however, was not submitted to the Supreme Council. I would like everyone to know about this. This is like adopting a resolution bringing a law into effect, with the law itself having not been under consideration.

Second, esteemed Leonid Makarovych, I have several very short questions. The following situation has arisen on the issue of nuclear weapons: Our executive power is governed exclusively by statements and declarations, being purely political documents, and pays no heed whatsoever to resolutions and laws adopted in Ukraine, or to its military doctrine or foreign policy. This is why I have this question to you: Do you think the implementation of this trilateral statement is obligatory for executive power?

The second question is this: What agreements were concluded during the negotiations on the fulfillment of the reservations? For example, was any agreement concluded on the civilian use of silo launchers, compensation, or anything else? Was it or was it not?

Finally, the last question: According to the foreign media, which writes in the words of members of the American delegation, some secret accords were reached during these negotiations, the contents of which will forever remain unknown to anyone. Were such accords reached or is it untrue? Thank you.

[Kravchuk] I would like to start at the end. A package of all the documents which were signed was published. Other protocol records related to purely technical matters rather than, shall we say, any issues of principle, because it is about elimination, withdrawal, their procedure, character, the timetable, and so on, and not about political documents, which would be of an obligatory nature and which were published in the press. In other words, what you are probably referring to is these protocol records. I cannot say anything else, I have not read it, so unfortunately I do not know what the press writes about.

Is the statement of an obligatory nature? The statement is of an obligatory nature in that we now—except, shall we say, that we, on the basis of existing reservations and of the Supreme Council's resolution—can act accordingly, having implemented these reservations with regard to 36 and 42 percent of the missiles subject to elimination and reduction. We can act right now. So in this sense it is of an obligatory nature, because it corresponds with the Supreme Council's resolutions. It does correspond with it.

As for what you are saying about other agreements, I have already said that these issues are settled after decisions of principle are made. Then the issues of specific agreements, specific issues, are settled. They by all means will be made at governmental and intergovernmental level after being worked on by experts. This is a whole number of documents rather than one document.

'Concluding' Address on START I

LD0302235694 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1400 GMT 3 Feb 94

["Concluding" address by President Leonid Kravchuk at the Supreme Council session in Kiev—live]

[Text] To begin with, I shall answer some of the comments made and questions asked here. First of all, about a legally binding document on compensation to Ukraine for nuclear weapons. As for strategic nuclear weapons, such a document was signed with Russia and it is legally binding. It was signed by the Russian and Ukrainian premiers, [Viktor] Chernomyrdin and the then Ukrainian prime minister Leonid Kuchma. As for compensation for tactical nuclear weapons, by all means there will be this compensation. As early as this month experts will begin to work on determining the value of these weapons. They are experts from Ukraine, Russia, and the United States. Thus, on the main issue on the agenda here, that is, on compensation for nuclear weapons to Ukraine, one part of it was legally settled and the other will be settled after the evaluation of these nuclear weapons.

This, I tell you, is what it is in reality. There is an absolutely specific accord on the part of Ukraine: Should one of the sides fail to fulfill its obligations, Ukraine for its part will stop actions.

Next, there is no agreement—and I do not know where what was said here comes from—on the destruction of missiles, including SS-24's. There is no such a thing, I emphasize this. What it is about is lowering the combat status of missiles, not destroying SS-24's. This is quite another matter. It is about lowering their combat status. As for withdrawing them, we will determine what warheads will be withdrawn and not the destruction of missiles, as was said here. Not a single document mentions this. Why distort facts? This is a question of principle.

I emphasize—please do not interrupt me—it is specifically about lowering their combat status and withdrawing 200 warheads within 10 months, without specifying what warheads and from what missiles.

Next, I have nowhere and never said that I will withdraw nuclear warheads independently from the Supreme Council decision. I address this reply to Mr. Hudyma. The talk was about the following: When the nuclear warhead becomes physically obsolete and when Ukraine faces danger, then irrespective of the decision, whether taken by the president or the Supreme Council—and the defense minister was saying about this, by the way, people will not say this is not true—then the nuclear warheads will have to be withdrawn. Because there will be a dilemma: Either danger or nuclear warheads. I have said this and I am saying this to you. As for everything else, the president's actions will be adequate to the Supreme Council decision.

Another question arises. I want to tell you about this sincerely. If we withdraw the warheads according to an agreement, this is an appropriate legal document and a process of compensation. If we withdraw in the face of danger, then the question will be put in a different manner by those who accept the warheads. It is not by chance that I read the message from the chief designer, or, a group of chief designers. This is a question of principle and one must take it into account.

I can fully support those deputies who are saying that not everything has been done neatly over this time, both on the part of the president and on the part of the government, that we have made many mistakes and that it is really true that we have been put in complicated economic, political, and international situations and that these situations require appropriate actions. And if someone has other possibilities for such actions, then let him offer them. I have been acting in line with the decisions of the Supreme Council and I was striving to achieve the fulfillment of those decisions.

One more thing: Not a single country can ever claim that all agreements should be concluded with it in advance, before it determines its final status. We have to determine our status. If we are a nonnuclear state, then we have to exercise this status consistently. And after that the agreements are concluded—both the defense minister and Vasyl Vasyloyvych Durdynets [deputy chairman of the Supreme Council] have partly enumerated those agreements which are envisioned for signing: On the value of compensation, on silos, on withdrawal, on schedules—everything will be done without fail. Not a single move can be made without such agreements because it would be dangerous to make such moves and nobody would do this.

I understand that today it is difficult to make decisions, there are political problems, there is pressure applied on

Ukraine. They are right who say that Russia should abandon its claims to Ukraine. But these claims were made by that Supreme Soviet which no longer exists. There is another Supreme Soviet. Now that country must determine itself and I support those who raise this question, but you must understand that there are relevant procedures and a relevant order. I cannot force the Duma or the Federal Assembly of Russia to cancel these reservations, as far as the former Supreme Soviet is concerned. Russia itself will determine whether or not these are legal. And, in the long run, this is the legal and constitutional right of the Duma and the Federal Assembly. We can only propose that such steps should be taken.

We are facing economic problems which must be solved. And if we stop or block, as People's Deputy Haysynskyy said, this process in the presence of all those economic difficulties and absence of possibilities to act, both in relation to power engineering, nuclear power stations, and fuel elements, then we will have to face the dilemma: Either one or the other.

I would like to assure you, esteemed people's deputies, that Ukraine will be compensated for both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. I would like to tell you that today, at lunchtime, I received a letter from U.S. President Bill Clinton, in which he gave his consent to double economic aid to Ukraine—specific figures, serious figures are mentioned, to provide assistance in eliminating nuclear weapons and to provide aid to those officers who need social protection, including housing.

As a matter of fact, I was acting in a situation which took shape, I was acting so as not to do harm to Ukraine, so as to preserve the state. Maybe, someone else can do it better. Now it is up to the Supreme Council. I would only like to say that we must take steps consistently. And this consistency was initiated by the Supreme Council and I believe that this Supreme Council must also say its final word, to finish what it once began.

Thank you for your attention.

Supreme Council Passes Resolution

LD0302211194 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2022 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet today ratified the START-I treaty leaving out all stipulations regarding guarantees of the republic's security that it introduced during the consideration of the issue on November 18, 1993. A resolution made today instructs the government to carry out the exchange of ratification letters to the treaty.

The stipulations related to guarantees of Ukraine's territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and protection from aggression by nuclear states as well as compensations for Ukrainian nuclear warheads withdrawn from the republic.

At present, the stipulations are lifted since the deputies believe that Kiev's conditions have been met.

The resolution was passed by a majority of 260 votes, with 3 votes against. Five deputies abstained and 21 failed to take part in the voting.

The parliament also decided to join the Lisbon protocol to the START-I treaty, including article 5. According to the article, Ukraine will join the nonproliferation treaty as a non-nuclear state in the near future. However, the parliament rejected the proposal to immediately join the treaty.

A total of 193 deputies voted for joining the treaty, 27 against. Eleven deputies abstained and 58 failed to take part in the voting.

Speaking before the session, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk said that the republic will necessarily receive the compensation for the nuclear weapons destroyed. He said Ukrainian, Russian and American experts will start work on determining the size of the compensation in February.

"If only one of the sides fails to fulfil its obligations, Ukraine will suspend the activities on its part," Kravchuk said, meaning the withdrawal of warheads of strategic nuclear missiles.

Supreme Council Resolution

LD0302211694

[Editorial Report] Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian at 1730 GMT on 3 February carries a 350-word Ukraine Supreme Council resolution on the START I Treaty as follows:

"The Supreme Council of Ukraine has resolved:

"1. Taking into account the specific measures taken by the president and Government of Ukraine regarding the implementation of the provisions of the Supreme Council resolution dated 18 November 1993, and the steps to meet Ukraine half-way on the part of the United States and Russia, in order to remove the reservations regarding the article of the Protocol to the START Treaty signed in Lisbon on 23 May 1992.

"2. To charge the Government of Ukraine with carrying out the exchange of instruments of ratification of the START Treaty.

"3. To accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty dated 1 July 1968, which will hereafter be termed the Treaty, as a state not owning nuclear weapons, with the following statement:

"1) Ukraine owns the components of the nuclear weapons that it inherited from the former USSR, and after the weapons have been dismantled and destroyed under its control, and in accordance with procedures that will rule out the possibility of reusing these weapons' components for the original purpose, Ukraine intends to use the material extracted from them exclusively for civilian purposes, in particular as fuel for Ukrainian AES [nuclear electric power station], or receive compensation for them;

"2) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] does not fully cover the unique situation that arose as a result of the disintegration of the USSR as a nuclear state. The presence of nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine until they are eliminated entirely, as well as appropriate activity to maintain, service, and eliminate them, does not contravene the provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty.

"3) Ukraine will hold talks with the International Atomic Energy Agency with the aim of concluding agreements regarding the guarantees envisaged by the Treaty.

"4) The violation of the territorial integrity or inviolability of Ukraine's borders on the part of any nuclear state will be viewed by Ukraine as a violation of the Treaty."

Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian at 1900 GMT on 3 February then carried the following service message:

"The news agency RESPUBLIKA [UNIAR] apologizes for the incorrect information about the approval by the Ukrainian Supreme Council of the resolution on the fulfillment by Ukraine's president of the Supreme Council of Ukraine recommendations made during the ratification of the START I Treaty. The Supreme Council approved a resolution of two items:

"1. Taking into account the specific measures taken by the president and Government of Ukraine regarding the implementation of the provisions of the Supreme Council resolution dated 18 November 1993, and the steps to meet Ukraine half-way on the part of the United States and Russia, in order to remove the reservations regarding article of the Protocol to the START Treaty signed in Lisbon on 23 May 1992.

"2. To charge the Government of Ukraine with carrying out the exchange of instruments of ratification of the START Treaty. With this aim to step up the activity of the Government on concluding specific international agreements stemming from the reservations of the Supreme Council resolution on the ratification of the START I Treaty.

"Item 3 on Ukraine's accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was excluded from the resolution due to the fact that it was not discussed in Parliament. Deputy Sergey Golovatyy made a remark to the effect that Ukraine could not announce itself simultaneously a nuclear state while acceding to START I and a non-nuclear state while participating in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Issues of compensation for the nuclear weapon components were touched upon with regard to the difference in prices for the fuel uranium on the U.S. internal and external market, etc. Deputies Sergey Golovatyy, Tetyana Yakheyeva, and Sergey Semenets proposed to discuss this in the standing commissions, and to then submit it for the consideration of the Supreme Council. After this the issue on accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will be solved."

Shmarov Comments on Denuclearization, Funding

WS0402083094 Kiev UKRAYINA MOLODA in Ukrainian 1 Feb 94 p 3

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov by Olena Lisychna; place and date not given: "Ukraine's Last Nuclear Season"]

[Text] Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov, who headed Ukraine's delegation to negotiations in Washington on the eve of the Moscow meeting, has indeed become a hero of Ukraine's last "nuclear" season.

For a while, the legislature has put aside discussion of the "nuclear" agreement. If the Supreme Council does not support the Moscow agreement, Ukraine will experience "hard days," claims Valeriy Shamarov. At the same time, Valeriy Shamarov does not support illusions that Ukraine will receive weighty credits and investments. However, he believes that even "small sums are better than nothing."

[Lisychna] This "nuclear" history still has many white spots, and the issue of compensation for our tactical nuclear weapons is of extreme interest.

[Shmarov] Indeed, for quite a long time, Russia did not agree to our demands for compensation. However, at the last stage of the negotiations, Russia recognized our ownership of the tactical nuclear weapons and we discussed, in general, forms of holding our mutual accounts. We will cancel part of our debts for energy resources by transferring these tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. In the first place, in my opinion, this is better than nothing. In the second place, Ukraine cannot enjoy equal partnership because it has amassed enormous debts to Russia.

[Lisychna] Valeriy Mykolayovych, what part of our debt could be canceled?

[Shmarov] The more the better. I estimate our 1993 debts to Russia at $1 billion, while 1992 debts—at $2.5 billion. In my opinion, we could settle 50 percent of our 1993 debts.

Well, the issue of strategic nuclear weapons is also very complicated. Economic calculations were based on data drawn from the worldwide uranium trade. The U.S. side will be a guarantor of the fulfillment of this agreement by the Russian party. A tripartite commission will draft the contract on this agreement in three-months time.

[Lisychna] Who will pay for the processing of uranium in Russia?

[Shmarov] This expense is included in the costs of Ukrainian deliveries to Russia. One more positive moment for Russia: Russia will be paid by the United States for each weapon dismantled on the territory of Ukraine.

[Lisychna] Is this payment for work or a kind of moral support?

[Shmarov] This moral support means big money. In general, the United States is deeply interested in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons because the missiles are still directed at the United States, despite the fact that the button is in Moscow.

[Lisychna] For how long can our nuclear power plants work on the fuel which we are going to receive from Russia as part of our compensation?

[Shmarov] Yearly, we require 100 tonnes of nuclear fuel. Currently, we are short of nuclear fuel. Our nuclear power plants could work for five to seven years on the fuel which will be delivered under the Moscow agreement.

[Lisychna] Our legislature must adopt the START I and START II Treaties and Ukraine should sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty before the Moscow agreements can start being implemented....

[Shmarov] If these agreements are not implemented, Ukraine will experience hard times. We have held a series of consultations in the Supreme Council. The deputies understand the importance of these agreements. In addition, after the Supreme Council says "yes" or "no," we will have to draft nine agreements on compensation issues. I hope that the Supreme Council's decision on the issue will be positive.

[Lisychna] On 25 January, IZVESTIYA published this report: "The second Chernobyl is under way. The dismantlement of old missiles in Ukraine has been stopped for an indefinite period due to the lack of military storage bases, transport, and material assets." Is this report true?

[Shmarov] These facts are partially true. Currently, we lack containers and means of transport. However, the Moscow agreements foresee that Russia will provide us with equipment and means of transportation.... The Russian Defense Ministry will deliver everything on time.... In general, our agreement with Russia is based on mutual relations: We also deal with servicing of nuclear-armed SS-24 rocket launchers in Russia because they were produced in Ukraine.

[Lisychna] Valeriy Mykolayovych, what about the sum of $2.8 billion? In late 1993, Ukraine demanded that this sum be earmarked for the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons. However, it turned out that this figure was also false. So, what sum does Ukraine currently require?

[Shmarov] The figure of $2.8 billion is likely to be too big. In my opinion, we require more than $175 million or even $1.75 billion. Well, concerning the so-called U.S. financial aid, I insisted (even during my stay in Washington) that the United States should increase its aid within the framework of the Nunn-Lugar program. The U.S. side has promised this. It is more important for us to not receive consultations (we have our own experts) or a system of satellite communications, but modern equipment, diesel fuel, assets for social protection of servicemen, etc.... Or, simply put, our requirements are more practical.

[Lisychna] Bill Clinton said at the Boryspil airport that Ukraine can use funds from the Nunn-Lugar program for purposes of conversion and defense....

[Shmarov] These means are miserable. As for conversion, we have signed an agreement between the Pentagon and the Ukrainian Ministry of Machine Building on the issue of cooperation in the sphere of conversion. This could be one more source of financial resources because we could draft projects in which Americans could become interested.

One more positive element of the Moscow agreement is the extension of our relations. Currently, our government delegation is working in the United States. Our economic cooperation with the United States currently stands at $500 million.

[Lisychna] Valeriy Mykolayovych, how can you predict that investments and credits will flow to a denuclearized Ukraine? Our economic reforms are at a standstill.

[Shmarov] This is a difficult question. U.S. business circles are dissatisfied with the course of reforms in Ukraine. However, they consider our issue of denuclearization to be of key importance, and the issue of economic reforms is of secondary interest to them.

In my opinion, the United States will not force us with the implementation of these reforms. Though, some people think this way.

Zlenko Urges Cooperation With Croatia, Slovenia

AU0302151794 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 1 Feb 94 pp 1, 5

[Taras Petriv report: "No War and No Peace, Just Human Suffering"]

[Text] No war and no peace, just human suffering. This is how Ukraine's Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Zlenko described the present situation in the region of the Bosnian conflict after a visit to the Ukrainian battalion within the UN peacekeeping forces in Sarajevo. Our state must decide what else it may do to help heal this bleeding wound in Europe.

UN representatives have repeatedly commended Ukraine's contribution to the peacekeeping process. The fact that the UN Security Council turned to our state with a request to add another 800 personnel to the battalion is proof of the prestige gained by the Ukrainian servicemen. At the same time, despite the considerable contingent of soldiers, Kiev does not have observers there. The number of officers is also small. This restricts any more extensive participation of Ukrainian representatives in untying the Balkan knot. The military contingent's main tasks in the region of conflict amount to accompanying humanitarian aid convoys to the civilian population, repairing electricity and water-supply networks, and holding, on special orders, operations to disarm the warring sides and demilitarizing the areas. During a meeting with Zlenko, commander of the joint troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina M. Rose praised the activities of the Ukrainian servicemen. (Incidentally, in view of the severe shortage of food in the city, our soldiers share their food rations with Sarajevo children, and the battalion has even adopted several orphan children.) During the talks in Sarajevo, the head of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry stressed that a mutually acceptable variant for resolving problems in the region is only possible if all the possibilities and interests of the sides are taken into account.

As well as Sarajevo, Zlenko also visited Croatia and Slovenia. For a number of reasons, the visit there had been delayed for a long time. That is why members of the Ukrainian delegation tried somehow to stress their interest in the development of relations with Zagreb and Ljubljana and held extensive consultations to find realistic ways to intensify ties with those countries, particularly in the economic sphere. A legal foundation was also laid in Zagreb for expanding contacts: Agreements on cooperation between the foreign ministries of the two countries and on consular ties were signed. A document on cooperation between the foreign ministries was also signed in the Slovenian capital. At the summing-up news conference in Zagreb, Croatian Foreign Minister M. Granic stated that a bilateral trade agreement, which will definitely be signed during his visit to Kiev, will promote economic ties. In his opinion, political relations between Ukraine and Croatia are much better developed than economic ties. It is, however, clear that every country must now pay much attention to its own domestic problems. An agreement on friendship and cooperation, which has been prepared, will be yet another step toward broad cooperation between Kiev and Zagreb. In Granic's opinion, Ukraine might have a positive influence on resolving the Balkan crisis and, in this context, on the position of the Serbs. He pointed out that the declaration on the settlement of the relations between Croats and Serbs is the first step toward normalization, but that this process depends on Serbia. The main problem is the restoration of normal life in reintegrated territories. Zlenko, in turn, stated that, on many issues, the positions of Ukraine and Croatia are very close or fully coincide. The Croatian position became clearer after the negotiations in Zagreb.

Observers reacted with surprise to Kiev's activity in the Balkan region, but they pointed out that its rapprochement with Zagreb and Ljubljana is understandable: There is a common desire to cooperate, and they are all, while respecting the aspirations of others, pursuing their own interests. Therefore, Ukraine will certainly respond positively to the Croatian side's request to help in settling the Balkan crisis and in normalizing relations between the Croats and the Serbs, but it will not diverge from its principles of balanced deportment. In its contacts with Slovenia, Kiev should have long passed from words to specific deeds, since that country presents a great interest for us, first and foremost, in the economic sphere. Ljubljana is also striving to establish close cooperation with Kiev. In particular, at the proposal of Slovenian Minister of Foreign Affairs L. Peterle, entrepreneurs from the two countries will hold a business conference in Ljubljana. In addition to that, Ukraine hopes that its Balkan partners with help in putting into effect its plans for joining the Central European Initiative.

However, Kiev, while trying hard to stress its desire to intensify relations with Croatia and Slovenia, is unable to open its embassies in those states. Perhaps, because of this situation, the relations between our countries have been deadlocked. I would like to hope that the earthquake that rocked Zagreb during the first day of Zlenko's official visit will shake off the dust from these relations.

Views Peace Regulation, Lifting Sanctions

WS0402111594 Kiev UT-1 Television Network in Ukrainian 1950 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Interview with Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko by unidentified reporter; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Reporter] What ways to alleviate the Yugoslav crisis does Ukraine believe to be the most promising and realistic?

[Zlenko] As is known, the world community has drawn a number of variants of peaceful regulation of the armed conflict on the territory of former Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, attempts to resolve this problem on the basis of the well-known Owen-Vance plan fell short of the aim. Disregarding consent of the leaders of all the three ethnic minorities [as heard], their parliaments failed to ratify the achieved agreements and the status quo was preserved. The new French-German initiative suggested by Foreign Ministers Kinkel and Juppe is currently being discussed by the conflicting parties at the Geneva peace talks. The plan stipulates the creation of three ethnic formations on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and establishing borders along ethnic lines or boundaries. In our opinion, this peaceful regulation plan is promising with regard to putting an end to armed opposition. Whether the plan will be implemented depends on the goodwill of the parties in the conflict. There are different approaches, even absolutely opposing ones on the part of the groups involved in the conflict. However, I believe that this plan corresponds more with the realities that have developed recently on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Reporter] [passage omitted] Can the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations help to resolve the Yugoslav conflict any quicker?

[Zlenko] When did the world community suggest these sanctions? It was toward the end of 1991, when Serbian troops were waging a war against newly independent states. By now, the situation has significantly changed and I discussed this issue with the Hungarian foreign minister, who had returned from talks with the Belgrade leadership. We touched upon Belgrade's viewpoint on this issue as well as the issue of suspending sanctions. I want to say that the Hungarian foreign minister informed me in detail on the dramatic situation in which the people of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia found themselves after the sanctions were imposed. In the first place, sanctions afflicted children and the elderly, causing shortages of food and medicine. I think that the situation currently developing in Serbia and Montenegro is terrible, and that the sanctions must not be preserved. They not only inflict heavy damage on the people of that state, but also on other states which found themselves within the range of these sanctions. I want to point out that from the military point of view the situation has changed. The suspension of sanctions imposed by the United Nations is currently being discussed. I would not like anybody to get the impression from what I have just said that Ukraine is ready to abolish the sanctions or abstain from using them. Of course, we are ready to do the world community's will, but at the same time we cannot disregard Ukraine's current situation. We know very well that we have been suffering heavy economic losses. We have almost lost our Danube commercial routes; our financial losses have exceeded $4 billion, according to preliminary calculations. I think that this urges us to resolve this problem. I would like to point out that at the same time, Ukraine is raising the issue of UN compensation for these financial losses, in accordance with Article 50 of the UN Charter. It was at our initiative that a UN session adopted an appropriate resolution in 1993, envisioning compensation for those losses. Thus, I want to underline that we must look realistically at the way the sanctions are observed and proceed from the postulate that further use of such harsh sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia may bring about unforeseen or even tragic consequences. We would like to avoid this. Thus, I believe that we must think seriously about the way the sanctions afflict children and elderly people. We may be considering some gradual, stage-by-stage alleviation of the sanctions.

'Terrorist' Kidnaps 4 in Ukraine

LD0302151794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1322 GMT 3 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vadim Byrkin]

[Text] Moscow February 3 TASS—A terrorist seized on Thursday two kids, their teacher and the driver of a van on Thursday [as received] in the Ukrainian city of Sukhodolsk in Lugansk region and is demanding 500,000 US dollars ransom, a pistol and a plane.

The kidnapper, who was identified as Nikolay Skvortsov a resident of Sukhodolsk, is holding a grenade with a pulled-out pin in his hand [as received] and threatens to explode it if his demands are not met, TASS was told at the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations.

Currently Skvortsov with hostages is going on the van to the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don where a plane is being prepared for him and anti-terrorist groups are ready.

The pistol which he received in Ukraine was out of order and he threw it away.

Seized at Rostov Airport

LD0302220794 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1807 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] The operation for the release of the hostages taken by a terrorist in Sukhodolsk on Thursday (formerly Krasnodon, the Ukrainian region of Lugansk) has practically come to an end in the airport in Rostov-on-Don. Well-informed sources told INTERFAX that the terrorist, who called himself Nikolay Skvortsov, was seized.

He had kept two boys, ages 3 and 4, and their 28-year-old nursery school teacher, Natalia Khitalenko, as hostages.

The terrorist, who had also captured a YAZ car with a driver, demanded on Thursday morning that $500,000 and a plane to go abroad be given to him.

He went from Sukhodolsk to Rostov-on-Don together with the hostages. Authorities there agreed to give him a Tu-134 aircraft.

Initially, he declared that negotiations would begin as soon as he boarded the plane. He also demanded that he and the hostages board the plane before the crew. Two crews had volunteered to pilot the plane.

According to some sources, the terrorist intended to leave for London. Other information says he was going to the U.S.A.

Foreign Ministry Protests Romanian 'Disinformation'

WS0302123694 Kiev KHRESHCHATYK in Ukrainian 1 Feb 94 p 5

[Unattributed report on statement issued by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry]

[Text] The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry press center issued a declaration saying that the Romanian mass media have recently intensified their dissemination of disinformation on Ukraine, often citing officials of that country. Those reports and declarations are an attempt to mislead the international community and distract its attention from internal problems currently facing Romanian society. The Foreign Ministry of Ukraine, the press center declaration said, reserves the right to react to these kinds of reports in a proper way.

Environmental Treaty Signed With Poland

WS0302123994 Kiev KIEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 1 Feb 94 p 2

[Report by Oles Buzyna: "Henceforth, Ukraine and Poland Are Allies"]

[Text] The Ukrainian and Polish ministers of environmental protection signed an agreement in Warsaw on cooperation in controlling shipments of hazardous waste. Poland faced this problem a couple of years before Ukraine. Its lengthy border with Germany—the world's largest manufacturer of these "products"—facilitated the immoral activities of companies involved in selling toxic waste. However, the Polish side adopted a strict law on shipping waste across the border. According to Greenpeace Ukraine, this is one of the best laws of its kind in the world.

Ukraine still has no legal footing for controlling this sector. A resolution adopted by the Supreme Soviet in November 1993 was not implemented because the Council of Ministers has been lingering in compiling the list of toxic substances. The problem of German waste shipped to Rivne, Nikolayev, and Ochakov has not been resolved, regardless of the investigation conducted by competent organs and negotiations with Germany on returning the waste "to its native land."

The treaty with Poland is important for Ukraine first of all, because it includes a clause on prevention of transit of hazardous waste via the two states' territories. Thus, our ecological border has moved farther to the west.

National Affairs

Crimean President Meshkov Inaugurated 4 Feb

LD0402095194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0936 GMT 4 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Efim Shvartsman]

[Text] Simferopol February 4 TASS—Yuriy Meshkov, who was elected the first president of the Crimea, was inaugurated on Friday at a session of the parliament of the peninsula.

The 49-year old lawyer put his hand on the constitution of the Crimea and the human rights declaration and read out the oath of the president.

He said his actions would be based on people's will and law.

Urges 'Economic Union' With Russia

LD0402095794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0928 GMT 4 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow February 4 TASS—Newly elected Crimean President Yuriy Meshkov said his first step will be the restoration of a close economic union with Russia and that he always considered the people of the peninsula to be a part of the Russian people.

"My first step will be the creation of an authoritative delegation which would go to Moscow to conclude a close economic and cultural union with Russia", he said in an interview with the business "VEK" (CENTURY) newspaper on Friday.

The Crimea was handed over to Ukraine by former Soviet communist leader Nikita Khrushchev in 1954, but Meshkov believes the people of the peninsula remained a part of the Russian people.

"As far as the Russian people are concerned—I believe that before and after 1954 the people of the Crimea were a part of the Russian people. I hope the restoration of unity, unification is an issue of the near future", he stressed.

Meshkov who was inaugurated on Friday insists that the Crimea should hold a referendum on independence despite the ban of Ukrainian authorities.

"The acting ban of Kiev on holding the referendum has no grounds", he said adding that enough signatures had been collected in the Crimea in favour of holding the plebiscite.

"The talk is about the right of the Crimea to independently determine the contents and forms of its relations with neighbouring states", Meshkov said.

The president also said that the Black Sea Fleet which is disputed between Russia and Ukraine should not be split and should remain Russian. However, he added that the fleet should help create the Ukrainian Navy.

Supreme Council Adopts Law on Local Elections

LD0402094994 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1630 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Kiev—A plenary session of the Supreme Council of Ukraine took place on 3 February, at the beginning of which a law "On the Formation of Local Bodies of Power and Self-Government" was adopted. The law envisages in particular the division of power into bodies of local self-government and bodies of state power. The chairmen of oblast, rayon, town, settlement and village councils are directly elected by the populace, and in accordance with their post they head the executive committees of the relevant councils and have dual subordination. The chairmen of councils and the executive bodies they head are accountable to and under the control of the relevant councils, but on issues of carrying out the authorities of state executive power delegated to them they are subordinate to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. The last article of the law envisages that after elections of deputies and chairmen of councils and the formation of executive bodies, the law of Ukraine "On the Representative of the President of Ukraine" will become invalid. A separate resolution envisages that elections of deputies to village and oblast councils and their chairmen will be conducted at the same time as the election of the president of Ukraine on 26 June 1994.

According to Ivan Plyushch, chairman of the Supreme Council, the issue of amendments and additions to the law on elections of people's deputies of Ukraine was put to the vote for the seventh time on 3 February. But this time the voting did not yield positive results. [passage omitted]

Draft Constitutional Law Considers President's Functions

LD0302224594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1822 GMT 3 Feb 94

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature No. 23 (513)]

[Text] A draft constitutional law on power which was considered by the Ukrainian parliament on Thursday morning attributes more representative functions to the post of the president.

As a member of the parliamentary commission on legislature and law Sergey Sobolev told the news agency Interfax-Ukraine, "the president becomes the head of state and represents Ukraine in international affairs, signs international treaties, and is entitled to cancel decisions of the Cabinet and implement a number of other duties."

The supreme body of the executive power in the republic is the Cabinet, which is confirmed by the parliament. As a result, Sobolev said, "Ukraine actually becomes a parliamentary republic."

The draft law on power also envisages that all authorities in regions are transferred to chairmen of local executive bodies, which should be elected popularly. The institution of presidential representatives in this case is eliminated.

Speaking at a session of the Supreme Soviet the day before, its Chairman, Ivan Plyushch, spoke against holding a referendum on basic constitutional provisions about power in Ukraine on March 27. Earlier, this proposal was made by President Leonid Kravchuk.

Plyushch believes that amendments to the organization of state power in Ukraine "should be made not through a referendum, but through the adoption of a constitutional law."

Parliament Passes Law on Forming Regional Bodies

LD0302221894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1807 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] On Thursday the Ukrainian Supreme Council passed a law on the formation of local power and self-government bodies. According to the law, after the elections, which will be held on June 26 simultaneously with presidential elections, the Ukrainian law on presidential representatives will become ineffective.

Under the law, chairmen of local councils of people's deputies are elected by the population of a region and become heads of executive committees of the corresponding councils. They are subordinate to the corresponding local councils.

In issues related to authorities of the state and executive powers, local councils are subordinate to the Cabinet and executive bodies of superior councils.

Nationalists Threaten Kravchuk With Prosecution

MK0302154094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 3 Feb 94 p 5

[Unattributed report on LOGOTIP-KP news agency materials under the "In the Newspapers of the Newly Independent States" rubric: "Ukraine"]

[Text] Ukrainian nationalists from the UNA-UNSO [Ukrainian National Assembly-Ukrainian Self-Defense] said that "on 12 January Ukrainian citizen Kravchuk met with U.S. citizen Clinton at Borispol airport," as a result of which a crime was committed, namely: "espionage, the disclosure of a state secret, high treason." Upon the UNA-UNSO's coming to power in Ukraine, Kravchuk will not just be held politically responsible for that, but he will be prosecuted as a criminal. The UNA-UNSO leaders also said that the Crimean elections were a result of a conspiracy by the Jews, who have always dreamed about autonomy in Crimea. In the nationalists' view, Israeli influence in Crimea will increase. (RATUSHA) [as published]

Belarus

Hryb Begins Forming Team of Advisers

LD0302222594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1822 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Myechyslaw Hryb, the new Supreme Soviet chairman, has started forming his team of advisers.

After a talk with his predecessor's foreign policy adviser, Valery Tsepkalo, the latter was told to resign. Tsepkalo himself told Interfax that his tense relations with Foreign Minister Petr Kravchenko, whom he had recently repeatedly criticized in the mass media, was one of the chief reasons for his resignation.

Hryb, "unlike his predecessor, has good relations with the foreign minister and would not like to quarrel with him because of me," Tsepkalo believes.

He agreed that "replacement of the team of advisers when a new head of state is elected is a normal and natural process" and added that he was not offended. He was thankful to the new speaker who "politely explained the situation, did not insist that I leave my position immediately, and allowed me enough time to find a new job."

By the latest reports, Tsepkalo is now in Tokyo to acquire first-hand knowledge of the Japanese banking system.

Another former adviser of Shushkevich, Professor Mikhail Kovalev, told Interfax that he was going to collect his last wage in the Supreme Soviet secretariat Thursday. He had not had a talk with the new speaker, but had "made up his mind to resign his position of an adviser and concentrate on work in the Belarusian State University" where he chairs a department and on the setting up of a Belarusian-German institute for systems analysis of market processes. He thinks that Dr. Anatoliy Mikhaylov will also resign and continue his scientific activities.

No decision has been made in the case of Ivan Stepura, the former speaker's adviser on interior matters and who has known Hryb personally since 1974. Stepura proposed abolishing regional structures and merging every five to six districts of the country into areas that would be managed directly from Minsk. He made numerous enemies among parliament deputies who represented agrarian sector managers and various local top officials by his demand that private ownership of land should be introduced, private farms encouraged, and all kinds of farmland property be made legally equal.

Stepura thinks that a decision on whether he should remain an adviser will be made once Hryb returns from St. Petersburg, where he will attend the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly.

Supreme Soviet Adopts Political Party Law

WS0302151494 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1300 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Report by Mikhail Rutkowski]

[Text] Today, our lawmakers discussed and adopted the Law on Political Parties. Anatol Vyartsinski, deputy chairman of the Commission for Mass Media and Human Rights, delivered a speech on this issue. I asked him to comment on the new law.

[Begin recording] [Vyartsinski] The Law on Political Parties addresses a lot of issues. First of all, in the general political aspect, in a legal aspect, it admits and legalizes individual rights for free speech and worship, and the right to band with other like-minded people in political organizations. The law legalizes the multiparty system as a reality of our actual sociopolitical life.

[Rutkowski] Currently, we have many parties in Belarus, however, the Communist Party is still one of the most prominent ones.

[Vyartsinski] The law foresees equal rights for all parties.

[Rutkowski] So, when the election campaign begins, each party will be able to nominate an established number of candidates to the Supreme Soviet. Is this true?

[Vyartsinski] To some extent. The Law on Political Parties foresees that parties can participate in elections and nominate their candidates, and it is highly likely that future elections will be conducted on the basis of party lists. However, this is the domain of the Law on Elections [words indistinct]. [end recording]

The draft law on alternative service has been discussed by our deputies not for the first time. Leanid Privalow, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet Commission for National Security, Defense, and Crime, delivered a report on this topic. However, the people's deputies have various opinions on the issue of alternative service; many deputies oppose it. We know that this law exists in many civilized countries. Yes, a young person should be able to choose between military service and something else. However, the implementation of this law demands that the mentality of our people change. This draft law was not adopted. I asked Leanid Privalow to express his opinion on this issue.

[Begin Privalow recording] I do not want to comment on the behavior of some of our deputies, and I do not want to blame them. However, being an expert on this issue, I claim that the time for this law has not yet come [words indistinct]. [end recording]

People's Accord Party Urges Elections, Backs Strikes

WS0302154294 Minsk BELAPAN in Belarusian 1406 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Unattributed report: "News Conference of the Party of People's Accord Leadership"]

[Text] Today, at the National Press Center, the Party of People's Accord [PNZ] leadership held a news conference. Chairman Henadz Karpenka said that the primary PNZ task is to nominate candidates for the future elections to the Supreme Soviet. Henadz Karpenka also said that the PNZ will urge pre-term elections and changes in the structure of the Belarusian Council of Ministers. The PNZ chairman expressed full support for the strike which was scheduled by the Free Trade Unions to begin on 15 February. The reason for this is the Council of Ministers' unwillingness to hold talks with trade unions and adopt a mutually acceptable resolution. According to Karpenka's words, the PNZ held consultations with trade unions last Saturday [29 January]. With regard to the economic situation in the country, Henadz Karpenka stated that its change will be accompanied by a sharp worsening of the people's living standard. H. Karpenka said that presidential elections are necessary; however, they should be organized not by the Supreme Soviet, but by the people. PNZ Deputy Chairman Alaksey Karol, while commenting on the dismissal of Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich, stated that this [dismissal] has strengthened the authoritarian basis and brought a shift toward an authoritarian style of governing and the monopolization of power in the government's hands.

U.S. Embassy Reportedly To Issue Visas as of 14 Feb

WS0302204794 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1815 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] According to RID information from the U.S. Embassy in Minsk, on 14 February the Embassy will open a consular section for issuing all kinds on nonimmigrant visas. In some individual cases, the term for receiving visas may be up to 15 days. Therefore, the Embassy recommends applying for a visa at least 2 weeks ahead of a scheduled trip.

IMF Experts Encourage Close Ties With Russia

WS0402090594 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1815 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Experts of the IMF, who recently visited Belarus, have encouraged the Belarusian leadership's efforts to develop close economic ties with Russia. They underlined the advantages of economic integration with Russia. At the same time, these advantages, according to expert opinions, do not imply the creation of a monetary and credit union. According to them, one should take into account the negative economic results for Belarus of the unification of the monetary and credit systems if Russia fails to secure its economic stabilization.

Moldova

Dniester To Boycott Parliament Elections

LD0302123494 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1030 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] The Dniester Republic will not take part in the Moldovan Parliament elections, planned at the end of February, Dniester Moldavian Republic President Igor Smirnov said when meeting Bendery inhabitants. Igor Smirnov said the talks on a settlement to the Dniester conflict, in which Russia has mediated, have produced no practical results. According to Smirnov, Chisinau has rejected Tiraspols's proposal for the setting up of a confederation and ignored the proposal to set up a demilitarized zone in the area.

General Lebed Interviewed on Situation

PM0302172594 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Feb 94 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Russian 14th Army Commander Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed by Aleksey Chelnokov; place and date not given: "General Lebed: The Job Is To Bring in an Armada of Planes and Pretend That They Came by Themselves"]

[Text] Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed, at various times in his command of the 14th Army, has played alternately the part of a czarist governor general and one of Kotovskiy's red partisans [Kotovskiy was a civil war commander who fought in Moldavia]. The show of military might in the troubled Bessarabian boondocks has given way to raids against enemy rear. The current Moldovan parliamentary election campaign has been marked by lightning strikes against the political reputation of a number of rulers of the unrecognized Dniester Moldavian Republic. The authorities' reaction was not long in coming...

[Chelnokov] Aleksandr Ivanovich, how come that you, whom the Dniester people see primarily as the man who stopped the bloody war in Bendery 18 months ago, are now being accused by the authorities of the Dniester Moldavian Republic of virtually attempting a coup d'etat?

[Lebed] Organizing coups d'etat, the charge they are leveling at me, is not my style. I am worried about the living conditions and the fate of the 25,000 14th Army servicemen and members of their families living in the Dniester region. The stores here are empty, prices in the food markets are astronomical, there are no medicines, and teachers are leaving. There is complete collapse and chaos. I call the government of the Dniester Moldavian Republic criminal—that is why the local press sometimes calls me the "black general."

[Chelnokov] The economic situation everywhere in the CIS right now is, to put it mildly, not in the best shape. The reasons for that, as a rule, are certainly not of a criminal nature....

[Lebed] The Dniester region is of tremendous interest to the Russian military-industrial complex. There are several unique defense enterprises here. I know that First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets would like to invest resources in this production, but the reputation of the local leaders as thieves is an obstacle. When these people get credits they shout for joy, plug a few holes in the budget, but put half the money in their own pockets. A bunch of adventurists has come to power in the Dniester Moldavian Republic by exploiting people's natural desire for freedom.

[Chelnokov] In Russia it has long been the fashion to talk about mythical suitcases packed full of sensational documents allegedly attesting to the corruption of officials. Are you not afraid of finding yourself in the same tricky position as many Moscow setters of that fashion?

[Lebed] I have sent a number of documents corroborating my accusations to the Dniester region's ministries of internal affairs and state security. What was the result? The rejected documents rebound against those who brought them. I sent a stack of compromising materials to the Russian law enforcement agencies—the Military Prosecutor's Office, the General Prosecutor's Office, the Security Ministry, and counterintelligence. I do not know where it has all gone... It is a vicious circle.

[Chelnokov] In that case what is the point of your revelations? To prompt the Dniester region's people to civil disobedience?

[Lebed] I am calling for a civilized way out of the impasse in which the Dniester people find themselves. People must know that the hierarchy of the Dniester Moldavian Republic is politically compromised by participation in the October events in Moscow. On the instructions of President Smirnov there were between 70 and 110 people from the Dniester region in the White House on that day, according to various sources of information. As a consequence, Defense Minister Grachev phoned me 14 October and authorized me to notify this "criminal government" that all ties with them would be broken off.

[Chelnokov] So in your opinion the only obstacle to the settlement of the Moldovan conflict is the leadership of the Dniester Moldavian Republic?

[Lebed] Moldovan President Mircea Snegur is not fated to be a peacemaker either. A single phrase which he used on television when there were killings and robberies taking place in Bendery—"Everything is fine, the constitutional process is being restored"—turned him into a political corpse. Only the simultaneous replacement of the authorities in Chisinau and Tiraspol will make it possible to break the deadlock in the peace process and set a precedent for involving the Russian economy in the Dniester region.

Snegur is now being most comprehensively wiped out. Moldovan speaker Lucinschi is gradually destroying him in all spheres. In the near future—after the parliamentary elections—Lucinschi will replace Snegur, you mark my words.

[Chelnokov] Is the 14th Army prepared for a change in the political situation in Moldova?

[Lebed] A certain military-political balance of forces has now been established in this region. The armed forces of Moldova and the Dniester region are semi-guerrilla, semi-militia gangs. It is no great difficulty to set one off against the other. The 14th Army, which represents the only real military force, is playing the part of the notorious sword of Damocles here and is thus maintaining relative stability.

[Chelnokov] You have written a book called "The Spectacle Called a Putsch" ["Spektakl po imeni putch"] and the various events in which you have taken part are often called theater or circus. What is your role in this?

[Lebed] I am a player-coach. This is an enforced role dictated by Central Committee practice which still persists. Ever since Sumgait in 1988 I have not received a single written order, it is all done by phone. "Fly down there. Things are not going well. Establish order," and that is all. For example, I went to Tbilisi with three regiments—in 140 military transport planes. Imagine the job that we had: to get dozens of planes from different cities, form them into an airborne armada, fly down there, and then, when Gorbachev expressed surprise, we had to pretend: The devil only knows how they got down there.... Nothing has changed since that time.

Sentence Against Ilascu Group Annulled

AU0302195494 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Today in Chisinau the Penal Judiciary Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Moldova examined the case and annulled the sentence passed on 9 December 1993 against the [Ilie] Ilascu group. The case is to be returned to the State Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Moldova in view of opening penal procedures against the judges belonging to the anticonstitutional court in Tiraspol, who participated in the passing of the illegitimate sentence that jeopardized the life, freedom, and health of those sentenced.

At the same time the Moldovan body decided to terminate the preventive arrest of the six [members of the Ilascu group].

In a statement made to our correspondent, Nicolae Gore, a member of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Republic of Moldova, emphasized the fact that today's court ruling annuls the Tiraspol sentence and all its consequences. According to the laws of the Republic of Moldova, as soon as the sentence was annulled, the Ilascu group has to be released from jail, added Nicolae Gore.

Kazakhstan

Envoy to Iran Interviewed on Nuclear Arms

NC0302194294 Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 27 Jan 94 p 15

["Exclusive" interview with Kazakh Ambassador Myrzadai Zholdasbekov by unidentified JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI correspondent in Tehran "on the sidelines of the fourth foreign ministers' conference of the Economic Cooperation Organization"]

[Text] [JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI] Mr. Ambassador, recently an agreement was signed on the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine by the leaders of Russia, the United States, and Ukraine. Reports are being carried in the international mass media that there are efforts to sign a similar accord with all the republics of the former Soviet Union that have nuclear weapons, including Kazakhstan. What is your opinion on these efforts?

[Zholdasbekov] We are responsible for safeguarding our nuclear weapons. Until all countries in the world guarantee that they will not use nuclear arms and the world is rid of such weapons, we will not destroy them or transfer them elsewhere. We are aware of the accord signed on the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine. However, we believe that disarmament should be accompanied by a world guarantee that such weapons will not be used.

[JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI] You have not announced this stance openly and officially.

[Zholdasbekov] Our stance on this matter will be conveyed to the U.S. President on 17 February when Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev goes to the United States.

[JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI] Why do you wish to report this to the U.S. President?

[Zholdasbekov] Our president is visiting the United States at the official invitation of the U.S. President. Naturally, the objective of his visit is not to provide any clarification on nuclear weapons. However, it is natural that Mr. Clinton will speak to Mr. Nazarbayev about Kazakhstan's nuclear weapons. I mean that during these talks Mr. Nazarbayev will convey our country's official stance to the U.S. President.

[JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI] Mr. Ambassador, it is clear that Russia is constantly seeking to extend its domination over all the CIS countries. Do you believe this?

[Zholdasbekov] It is not to our advantage to magnify such points. In view of the extensive economic and industrial relations that we have with the Russians, we do not consider it appropriate to overshadow these relations with political issues. We should keep in mind that we have the longest common border with Russia and that we should be seeking logical and principled ways to broaden these relations.

[JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI] Do you have any political or economic news about Kazakhstan for us?

[Zholdasbekov] Yes. In the economic field, I wish to tell you that in the last few days of 1993 (that is one month ago) we replaced the ruble with our own monetary unit, the tenge. In the political field, I may add that soon parliamentary elections will be held in Kazakhstan.

[JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI] How soon?

[Zholdasbekov] On 7 March.

Nazarbayev on Relationship With Russia, CIS

PM0302145194 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 3 Feb 94 p 3

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondents Nikita Yermakov and Konstantin Pribytkov: "Kazakhstan's Future Is With Russia"]

[Text] When Kazakhstan was part of the Soviet Union, few people were familiar with it, and from this point of view participation in the Davos World Economic Forum provides an opportunity to showcase the republic, its potential, its legislation, and its development potential, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan said in an interview with ITAR-TASS correspondents.

At first the West did not understand the real situation in the economies of the CIS countries, the Kazakhstani head of state went on to say. Now it is starting to understand the realities taking shape in the CIS. If I myself had not believed in the Commonwealth's potential, I would never have been a fervent supporter of the integration process. The fact that the ruble zone, for which I also fought, has collapsed attests to what has now become clear: We are different. The economies and the states are different. We have become really independent states. Some people, maybe among the Russian political establishment, dislike this. As for Kazakhstan, I firmly declare (not because I am afraid or apprehensive of something or because I am engaging in intrigue): Strategically, Kazakhstan's future is with Russia. The future of the people, the future of the state, the future of the economy. This is not only advantageous to Kazakhstan, it is also advantageous to Russia. If we speak of independence, Russia was the first to proclaim sovereignty in 1990. I was astounded at the time: from whom, from what? But what is there to be surprised at now?

I do not regard sovereignty and independence as an end in itself, the president went on to point out. The end is to improve people's lives and the economy through this. When any state signs some agreement, it assumes obligations and gives up part of its sovereignty. The CIS countries' integration must now proceed along a path similar to the West European one, as the EC is doing. They are all independent states in the EC, and they all have their own currency, political independence, and freedom. Here, I believe, fate itself has determined a very important place for Russia. Russia can act as a unifier by fully recognizing sovereignties and not exerting any pressure, and maybe it can forgo some things at first. We must do as the West Europeans did, only not travel this path in 30 years, like they did, but in a shorter space of time.

President Nazarbayev Approves 1994 Budget

LD0302173194 Almaty Kazakh Radio Network in Kazakh 1500 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] In accordance with the law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 10 December 1993, with regard to the temporary delegation of additional powers to the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan and heads of local administrations, the president of Kazakhstan, by his decree, has endorsed the republican budget for 1994.

The budget has been presented by the Kazakhstan government. The revenues total a figure of 40,299,685,000 tenge, and its expenditures 48,111,806,000 tenge; the maximum size of the deficit stands at 7,812,121,000 tenge.

Kyrgyzstan

President Creates National Security Council

LD0402105294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0947 GMT 4 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Mainayev]

[Text] Bishkek February 4 TASS—The president of Kyrgyzstan decreed on Friday to create the National Security Council which is to become a consultative body at the president [as received] and will draft security decisions for the head of state.

The council is to consider strategic problems of state, economic, ecological and other types of security.

It is also to expose internal and external threats to Kyrgyzstan, assist the drafting of major guidelines of the national security strategy, prepare recommendations for the president on urgent decisions to avert extraordinary situations and other problems.

The council united the defence, interior, security ministers, the commander of the National Guard, several government members.

Dispute Over Dual Citizenship Issue Viewed

PM0302112194 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 3 Feb 94 p 3

[Report by correspondent Leonid Kalashnikov: "Kyrgyzstan: Passions Around Dual Citizenship"]

[Text] Kyrgyz Republic—It is by no means the heated disputes of deputies at the recent parliament session on the republic's budget nor even the long debates on the new coat of arms which have been the main topic for January in Kyrgyzstan's political life, but the idea of dual citizenship and whether or not to introduce it. That is where passions are seething!

The whole point is that the draft agreement on dual citizenship was prepared by the Russian side and conveyed through the Russian Embassy in Kyrgyzstan to the republic's president and government. Later there was Askar Akayev's New Year address to the people, his interviews with newspapers, and speeches in which he noted that dual citizenship "will be useful to both sides and will introduce a new spirit of trust, cooperation, and fraternity to relations between the two peoples—Russian and Kyrgyz." And most importantly it will work like a dam in the path of the stream of the Russian-speaking population leaving the republic. After all, last year alone, according to the Slav foundation, over 100,000 Russian speakers, as almost all inhabitants of nonindigenous nationality are now called here, left Kyrgyzstan. And those who left were primarily skilled national economy specialists, doctors, teachers, and engineers.

The republic's president is concerned. Measures are being urgently elaborated in the government to halt this destructive flow. But the process has begun, as the saying goes. And, unfortunately, it is being accelerated by several political parties defending so-called "national resurrection." Closing their eyes to the obvious advantages of dual citizenship both for Russians and for the Kyrgyz, not only, for instance, in the stabilization of the situation in the republic but also in the sphere of science, education, and so forth, they have rallied on one salient—preventing the signing of this agreement. The fiercest attacks on Askar Akayev come from the headquarters of the "Asaba" national resurrection party. Its central council has stated categorically and without beating about the bush: "The introduction of dual citizenship is a threat not only to the sovereignty of the Kyrgyz state but also to the very existence of the Kyrgyz nation."

But sober politicians who have preserved a spirit of internationalism do not think that way at all. Here is the opinion of Feliks Sharshenbayevich Kulov, a hero of August 1991 in Kyrgyzstan, vice president, and now head of the administration of Chuyskaya Oblast, the largest in the republic:

"I hope no one can accuse me of lacking patriotism, and I hope it does not seem immodest, but my actions have spoken louder than any words.... I unconditionally support the idea of dual citizenship since it serves primarily the interests of the Kyrgyz nation and could become the foundation of our state's security."

An interview with Chingiz Aytmatov appeared in VECHERNIY BISHKEK at just the right time. Considering Russian culture and its influence on him as an Asian man, the writer simply and clearly told his fellow citizens as if for their edification:

"How blind are those who call for national self-isolation, speaking of national exclusiveness. That road is a dead end. I think Kyrgyz culture should in no circumstances separate itself from Russian culture, from the Russian language which opened the way for the Kyrgyz people into world culture."

Whether or not there is to be dual citizenship will most likely be decided in the next few days. Optimists, and there are many of them among sober Kyrgyz politicians, believe that Askar Akayev will embark on such an interstate agreement between Russia and Kyrgyzstan after victory at the referendum.

Armenia

Azerbaijani Planes Bomb Karabakh Settlements

NC0302151894 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1400 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Despite lessening tension on the Karabakh fronts, the Azerbaijani troops are still trying to advance in several directions.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Defense Army Press Service reported that large enemy forces, mostly armored cars, launched an attack yesterday against Karabakh positions in the direction of Martuni and Gadrut. The offensive lasted from morning until late at night. After losing five tanks and 30 soldiers on the battlefield, the Azerbaijani troops retreated to their initial positions. Two Karabakh fighters died and seven were wounded.

Relative calm prevailed on the other sectors of the front until noon today.

The same source reported that an Azerbaijani Air Force plane appeared over Karabakh at around 1030 today. According to preliminary reports, the enemy plane was most probably engaged in a reconnaissance flight. Azerbaijani attack planes bombed the settlements in Askeranskiy Rayon at 1100. Casualty figures are being determined.

The Armenian Defense Ministry Press Service has reported that the calm prevailing on the border for the past three days has not been violated. We talked with the Press Service a short time ago and were informed that the situation on the border remained unchanged at 1930.

Ter-Petrosyan's Entourage Profiled

PM0402095194 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jan 94 First Edition p5

[Report by correspondent Sergey Bablumyan: "The Armenian President's Team: Artem Atalyants and Others"]

[Text] Yerevan—Yerevan newspapers often publish old photographs of Levon Ter-Petrosyan and his friends from the Karabakh Committee. There is nothing surprising in the fact that the same people still surround him now and that some of them are members of the president's team.

They all helped to found the current ruling party, the Armenian National Movement; the Karabakh Committee flowed smoothly down into it. Observers usually include parliamentary Speaker Babken Ararktsyan, Interior Minister Vanik Siradegyan, and, until recently, Chief National Security Adviser to the President Ashot Manucharyan in the circle of people closest to Ter-Petrosyan. Public opinion gives Siradegyan a special place among those closest to the president. The interior minister's almost unlimited freedom of action and independent conduct and opinions make these comments convincing enough. Levon Ter-Petrosyan has repeatedly expressed public satisfaction with the work done by Vanik Siradegyan's department. In turn, the interior minister categorically rules out the possibility of any difference of opinion with the president.

The president is helped in forming and implementing domestic policy by members of the Armenian National Movement, his loyalty to which he never tires of reiterating. It is Armenia's most liberal political party and favors cooperation not only with Russia and the West, but also with the East—with Turkey and Iran.

According to people in the know, Levon Ter-Petrosyan's economic views were formed under the influence of Prime Minister Grant Bagratyan and his predecessor, now Armenian Vice President Gagik Arutyunyan. As far as the well-known businessman Artem Atalyants is concerned, foreign economic issues are his sole responsibility as chief adviser to the president. Some observers assessing the situation in this sphere make no secret of their skepticism; this, incidentally, applies equally to the economic situation in the republic itself.

The average age of the president's closest entourage is 40-45. It is widely held in Armenia that the president's team is virtually entirely made up of his former fellow students from the Yerevan University Oriental Studies Department, as well as his work colleagues from the Institute of Ancient Manuscripts, the Matenadaran. In actual fact his team includes lawyers, economists, mathematicians, even musicologists, and, of course, orientalists.

A recent adviser, Vagan Papazyan, now heads the Armenian Foreign Ministry. This appointment is seen as a logical continuation of the president's cadre policy, as he earlier assigned another of his advisers, U.S. citizen Zhirayr Liparityan, to the same department. Continuing to work as first deputy minister, according to well informed sources, he is still one of the president's most trusted consultants in the foreign policy sphere.

Vazgen Sarkisyan, the president's chief military adviser, was a journalist until recently. According to many military specialists, he has quickly mastered military matters and no one in Armenia doubts his personal courage.

The opposition accuses Levon Ter-Petrosyan's closest associates of being incompetent, of being out of touch with the people's real problems and concerns, and of having totally forgotten their promises. The president's team does not outwardly respond to these attacks, although some members assess the results of their activity fairly soberly. But they stay with the president and, according to one of his comrades, if anyone were forced to leave it would only be "because of incredible physical exhaustion."

It is extremely rare for one of the president's closest entourage to leave on his own initiative, and in this sense the departure of former chief adviser Ashot Manucharyan is the exception.

"He only left because he wanted to leave," is the official comment on the resignation of one of the most influential members of the president's closest entourage. Few people in Armenia believe that Ashot Manucharyan has left the political scene for long.

Azerbaijan

Foreign Minister Views Talks With Russian Envoy

LD0302185894 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1408 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Azerbaijan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Gasan Gasanov gave a news conference today on the results of his talks with Vladimir Kazimirov, special envoy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Before the talks, Kazimirov visited Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh with a new Russian peace initiative on the Karabakh conflict. Yesterday, our correspondent Islam Kuliyev asked Gasan Gasanov to explain this especially for Mayak Panorama listeners.

[Begin recording] [Kuliyev] Gasan Azizovich, several days have passed since your talks with the Russian president's personal envoy, Vladimir Kazimirov, but unfortunately we have not yet received exhaustive information about the fate of the new peace initiative proposed by the Russian side. Could you please tell us about this in more detail?

[Gasanov] In fact, what one means by the Russian initiative is an initiative on settling this conflict by peaceful political methods. In this respect we totally and fully support the Russian initiative and believe that Russia must, without fail, participate in this settlement process. The point is that in addition to this overall settlement process, Kazimirov also had the idea that a ceasefire should be concluded immediately.

We gave our consent to Azerbaijan and Armenia urgently concluding a truce on a cease-fire. [sentence as heard] Azerbaijan was even willing not to place any terms on the cease-fire. However, the Armenian side set the condition that Nagorno-Karabakh should also sign this, as an equal partner. For Nagorno-Karabakh to sign as an equal partner would, in practice, have meant that they were, so to speak, a third party in this conflict even though they are not an equal third party. We very much regret the failure to persuade the Republic of Armenia to sign a cease-fire agreement with us.

[Kuliyev] As you see it, is there a chance that they might agree to the Armenian community in Nagorno-Karabakh playing some part in this whole talks process?

[Gasanov] That is precisely how we understand it, namely that Nagorno-Karabakh has two communities—the Azerbaijani community and the Armenian. Of the 150,000 population living in Nagorno-Karabakh, 100,000 are Armenians and 50,000 are Azerbaijanis. The Republic of Armenia totally ignores the rights of the 50,000 Azerbaijanis of Nagorno-Karabakh.

[Kuliyev] How do you see this conflict developing in the future?

[Gasanov] I see only one path, the path of a peaceful political settlement. We need to sit down at the negotiation table and to talk and talk and talk and not to expect instant results from these talks. We reckon on them being long-term but successful talks. Moreover, of course, I do not rule out the possibility that when we do sit down at the negotiation table, the Armenians will realize that talking from their position of strength does not have the effect it used to. And and having realized that it is not as effective to speak from a position of strength as it used to be, they will probably behave more realistically at the negotiation table. [end recording]

Armenia Blamed for Failure of Mission

NC0402084894 Baku TURAN in English 1641 GMT 3 Feb 94

["Armenia Again Destroyed the Signing of Cease-Fire Agreement"]

[Text] Baku, February 3 (TURAN)—Tofik Zulfugarov, the chief of the Division for the Conflicts and Political Regulation of the Armenian-Azeri Conflict, attached to the Azeri Foreign Ministry said at the press conference in Baku today "Azerbaijani side possesses numerous facts, including the testimonies of the Armenian officers taken prisoners in Kelbadzharshiy region recently proving the direct participation of the military units of the Republic of Armenia in fightings against the Azeri army in Karabakh and around [it]. Moreover, the documents and maps with instructions, withdrawn from the prisoners of war testify that all the operations are being worked out by the General Staff of the Armenian Republic. So, there is an armed conflict exactly between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Touching upon the problem of regulation of the conflict T. Zulfugarov said that the recent visit of the Special Russian Envoy Kazimirov to Baku was concerning the signing of cease-fire agreement. As Tofik Zulfugarov said "Azerbaijan stands for the political regulation of the conflict and is ready to cease hostilities in order to assist solving the problem. But we insist that the cease-fire agreement is signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan as they are the parties to the conflict." Mr. Zulfugarov said that Armenia says it is "responsible only for the situation on the Armenian-Azeri border, but the cease-fire agreement have to be signed between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh." "So, Armenia's conditions are directed at attaching the Nagorno-Karabakh status of the party to the conflict, and in perspective—an independent party at the talks. We cannot agree to this," T. Zulfugarov said.

Zulfugarov said that for the destructive position of Armenia the meeting between Azeri Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov and Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev did not take place.

Zulfugarov also said that the documents, testifying the participation of the Armenian Army in the aggression against Azerbaijan are sent to the UNO [United Nations Organization] Secretary General, to the CSCE Secretariat, NATO secretary general, European Soviet [Council of Europe] and a number of international organizations. "Our position is clear, constructive and has elements of compromise", Zulfugarov said.

Aliyev Urges Turkish Role in Karabakh Peace Force

TA0302182994 Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish 1700 GMT 3 Feb 94

[By Ali Dogan in Baku]

[Text] Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev has talked to Turkish reporters in Baku before his visit to Turkey. He said that Azerbaijan want peace but that the first and foremost condition is that Armenia withdraw from the Azerbaijani territory it has occupied. Pointing out that the Russian proposal for an immediate cease-fire was rejected because this condition had not been met, Aliyev stressed that Azerbaijan definitely wants Turkey to participate in the peacekeeping force Russia intends to station in Karabakh. Recalling that he will be making an official visit to Turkey as the guest of President Suleyman Demirel between 8 and 11 February, Aliyev added that this visit will constitute a stepping stone to further develop the existing bilateral relations. He noted that he will be conducting talks on all issues with Turkey and that the Ceyhan-Baku oil pipeline issue will also be taken up.

New Type of Timer Used in Baku Station Bomb

PM0302160794 Moscow TRUD in Russian 3 Feb 94 Night Edition (signed to Press 2205) p 1

[Tunzale Kasumova report: "Cars Blown to Smithereens"]

[Text] Baku—Train No. 660, which was standing at a platform in Baku Railroad Station, was blown up at 2247 hours yesterday. Three people died, and seven were injured.

If the explosion had happened some 20 minutes earlier or later, the scale of the tragedy would have been more considerable. By a lucky chance, however, by the time the delayed-action mine placed in the second car went off, the passengers who had just arrived on this train from Kislovodsk had already got off and all those who were to set out in it for Astara at 2307 hours had not yet had time to get on. Nevertheless, material damage (considerable damage!) was caused: In addition to the two cars blown to smithereens, windows were blown out in the nearby Baku-Tbilisi and Baku-Ganja trains.

A. Bagirov, the republic's transport prosecutor, has said that an investigation has started. "This is not the first act of terrorism," he remarked. "Whereas in previous instances we were dealing with explosive devices with a clockwork mechanism restricting their operating time to 12 hours, a mine has now been used which, thanks to special chemical fillers, can be set off two or three days after being put in position."

'Large-Scale' Armenian Offensive Reported

NC0302205094 Baku TURAN in English 1742 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Baku (February 2) TURAN—According to local reports, early morning on February 2 Armenian forces launched a large-scale offensive against the TerTerskiy region of Azerbaijan from the town of Agdere (Mardakert).

The Armenians managed to advance into some sections of Azerbaijani territory. The same day the village of Burudj of TerTer region was shelled. As a result, 3 civilians died.

In the Agdamskiy Region, the units of the Azerbaijani army sucessfully repulsed the attacks of the Armenians.

Air Force Bombing of Karabakh Reported

LD0302144294 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1408 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] We have just received a report by the LUR agency that the Azerbaijani air force is bombing towns and villages in Nagorno-Karabakh. At 1100 hours, the Azerbaijani air force violated the airspace of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and carried out an air strike against several populated localities in Askeranskiy rayon. Casualty figures are being clarified.

Georgia

More on Russian-Georgian Talks; Kozyrev Quoted

LD0302133594 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1200 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the head of the Georgian state, Eduard Shevardnadze, have signed in Tbilisi an all-embracing Treaty of Friendship and Good-Neighborliness between the countries. With the details Nikolay Mamuashvili.

[Mamuashvili] Apart from the signing of a large, so-called Framework Treaty on friendship and good-neighborliness, the sides examined and signed a whole package of agreements envisaging cooperation between the countries in virtually all spheres and fields. I will remind you that before the official signing ceremony, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the head of the Georgian state, Eduard Shevardnadze, had a one-on-one meeting. The heads of the Georgian and Russian foreign political departments—Aleksandr Chikvaidze and Andrey Kozyrev—also had talks and a discussion on questions of mutual interest behind closed doors. Otar Patsatsia, the republican prime minister, met with Oleg Soskovets, and Jaba Ioseliani, a Georgian parliament deputy, had talks with Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev.

At the conclusion of these meetings the sides stressed that they were completely satisfied with the results achieved. In an interview for an IPRINDA agency correspondent, Andrey Kozyrev said, I quote: We see the Interstate Treaty as a symbol for settling the conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, solving the problem of the republic's Russian-speaking population, and other no less important issues.

The so-called military part of the talks is also evoking undoubted interest. Russian Defense Minister Grachev, after his meeting with Jaba Ioseliani, said that he was also happy with the talks. He said that it was possible that three Russian military bases would be deployed in Georgia. As far as the subunits of Russian troops stationed in Abkhazia are concerned, they are now subordinate to General Fedor Reut, the commander of the Transcaucasian Group of Troops—all with the exception of the 345th Parachute Assault Regiment that remains subordinate to Moscow, and Jaba Ioseliani said that all that the sides are now doing is being done on mutually advantageous conditions without any encroachments [ushchemleniya].

Agreements Signed

LD0302174194 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1407 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze have ended talks in Tbilisi by signing an outline friendship and cooperation treaty between their countries. Ten other agreemnts were also signed.

The framework agreement binds the two sides to build relations as friendly nations and not to participate in any blocs or alliances aimed against each other. It also provides for bilateral consultations and appropriate measures if one of the sides' interests or security is threatened.

Speaking before flying to Tbilisi, Yeltsin said the question of the Russian parliament ratifying the treaty would be delayed until a comprehensive solution to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia was found.

Opponents of the treaty, many of them Russian deputies, have attacked some of its clauses saying the two sides will sign further agreements to help Georgia set up its own army and supply it with Russian-made weapons, military hardware and technologies.

Other agreements signed by Russia's First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets and Georgian Prime Minister Otar Patsatsia are on trade and economic cooperation for 1994; free trade; the status of Russian border guards deployed in Georgia; international roadway communications; cooperation in areas of science and technology and communications; regulation of resettlement processes and the protection of resettlers' rights; early warning and elimination of emergency situations; and a protocol on financing Russian border troops deployed in Georgia.

Cooperation agreements on cultural links, science and education were signed by Foreign Ministers Andrey Kozyrev and Aleksandr Chikvaidze.

Earlier in the day, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and Chief of Staff of the Georgian Defense Ministry Guram Nikolaishvili signed a protocol of intent providing for the establishment of three Russian army bases in Georgia.

Yeltsin, Shevardnadze News Conference

LD0302160594 Tbilisi First Program Television Network in Russian 1024 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Opening statements and question and answer session at a news conference by Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin and Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze with correspondents in Tbilisi—live]

[Text] [Vakhtang Rcheulishvili, deputy speaker of the Georgian Supreme Council] Dear colleagues, the [Russo-Georgian] agreement has just been signed. Talks have been held between the heads of states and the official delegations. After statements by the heads of state, Vlachislav Vasilievich and myself will give you a possibility to ask questions in turn, but please ask questions only at the microphones.

Boris Nikolayevich, as our guest, we ask you to make a statement.

[Yeltsin] Esteemed ladies and gentlemen. Today's visit by the Russian delegation to the Republic of Georgia is proceeding quite successfully. A major, joint work has been carried out. The time has come already to sum up with you at least the preliminary results of the meeting. I think that we have every grounds for satisfaction. The fates of our peoples are closely intertwined. From ancient times, Georgia has seen in an alliance with Russia the guarantees for preserving its culture and for saving the nation from plunging into catastrophe. Our bonds are strong and many-sided, and mutual fondness is genuine.

Everybody in Russia knows Ilia Chavchavadze [famous Georgian writer, poet, and public figure] and honors the memory of Grand Duke Bagration. Everybody has heard about Meliton Kantaria [Georgian soldier in WW II]. History itself calls on the peoples of Russia and Georgia to live in peace and agreement. There is no other sensible solution. We have gone through difficult times in the past as well; however, our great predecessors used to always find ways to guarantee a calm and respectable life for our peoples. We have no right to destroy what we have inherited.

The aims of Russian policy are clear and concrete—establishing not simply friendly but also allied relations with Georgia, of course, mutually taking into consideration legal, state, and national interests.

As you know, Eduard Ambrosyevich Shevardnadze and I have signed a comprehensive agreement on friendship, good-neighborliness, and cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia. This was the main official aim of the Russian president's visit to Tbilisi. We assess the agreement highly. The agreement lays a solid legal basis for our cooperation. I hope that it will work effectively for the development of future Russian-Georgian relations.

Altogether, 25 documents have been signed. Eduard Ambrosyevich and I have exchanged opinions on bilateral cooperation, on regulating the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on pressing international issues, and on the situation in the Transcaucasus.

The Russian side supports a fundamental improvement of relations with Georgia in all fields, the speediest restoration of broken economic, cultural, and spiritual bonds, and a gradual rapprochement and integration. Joining of efforts will help our countries to find a way out of the complex economic situation in which they found themselves after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

I would like to stress once again that Russia is proceeding from the necessity of observing Georgia's territorial integrity and fully securing the interests of the multinational population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia supports a full-scale settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts through peaceful political means and supports mutually acceptable solutions regarding state and political arrangements.

The Russian representatives will continue, together with the Georgian and Abkhaz sides and the CSCE, to participate in efforts directed toward regulating the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. They will keep on achieving considerable growth in the number of international observers, both military and civilian, and in using peacekeeping military forces in the conflict zone.

The issue of refugees from Abkhazia is an acute one. Russia is ready to assist in resolving it. We are, once again, addressing the sides to launch a full-scale operation for supporting peace in Abkhazia. The Russian contingent could also take part in it. The main goal of these forces is to guarantee a secure return of refugees. It is necessary to keep on searching for mutually- acceptable solutions to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that will help turn the Caucasus region into a zone of solid peace and stability.

The issue of ethnic Russians is vulnerable for us and, although the official stance of the Georgian authorities must not give us a cause for alarm, the departure from Georgia of 150,000 Russian- speaking people over the last two years cannot but put us on guard. There have been instances of oppression at the social scale—usurpation of servicemen's apartments, etc. We expect an active counteraction against such negative occurrences and others. It is in the interests of both of the countries and in the interests of deepening friendship and cooperation between our peoples.

Russia is ready to cooperate bilaterally with Georgia, within the CIS, and on the international arena. Only under the circumstances of peace can economic and democratic developments be safely guaranteed.

Using this opportunity, I would like to express my gratefulness for a warm, friendly welcome extended to the Russian delegation in friendly Georgia.

Thank you for your attention.

[Shevardnadze] Ladies and gentlemen! Esteemed Boris Nikolayevich! Thank you for participating in the news conference, and for the attention you paid to the first official visit of the Russian president in our country.

I have already said at the negotiations that it is a significant event in the 200-year-old history of relations between our peoples. This event undoubtedly deserves great attention from both of our countries. I think that the negotiations and the documents signed here in Tbilisi—and not only negotiations—will assist in strengthening friendship and cooperation within the framework of the CIS and the region as a whole.

For the first time in the ancient history of relations between Russia and Georgia, we have been presented with a chance to build them on a totally different basis. For the first time, unlike in the past, we have decided to confirm each other's strategic aims and interests as two equal and independent states. For the first time following a long period marred by a string of events, the aftermath of which we will still have to be overcome through joint efforts, there is a hope for restoring traditionally friendly relations between our peoples. The importance of the visit by Boris Nikolayevich and such an imposing delegation goes beyond the boundaries of Russo-Georgian relations. The normalization of these relations is closely connected with the complexity of regulating the Caucasus and the Black Sea regions and of achieving peace and stability here.

Boris Nikolayevich and I talked about activating the Caucasian factor in the process of regulating all conflicts about which the whole of the world knows. It is a great tragedy for peoples of the Caucasus.

We have talked about the necessity of holding a dialogue on the Caucasian issue with the participation of the three

Transcaucasian states and, naturally, with Russia's participation and about inviting the Russian Federation subjects. I mean the North Caucasian republics. By the way, I discussed this issue the day before yesterday with my colleagues, [Azerbaijani President] Geydar Aliyev and [Armenian President] Levon Ter-Petrosyan, who support this idea with great enthusiasm.

We have just signed a comprehensive agreement between the Russian Federation and Georgia. I suppose that the name speaks for itself. It includes friendship, good-neighborliness, and cooperation. This is what, for several centuries, Georgia has aspired for in connection with its great northern neighbor.

A package of documents containing many agreements have been signed. Boris Nikolayevich has already mentioned the number of the agreements. I would only like to name several that are principally important for our countries: agreements on free trade, culture, education, relations, international highway links, regulating the processes of migration, guarding the human rights of the dispossessed, and preventing and (?liquidating) emergency situations. Several agreements on regulating military cooperation have also been signed; I mean the issues connected with border troops and, on the whole, the status of the Russian Army, and many others.

We have, in principle, agreed to create bases for Russian troops. I think that it is in accordance with the interests of Georgia and Russia and the whole of the Transcaucasus. We have signed a protocol about setting up a special working group that will study all aspects of granting the presence of the Russian Army a new principle. Our primary aim is that the terms of the treaty and other agreements signed today be implemented as soon as possible. It is in the interests of Russia and Georgia and the whole of our region and, of course, the world's peace and security. It was the main subject for our present talks and negotiations, which were a continuation of the dialogue that had been started a long time ago.

We have examined in detail and thoroughly the status and the prospects of developing relations between our countries. I would like to stress a mutual aspiration for a comprehensive improvement of relations. The conclusion has been drawn that the current situation is favorable for this and that we will make every effort in order to achieve the realization of these goals.

Much time, and maybe the most significant time, was naturally devoted to Abkhazia, to the political settlement of this and other conflicts under the auspices of the United Nations and with Russia's most active participation and mediation.

All aspects for regulating the Georgian-Ossetian conflict have been discussed. I told Boris Nikolayevich that I did not see the reasons why we could not resolve these most complex issues of modern times in the near future. They are the most complex issues, but the traditions of friendship that are centuries-old and the relations between the Georgian and Ossetian peoples—the Georgian and Abkhaz peoples—and the favorable influence of Russia and the whole of the world public, give us a chance to resolve these issues in the near future.

We have also discussed the situation in the Transcaucasus on the whole and expressed our own views on the situation. As Boris Nikolayevich has already mentioned, there are no serious gaps between us in connection with all these pungent problems; I mean the region and the CIS on the whole.

The subject matter of our talks also included the issues of perfecting the activities of the CIS. Skimming through the international situation, we fixed our attention on the issues of guaranteeing collective security and the different forms of strategic cooperation in this important trend between regional and intergovernmental structures. Naturally, the results of our negotiations will help establish peace and calm in the Transcaucasus, strengthen the CIS, strengthen the alliance of the Black Sea countries where Russia is playing a very active role, as well as Georgia and our neighbors—Turkey, Ukraine, and other states, such as Azerbaijan and Armenia. Naturally, there are no conflicts between those international organizations and the European structures with which we are collaborating.

Great prospects are opened, and I would like to express deep gratitude to the president of Russia, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, and all members of the delegation for the good will displayed to us and the wish to establish principally new relations with independent and democratic Georgia. Thank you.

[Rcheulishvili] I would ask the journalists to introduce themselves, and since there are a lot of people here and not every one of you will be able to approach the microphones, I would request you to state your questions loudly.

[Unidentified moderator] The first question is from Ilyashenko, RIA Novosti. Louder.

[Ilyashenko] Boris Nikolayevich, have the issue of Georgia's joining the ruble zone or the issue of granting credits to Georgia been discussed during talks today?

[Yeltsin] Both these issues have been discussed. The issue of credits has been decided on the governmental level, and a definite sum of money will be earmarked for Georgia. As for the ruble zone, when Eduard Ambrosiyevich [Shevardnadze] and I were having tete-a-tete negotiations, we agreed that considering the complexity of this issue, we would set up working groups that will weigh everything, all pros and cons for both Georgia and Russia. Only after that will we make decisions.

[Shevardnadze] There are a lot of talks about the issue of the ruble zone. Some are protesting; others demand that we join as soon as possible. As far as I understand it, the door has not been opened yet, so to say. The issue should really be researched.

[Moderator] Ibervisia TV company.

[Correspondent] The "Monitor" program, Ibervisia Independent TV company. Boris Nikolayevich, what has caused such a negative attitude by the Duma toward your visit and the signing of the treaty, and why does the aspiration for the stabilization of the situation in Georgia stir up such a negative attitude in North Caucasia?

[Yeltsin] I do not know from what sources you draw this sort of information, that the Duma regards this visit negatively. This is an official state visit of the president of the country; therefore, the Duma will ratify this treaty. There is another thing. There will apparently be certain discussions during ratification, and this is not ruled out during the ratification of any international agreement that is being signed. I do not remember a treaty being ratified immediately, without any discussions. We also expect discussions on this issue. Nevertheless, I am certain that the Duma will regard this full-scale treaty with the independent Republic of Georgia positively.

[Correspondent] What about North Caucasia? [no reply given to this question as heard]

[Grushenko, INTERFAX correspondent] Boris Nikolayevich, can you tell us please to what extent the comprehensive political treaty can assist the growth of Russia's potential for stabilizing the situation in the Caucasus and the Transcaucasus in this region. I think that Georgia also must have the say. Could the head of the Georgian state, esteemed Eduard Ambrosyevich, comment on this question too? Thank you.

[Yeltsin] During our one-on-one discussions and talks, we devoted most of our time to this very issue. If we do not regulate properly the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, then there will be difficulties in the development of our future relations. Thus, the key aim for us is to regulate these relations. As to how and in which way we will do it, we have agreed that we will be working jointly—Russia, the UN, and the CSCE will all act to introduce peacekeeping forces there [in Abkhazia]. Subsequently, Georgia must grant a definite political and legal status to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This is so that Abkhazia and South Ossetia will work together with Georgia on the draft of the new constitution that is being worked out now. It will also improve the situation. Therefore, I hope that with joint efforts we will manage to regulate the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

[Shevardnadze] I agree with Boris Nikolayevich, and I would like to add that resolving these conflicts—if we are talking about strategic goals, then it is the most important issue—is in Georgia's interest in all aspects because the country is on the brink of starvation, literally on the threshold of poverty. Our strategic interests coincide completely, and there is a complete, mutual understanding in this respect. As for how we understand strategic interests, I have already said during the talks that several months ago—I think it is worth remembering—I asked Boris Nikolayevich what Russia's strategic interests in the Caucasus and, in particular, Georgia, were. Boris Nikolayevich answered that they wanted to deal with the single, integral Georgia, the integral state that would develop democratically and have good-neighborly relations with Russia. I think that we understand it correctly that Russia, naturally, has its geopolitical and strategic interests. We have found a complete and mutual understanding when we talked about strategic interests.

[Unidentified correspondent] Georgian News Agency. I would like to ask how the Russian president and the Georgian head of state assess the last UN resolution on Abkhazia, passed on 31 January, and how you visualize the return of refugees to Abkhazia, or whether all this will remain on paper. Before I receive an answer to this question I would like to make use of an opportunity and hand over to you, Boris Nikolayevich, an appeal by Georgian correspondents and their Russian colleagues about the fate of a well-known Sukhumi correspondent, Aleksandr Berulava, who is still...

[Unidentified woman, interrupting] You can hand it to me later.

[Correspondent] All right.

[Yeltsin] I regard the UN resolution as the one that meets the interests of both the Abkhazian and Georgian peoples, as well as the interests of Russia as a mediator.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, will you please allow Georgian TV to ask a question?

[Shevardnadze] I beg your pardon, but I would like to remind those who ask this question or those who are interested by this problem that the resolution, the last UN Security Council resolution, was drawn up with the active participation of Russian representative at the United Nations. Thus I can say that we have a complete agreement with regard to the views and interests over this issue.

[Moderator] Sergey Medvedev, Ostankino Television, please.

[Medvedev] I have a question for the two leaders.

[Moderator] Only one question, please.

[Medvedev] Boris Nokolayevich, I would like to hear an answer to the following question: Boris Nikolayevich, The Abkhazian side, a conflicting party, is very concerned about the Union agreement—let us put it this way—with Georgia, with regard to the fact that Russia will participate in building up the Georgian Armed forces, and it is concerned that this will not encourage a peaceful settlement of the conflict. although I have been warned, I would like to get an answer to another question. Do you think that the economic situation Georgia has found itself influences this treaty, or that the signing of a document like this is a conclusion to a strategic trend?

[Yeltsin] As regards Paragraph 3 of the agreement, which reflects the issue of rendering assistance in building up the Georgian Armed Forces, we certainly do not mean a huge army. Georgia is unable to feed a big army. We mean a minimal number of forces in these armed units, assistance with equipment, and so on. And this is not expected today or tomorrow. This is a ongoing topic and it will be enough to help settle the Abkhazian issue. This is a common army. It is not planned for the territory of Georgia without Abkhazia and without Ossetia. No. This is an army of an integrated Georgia, and the Abkhazians do not have to be nervous about it. Moreover, we will be in complete control this issue.

[Shevardnadze] As for the army, we are not intending and actually we are not able to have a gigantic army. No one will threaten us, and it is unreal that we will threaten someone. Therefore, we will be building a small army. Without Russia, we are unable to create even a small army. I think this is in Russia's interest, too. Regarding what we had in mind when signing the comprehensive treaty and a package of economic and other agreements, I agree it was the economic situation. I believe that it was a mistake, a big mistake, when Georgia isolated itself. It did not gain anything. Neither Russia nor any other countries who cooperated with us gained anything. But not only economy. I have already spoken of a strategic interest between Georgia and Russia, and the interests of the Commonwealth states, of our neighbors. So, the approach was a complex one. And there was complex interest toward building new relations with Russia.

[Moderator] Introduce yourself, please.

[Bakhtadze] Vakhtang Bakhtadze, the FORUM newspaper. A question to Mr. Yeltsin and Mr. Shevardnadze. It is known and it is a fact that the Republic of Georgia became the 179th member [not further specified] on the basis of the Act of Independence and the results of a referendum held on 31 March 1991, when 99 percent of the people said yes to independence. It was said that everything infringing independence is unlawful. Do you not think that the agreements signed by you in the spheres of credits and finances, [words indistinct] and customs, as well as in the military sphere, are contradictory, to say the least, and can be regarded as a different interpretation of the definition of total independence and total sovereignty. Will you please state what you mean by the definition of the independent state of Russia and the independent state of Georgia. Thank you.

[Moderator] Thank you for your speech.

[Shevardnadze] I will answer. When drawing up and signing all the documents, the comprehensive treaty, the economic package, and all the rest, which regulate relations between the two countries, the interests of Georgia and the interests of Russia were fully considered. And if some compromise approach can be observed in some cases, I believe that it is impossible to survive without compromises during our time. I am stating with full responsibility that neither all these treaties nor all these agreements contradict the act you mentioned. They comply with the interests of Georgia, and not only the present Georgia but also tomorrow's problems and prospects.

[Rcheulishvili] Thank you very much, and for God's sake excuse us, but the time is up.

[Moderator] The stipulations of the protocol demand that we finish the news conference.

Discuss Military Cooperation, Peacekeeping

PM0302172094 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Feb 94 pp 1, 4

[Report by Boris Vinogradov and Besik Urigashvili: "Russia and Georgia Agree on Military Cooperation"]

[Text] Tbilisi—The main event of Boris Yeltsin's visit to Georgia is the signing of a treaty of friendship, good-neighborliness, and cooperation, and also a number of documents on economic ties.

Most interesting of all are the military aspects of the treaty, which state that the two sides commit themselves to taking measures designed to guarantee each other's security and defense organizational development. The treaty also envisages joint protection of Georgia's foreign borders, which are also the borders of the CIS. The result of the preliminary consultations between Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and Shevardnadze was an agreement on establishing three Russian military bases on Georgian territory. The number of troops at these bases will not exceed 20,000 men. Nothing has yet been announced about the purpose or size of the bases or the terms of the lease, but at this preliminary stage, the members of the Russian delegation indicated, we are talking about Air Force and Naval bases. The Russian troops stationed in Georgia will occupy their former positions and guard railroad lines.

Russia will provide Georgia with assistance in setting up a national army and equip it with weapons, hardware, and technology without the right to transfer these products to other countries. It is generally supposed that this point of the treaty will displease both Abkhazia and a number of North Caucasian peoples who are supporting the Abkhazian separatists. This military "tethering" of Georgia to Russia, the opposition believes, will increase Shevardnadze's dependence on Moscow's policy even more.

The majority faction in the State Duma has expressed its own position on this issue by noting the obviously anti-Abkhazian bent of the military cooperation. There can be no doubt that the treaty will run into difficulty at the ratification stage in the parliaments of both countries. However, Boris Yeltsin intends to resolutely follow up the promises he has made and he stressed that the present treaty is in no sense a military pact against anyone.

Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze also discussed the prospects for the peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia. They expressed restrained approval of the UN Security Council's plans to increase the number of international observers in Abkhazia to 88, but they did not hide their disappointment that the UN is delaying its decision to send "blue helmets" to the conflict zone.

In an interview with IZVESTIYA, Georgian Foreign Minister A. Chikvaidze noted that the situation is deadlocked. The United Nations does not want to give its mandate to the Russian Army until it can see real progress on the political settlement front. But the settlement process has now come up against the problem of refugees who are afraid to return to their homes unless peacekeeping forces appear on the banks of the Inguri.

In September last year Pavel Grachev proposed to Eduard Shevardnadze that Russian troops should be sent to Abkhazia, but the Georgian president declined this proposal. Tbilisi now recognizes that this was the wrong course of action.

In Tbilisi, despite the security measures taken in connection with Yeltsin's visit, terrorist acts are still taking place. The night before the arrival of the Russian president, Colonel Nikolay Kekelidze, an aide to one of Georgia's deputy defense ministers, was blown up after stepping on a mine in the porch of his home.

Official Dinner, Departure

LD0302192594 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1814 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Tbilisi, 3 Feb (ITAR-TASS)—At the end of Boris Yeltsin's official visit to Tbilisi, Georgian head of state Eduard Shevardnadze hosted a formal dinner in honor of the Russian Federation president.

In his speech at the dinner, Eduard Shevardnadze described the first official visit of the Russian president to independent Georgia as an historic event, with which hopes are being linked for reviving the traditions of spiritual proximity between the peoples of the two states. "Or, speaking in political terms, hopes for building fundamentally new Georgian-Russian relations in the spirit of equality, mutual understanding, goodneighborliness, and friendship," Eduard Shevardnadze said. Shevardnadze added that this event raises hopes for a "restoration of justice, which to us means restoring Georgia's territorial integrity."

In his speech, Boris Yeltsin also noted the importance of the summit in Tbilisi. "We have made mutually beneficial and perspective decisions in the political, economic, and other spheres of mutual cooperation," he underscored.

The Russian president said that he is determined to continue patiently seeking mutually acceptable solutions to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in order to transform the whole Caucasus into a zone of stability and stable peace.

In conclusion, Boris Yeltsin expressed his gratitude for the warm and hearty welcome "which was rendered to the Russian delegation in friendly Georgia," and proposed a toast toward friendship between the people of Russia and Georgia, and for their further cooperation.

This evening the Russian delegation left for Moscow. At Tbilisi Airport Boris Yeltsin and members of the Russian delegation were seen off by Eduard Shevardnadze, Prime Minister Otar Patsatsia, and other officials.

Protocol Signed on Setting Up 3 Russian Bases

LD0302135194 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1143 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Russia's Defence Minister Pavel Grachev and Georgia's Chief of Staff Guram Nickolaishvili signed in Tbilisi on Thursday, February 3, a protocol of intent, which provides for setting up three Russian military bases in Georgia.

As Grachev has reported in an interview with Interfax, the facilities are to be located at Vaziani (30 kilometers south of Tbilisi), at Akhalkalaki (southern Georgia), and at Batumi (the Ajar Autonomous Republic).

As he explained, the bases will get under construction in 1995 after the term of Russian troops interim presence expires, and their status will differ much from that of the Russian forces in Georgia now. Russia will foot the entire troops maintenance bill and will partly compensate for its military presence in Georgia.

Grachev emphasized that the primary goal of the bases would be to defend the CIS North Caucasian flank.

According to experts, there are about 8000 Russian servicemen in Georgia. With the formation of three bases in Georgia plus two facilities in Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Russian army in Transcaucasia will total 23,000 men.

Grachev, Patsatsia on Signing Agreement

LD0302232394 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1607 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Interview with Prime Minister Otar Patsatsia and Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev by unidentified correspondent in Tbilisi on 3 February—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Otar Patsatsia] This is an historic occasion. It not only has political importance but also economic importance. We are witnessing deep forms of fraternity and friendship between the Georgian and Russian peoples, and these are at the stage of restoration. It is necessary for us to restore them. We pin great hopes on this large package [of agreements] that was just signed. This will provide an impetus in the development of the economy in our republic.

[Correspondent] Thank you.

[Pavel Grachev] These issues were agreed upon at the level of working groups. A consent has been acquired from the two presidents. I had a talk with Eduard Ambrosyevich Shevardnadze on this subject yesterday. He confirmed all these intentions, and this morning our experts finished the text of the protocol we signed.

[Correspondent] Will the issue of the return of refugees to Abkhazia be discussed, and how safe would it be?

[Grachev] All issues linked with the further work, even the the principal treaty our presidents will sign, will certainly be linked with the situation in Abkhazia as well as the situation in South Ossetia. Indeed, without a stable political situation in the Georgian state, all of these good undertakings, good protocols, and all other good things will not gain momentum. A firm, good, and stable political situation is required. [passage omitted]

Kozyrev on Regional Implications of Treaty

LD0302165894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1409 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev has declared that the Russo-Georgian Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation, signed in Tbilisi on February 3, "demonstrates the vital interests both states have in each other."

In an interview with Interfax, he said that the treaty and the entire visit should be regarded "as a strong impetus to political efforts to return peace to Abkhazia and South Ossetia rather than a substitute for such efforts."

Kozyrev stressed that in defining the future status of the regions it was necessary to renounce force and seek "a realistic compromise."

Soskovets Says No Discussion on Ruble Zone

LD0302233894 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1600 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] A strict itinerary for the Russian delegation in Georgia ruled out the opportunity for a conversation with Russian Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets. However, after his talks with the Georgian prime minister on 3 February, he found some free minutes.

Oleg Soskovets said that, historically, our peoples have always been together. Everything that is happening today reflects the aspiration of the two parties, that is, to support what was stipulated by history. One cannot gamble with the welfare of the people, but people can endure anything, including unreasonable activities, for a certain length of time.

Responding to our correspondent's question about the importance of the CIS, Mr. Oleg Soskovets said: This Commonwealth is an opportunity to protect our traditions, economic relations, and industrial union. It is necessary to admit that sensible unities are justified and to realize that the life of the people and the improvement of their life is principal. Now we are independent states. We have our own policy and free economic relations. We are building them on an absolutely new basis of equality. All of this is a proof that politicians as well as people have become wiser.

Asked the question, Have you discussed the issue of Georgia's joining the ruble zone with the prime minister?, Mr. Soskovets answered: We have not discussed the issue this time. We have discussed ways to arrange the restoration of broken economic relations and, in particular, possibilities to stabilize Georgia's power and fuel economy and secure transport movement between Georgia and Russia.

South Ossetian, Abkhaz Stance on Treaty 'Incorrect'

LD0302154194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1341 GMT 3 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Yuriy Sizov and Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Tbilisi February 3 TASS—The full-scale treaty of friendship and cooperation signed by Russia and Georgia today, which is seen as "most useful to Russia in its political aspect" by Russian Presidential Council member Emil Paine, has met cool reception in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia's autonomies claiming greater independence.

Paine called their attitude "incorrect" from Russia's viewpoint for two reasons: "It is wrong to stick to double criteria in politics: if you support territorial integrity of Russia, you must support territorial integrity of the neighboring states—there is no alternative," Paine said. "And it is wrong to condition the signing of an inter-state treaty on the settlement of internal conflicts. Problems of this kind exist in many countries. It is difficult to imagine someone order other countries not to have anything to do with Russia until its federal authorities settle relations with the Chechen Republic, for example".

As concerns benefits for Russia, Paine said Russia needs sea ports badly. Georgia has several and can provide the much-needed services to Russia.

Paine also pointed to the problem of Russian troops and military bases on Georgian territory. "Georgia guarantees required provisions for the Russian troops," he said. The two countries's agreement on military strategic issues is of significance for all Commonwealth member-countries.

The drawing of new borders could cost Russia tens of billions of roubles. Also important are the agreements with Georgia on transit transportation of Russian goods by land and sea via Georgia, Paine said.

Abkhaz Statement on Georgia's 'Sabotage'

LD0302231194 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1939 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] The Abkhazian Defense Ministry reported on continuing acts of sabotage committed by the Georgian formations in the Abkhazian region of Ghali.

The ministry's statement published on Thursday says that as many as 3 Abkhazian servicemen were killed during an act of sabotage near the populated center of Sida on February 2.

The document underlined that this displayed the Georgian formations' intention to destabilize the situation in the region of Ghali and to block the Abkhazian troops defending the Abkhazian- Georgian border on the Inguri River.

The Abkhazian Defense Ministry announced that it could "not ignore all these facts and would undertake the appropriate measures."

Defense Minister Injured in Second Explosion

LD0302203394 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1807 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] The press center of the Georgian Defense Ministry told Interfax that another explosion took place today at about 13:00 in the apartment of Georgian Deputy Defense Minister Niki Kekelidze, killed by the first one last night. The second explosion was much less powerful, but caused a slight concussion to Georgian Defense Minister Georgiy Karkarashvili, who came to see the site of the incident.

The press center said that no one except the minister was hurt and suggested that a booby trap had been installed in Kekelidze's apartment.

Meanwhile, the press center of the Georgian Interior Ministry failed to confirm the information on the second explosion.

Troops Reportedly Prepare for Offensive

LD0302132894 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1200 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] The situation in Abkhazia's Galskiy rayon remains tense. Vladimir Mikanba, deputy head of the Abkhazian Council of Ministers, told ITAR-TASS that armed groups of Georgian troops are still crossing the border along the Inguri river. These formations have recently stepped up their activities. The Abkhazian leadership has information that the Georgian troops are preparing for an offensive. This matter will be reflected in a statement by the republican government which is being prepared today.

Poti Port To Become Joint-Stock Company

AU0302110294 Tbilisi SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA in Georgian 28 Jan 94 p 1

[Report by Eduard Ediberidze: "In the Cabinet of Ministers. From Principled and Serious Positions"]

[Excerpt] The commercial port of Poti is to become the biggest joint-stock company in Georgia. The Georgian Cabinet of Ministers agreed in principle to transforming this state enterprise, the biggest in the republic, into a joint-stock company during its regular session held on 26 January under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Otar Patsatsia. Out of the whole block of shares of this future joint-stock company, which, according to preliminary calculations, will amount to 307.8 billion rubles, 51 percent will be kept by the state while the remaining 49 percent will be owned by the port's collective, Poti city administration, and others wanting to buy shares both in the near abroad and in other foreign countries. This will provide the opportunity to attract solid investments for both the port and the city and the development of its infrastructure. It is significant that it is planned to organize the registration of shares in the port of Poti at the world's leading stock exchanges. The port, which assumes the function of a key base along the Eurasian transport corridor, will serve not only Georgia but also Armenia and Azerbaijan and 12 more countries. As Deputy Prime Minister Zurab Kervalishvili said, it is planned that, following the port's reconstruction and expansion and the building of new terminals, the volume of freight traffic handled by it will increase from between 3 and 4 million to 15 million tonnes within the next two years alone. Moreover, according to estimates, this will ensure that the republic receives $120 million.

It was the unanimous opinion of those participating in the session that the transformation of the port of Poti into a joint- stock company should become a model for all state enterprises and organizations that are to become joint-stock companies. [passage omitted]

Nationalist Leader Congratulates Zhirinovskiy

MK0302143594 Moscow KURANTY in Russian 3 Feb 94 p 3

[Inga Abgarova report under the general headline: "V.V.Zh. Has Given Georgia to Turkey... But They Do Not Know it Yet in Georgia"]

[Text] For all the variety of party movements in Georgia and serious differences of views between loyalists of one party or another, they all met Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's victory in the Russian elections with unanimous silence. Only Zurab Gagnidze, candidate of philosophic sciences and leader of the Georgian National Ideology Party, has sent a congratulatory telegram to Vladimir Volfovich on behalf of his supporters. "We are confident that your victory will have a positive influence on the attainment of genuine freedom in Georgia," the telegram says. "Zhirinovskiy is a nationalist in the good sense of the word," Gagnidze believes. We concluded from a conversation with the leader of national ideologists that he is attracted by the Liberal Democrats' economic program, Zhirinovskiy's desire to cut down the bureaucracy, and his struggle against American aggression. Zurab Gagnidze opposes the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia, saying that there has been not a single serious conflict in the decades while Russian soldiers were present here.

Parliamentary Agreement With Kazakhstan Published

AU0302162394 Tbilisi SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA in Georgian 28 Jan 94 p 1

["Agreement on Cooperation Between the Georgian Parliament and the Republic of Kazakhstan Supreme Council" signed in Almaty on 1 June]

[Text] The Republic of Georgia Parliament and the Republic of Kazakhstan Supreme Council, henceforth to be called the sides,

being guided by the aims and principles of the treaty concluded between the Republic of Georgia and the Republic of Kazakhstan on friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance,

proceeding from the desire to build relations between their parliaments on the basis of mutual understanding, justice, equality, and non-interference in one another's internal affairs,

aiming to promote political, commercial and economic, scientific and technological, and cultural cooperation between the two states and the future development and strengthening of traditional friendly relations between the peoples of Georgia and Kazakhstan on this basis,

have agreed to the following:

Article 1

To create in the Republic of Georgia Parliament a parliamentary group responsible for contacts with the Republic of Kazakhstan Supreme Council; to create in the Republic of Kazakhstan Supreme Council a parliamentary group responsible for contacts with the Republic of Georgia Parliament.

Article II

The parliamentary groups will ensure cooperation on a parity basis in the sphere of legislative activities: the economy, human rights, power engineering, transport, science and culture, environmental protection, the struggle against crime, and other spheres.

Article III

The sides commit themselves to holding regular negotiations and consultations between the parliamentary groups on bilateral relations and international problems that are of interest to both sides.

Article IV

The sides will hold annual official meetings in order to impart a systematic and planned character to interparliamentary relations.

Article V

The sides will constantly exchange information on the parliaments' activities, jointly discuss legislative problems, and hold consultations on such questions that concern the important interests of both states.

Article VI

The sides will determine annually in a special protocol the dates for holding consultations and their level and also the questions to be discussed.

Article VII

The sides will promote cooperation between standing parliamentary committees (commissions) for which purpose joint working groups and groups of experts will be created if need be.

This agreement is valid for two years and is subject to ratification. The duration of the agreement will be extended if one of the sides does not inform the other that it no longer intends to be a party to the agreement.

This agreement comes into force following the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

Concluded in the city of Almaty on 1 June 1993 in two copies, each one in Georgian and Kazakh. Both texts are authentic [avtenturia] and have equal force.

[Signed] On behalf of the Republic of Georgia, E. Shevardnadze
On behalf of the Republic of Kazakhstan, S. Abdildin

Agreement With Kazakhstan Ratified

AU0302162594 Tbilisi SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA in Georgian 28 Jan 94 p 1

["Georgian Parliament Decree on the Ratification of the Agreement on Cooperation Between the Georgian Parliament and the Republic of Kazakhstan Supreme Council" signed in Tbilisi on 25 January]

[Text] The Georgian Parliament decrees:

To ratify the Agreement on Cooperation Between the Georgian Parliament and the Republic of Kazakhstan Supreme Council.

[Signed] Vakhtang Rcheulishvili, deputy speaker of the Georgian Parliament
[Dated] Tbilisi, 25 January 1994

Estonia

More Details on Israeli Weapons Shipment

PM0302141594 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Feb 94 First Edition p 4

[Report by Leonid Levitskiy: "Estonia: Arms Ships Have Arrived, But Arms Trial Only Beginning"]

[Text] Tallinn—The motor ship delivering weapons from Israel spent five hours in the port of Tallinn. The consignment was valued at $4 million. ETA has reported that Estonia's defense forces are now fully equipped with modern weapons. Admittedly, an Army spokesman refused to say just what had arrived and in what quantities.

A year ago the Estonian Government signed a secret contract—secret even to parliament—with the firm of Taas [name as transliterated] Israel Industries Ltd for the delivery of weapons. Information reaching the press caused a stir among opposition factions—deputies demanded that the deal be discussed, and the government was forced to offer an explanation.

The legislators are complaining that the weapons that have been bought are not the best, and that the government overpaid almost by 100 percent in signing such a major deal arbitrarily. Prime Minister Mart Laar has been trying to show that the reverse is the case. His main argument is that Western countries have been refusing to deliver weapons to Estonia owing to the unstable situation there, but Israel agreed. And the Taas firm has supplied the weapons on credit—until the year 2000. By late 1995 Israel will have delivered weapons worth $50 million. But, when interest payments are taken into account, the total cost will be $60.4 million. Under the contract Estonia will receive "Galil" assault rifles, "Negev" machine guns, "Mini-Uzi" pistol-type machine guns, marksmen's rifles, grenade launchers, 81-mm mortars, 106-mm guns, antiaircraft guns, missiles, guided projectiles, and ammunition.

The Israeli weapons will be enough for the republic to have 12,000 men under arms. "When everything covered by the contract has arrived, Estonia will be able to resist an aggressor for as long as it takes until the international system of assistance starts working," Reyn Khelme [name as transliterated], chairman of the parliamentary Defense Commission, believes.

The problem of cartridges is also being resolved. The assault rifles and machine guns meet NATO standards, so ammunition can also be bought in Europe. The republic is organizing its own cartridge production.

The arrival of the Israeli ship coincided with the opening of the hearing in Tallinn City Court of the suit brought against the prime minister by State Assembly member Juri Toomepuu [surname as transliterated]. A former U.S. Army colonel, a veteran of the Vietnam and Korean Wars, commander of a "Green Beret" unit, and now Estonian citizen, Toomepuu believes that the head of government's deal with Taas has greatly damaged the republic and himself personally as a taxpayer. The parliamentarian puts his own material damages at 1,075 krooni (around 140,000 rubles) and his personal damages at 10 million krooni. We do not know whether the war veteran and weapons expert will become an Estonian millionaire. The first court hearing ended noncommittally—the judge asked for additional material. Judging by everything, the dogged colonel will yet do some damage to the nerves of the government, which undertook to arm the republic without consulting this highly experienced serviceman....

Minister on Partnership for Peace Program

WS0302184994 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE in English 1630 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Estonian Minister of Defence Indrek Kannik, after meeting NATO mission currently visiting Estonia, told a press conference that Estonia's main interest in the Partnership for Peace programme, signed by Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Juri Luik in Brussels, on Thursday [3 February], lied in a possibility of having joint political discussions with states included in the programme, joint training programmes of the military and participation in joint military exercises.

Kannik stressed the fact that the obligation taken by NATO in the initiative to hold consultations with new partners was "especially important for Estonia because of a possible political crisis in the near neighbourhood".

"Estonian Government considers Partnership for Peace a positive programme and a great step ahead. We understand that it is a part of a process of becoming a full member of NATO," Kannik said.

Head of the NATO mission, permanent representative of Germany in NATO Hermann F. von Richthofen told the press conference that as NATO was not a closed system, no obstacles were laid to any states in joining it, adding, however, that participation in the Partnership for Peace programme did not mean a soon membership of NATO, but was still a step towards wider and closer cooperation.

Kannik said that in the report to be made to NATO as to the Estonian standpoints on aims of the Partnership for Peace programme and means necessary to participate in the programme, Estonia will make a proposition to hold a part of the joint exercises of the Partnership for Peace programme in Estonia to reduce cost of participation in the programme. At the same time NATO aid to founding the Baltic peacekeeping battalion was not out of question, he added.

Officials on Cooperation With NATO

LD0302230894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1939 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] A team of NATO officials sent to determine to what extent Estonia was prepared to join the Partnership for Peace program has ended its visit there.

Estonian Defense Minister Indrek Kannik said at a news conference Thursday that the mission members discussed with Estonian officials ways to step up the country's cooperation with NATO, in particular the setting up of a consulting mechanism which would work in crisis situations, joint military exercises and training of Estonian officers. They also discussed what Estonia could offer NATO.

Hermann von Richthoff, the mission head, emphasized that Partnership for Peace was not hostile to any country. He said that joint exercises with NATO could be staged in Estonia in 1993 [as received].

General K.-T. Steinkopf, a mission member, said that NATO could not sell weapons to countries that were not its members but Baltic states could buy them from NATO members in bilateral deals.

The NATO team has left for Latvia from where it will go on to Ukraine and Moldova.

CSCE Disagrees With Human Rights Institute

WS0302173394 Tallinn BNS in English 1353 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Tallinn, Feb 03, BNS—The CSCE mission to Estonia denied the accusations that its reports misinform the world community about the situation in Estonia.

The Estonian Human Rights Institute accused the mission last Monday [31 January] of using premises that contradict international law and inaccurate data as the basis of its official reports.

The Institute based its accusations among other things on the mission's activity report No.46 of Jan. 10, which is based on the point of view that the Estonian state came into being after the Soviet Union disintegrated and thus fails to recognize the state's continuity. As a result, the responsibility for citizens of the former Soviet Union, who immigrated into Estonia during the occupation period, is laid on Estonia.

The CSCE mission to Estonia in a statement released on Thursday in Tallinn says that the No. 46 report of the mission "says nothing of the kind".

"The mission supports the Estonian Government's freedom to determine the requirements for Estonian citizenship and makes a clear distinction between the status of the Baltic states and that of the CIS," the mission writes.

In its' Thursday's statement the mission notes that the No. 46 report "favoured prompt implementation of Estonian's law on aliens and supported the right of all persons, regardless of nationality, to leave the country legally".

The mission also states, that the Russian affairs are outside of its mandate, since the mission is authorized to examine only the situation in Estonia. The Estonian Human Rights Institute said on Monday that the CSCE mission "failed to take notice" of the human rights' violations in CIS and "the aggressive nationalism" of Russia.

Security Police Visit Zhirinovskiy Party Activist

WS0302173994 Tallinn BNS in English 1353 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Tallinn, Feb 03, BNS—Officials from the Estonian Defense Police visited the home of Pyotr Rozhok, the representative of the ultra-nationalist Russian Liberal Democratic Party in Estonia, after Rozhok refused to appear before Defense Police investigators in Tallinn.

A detective had a conversation with Rozhok in the latter's apartment.

The head of the Estonian security police, Juri Pihl, has earlier said his department had no reasons to implement any measures against Rozhok, as the man had committed no concrete action against the Estonian State.

Rozhok says he received a formal order to appear in the office of the Estonian Defense Police in Tallinn on Jan. 24. He said he had refused to go because his appearing before Estonian investigators had not been agreed upon with the Russian embassy in Tallinn.

The representative of Zhirinovsky's party says he received another call from a defense police official on Jan. 25. The official, who had identified himself as detective Sergei Melnik, had used expressions of "threat and blackmail" while speaking to Rozhok on the phone, Rozhok said.

Rozhok also said he had delivered all publications in the Estonian press concerning his activity in the country to the Liberal Democratic Party faction in the Russian parliament.

Rozhok said Estonian security police officials had later appeared in the place where he works. He claims the country's security police had "worked out a number of schemes" for his arrest.

"As long as violation of the rights of Russians and exploitation of the Russians' labor continues in Estonia, also my political activity toward the protection of their rights will continue," he said. He also claimed that ninety-nine percent of the reports published on him in the Estonian press were "a lie, intertwined with threat and blackmail."

Latvia

U.S. Supports Skrunda Accord Plans

LD0302140794 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1143 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] The U.S. believes that Latvia and Russia must conclude an agreement on the operation of radar in the village of Skrunda and on the term of its utilization by Russia, says the press release highlighting the results of the visit to Washington by a Latvian delegation led by Latvian Foreign Minister Georgs Andrejevs.

Among the Russia-advanced terms for the withdrawal of about 13,000 Russian servicemen from Latvia by August 31, 1994, is holding on to the early-warning radar during the next five years. Latvia has agreed to 3 years and to the radar's dismantling during one more year. The absence of compromise is the stumbling block hampering the bilateral talks.

The press release also says that in the U.S. Latvian deputies and diplomats met with President Bill Clinton, Vice President Albert Gore, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Under-Secretary of State Strobe Talbott [title as received], and representatives of the National Security Council, the Pentagon and other officials.

The talks concentrated on the Latvian-Russian talks, on Latvia's participation in the Partnership for Peace program, on European security and on ways of broadening military cooperation between Latvia and the U.S..

Deputies View Results of Troop, Skrunda Talks

LD0302180594 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1400 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] A delegation from the Latvian Saeima, consisting of representatives of all the groups, has returned from a visit to the United States of America. Deputy Andrejs Pantelejevs today told a news conference that the aim of the visit was to discuss the issues of Latvian national security.

The delegation was also received by U.S. President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher. It became clear during the talks that the United States of America viewed the withdrawal of the Russian Army not only as Latvia's internal issue, but rather as a problem of all-European and American security systems.

One of the most complicated issues is the fate of the Skrunda radar station. Russia has expressed the wish to use it for another four years and after that, it will scrap it within 18 months. In that case, Russia would withdraw all the troops from Latvia by 31 August this year. That is the best option which Latvia would have to accept, said Deputy Jevgenijs Zoscerinskis. Such a compromise would satisfy all the European countries.

Deputy Maris Grinblats for his part assessed the results of the visit very briefly—they tried to persuade us that the world would be glad if we give in on this issue.

U.S. Security Said Tied to Latvian-Russian Pact

WS0302173194 Tallinn BNS in English 1353 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Riga, Feb 03, BNS—The signature of a Latvian-Russian agreement on troops' withdrawal will entitle Latvia to receive international security guarantees from the United States and European countries, Foreign Minister Georgs Andrejevs told reporters Thursday [3 February].

The United States pledges to send Latvia internationally recognized experts to monitor the agreement's implementation, said Saeima (parliament) Foreign Committee head Alexander Kirsteins.

Latvia's Way's Andrejs Pantelejevs underlined that Latvian security was important not only to his country but also to American and European security, judging by the results of this week's meetings in Washington.

The U.S. Government confirmed its interestedness in the conclusion of a formal agreement between Latvia and Russia on the withdrawal of the Russian troops and the dismantling of the Skrunda radar station.

The Russian Government promised the United States to get the remaining troops out of Latvia until the end of August on condition Latvia allows it retain the Skrunda radar for four years and 18 months.

If Latvia rejects the term and follows its own way to reach an accord with Russia, the United States declines to extend any subsequent security guarantees.

Latvia, however, will accept the proposal only if the new building of the Skrunda early-warning antimissile installation will be pulled down immediately, said Pantelejevs.

The United States supports Latvia's signature to NATO's Partnership for Peace program and will help Latvia with technical provisions, Kirsteins said.

The Latvian delegation met with President Bill Clinton, State Secretary Warren Christopher, Deputy State Secretary Strobe Talbott and Deputy Defense Secretary William Perry.

Birkavs Stresses Active Participation in NATO

LD0302153594 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1400 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] [Announcer] State President Guntis Ulmanis and Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs today sent a letter to NATO concerning Latvia's wish to join the Partnership for Peace program.

At a news conference Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs stressed that joining this program is one more step in implementing the number one priority of the state—security policy. The security and defense policy is currently being implemented in Latvia in three main aspects.

[Begin Birkavs recording] One is the budget intended for defense and security structures. Compared with the past year, it has been increased by 57 percent; obviously it is not enough.

The second step in that direction is the talks that we have begun to also use credits for strengthening our armament. We need international guarantees. We have to interweave into the European context with all our structures. And the Partnership for Peace, this initiative, is the one that gives us new opportunities. But I would like to say that that is not a security market, on which everyone buys his security, but rather that it is an opportunity for a state to achieve gradual approach to NATO structures in talks with NATO. That is a vehicle that will allow us in the event of a crisis to obtain consultations and thus react correctly to specific crises. This will require a great deal of strength, this will also require additional funds, but this has to be done, because otherwise we may lose all that we have achieved.

According to the Partnership for Peace, each state can set up its own communication bureau in Brussels with NATO Headquarters. So then, I consider that we will need a person who would be specifically oriented toward cooperation with NATO so that we can actively participate in the creation of the NATO partnership.

The 14th clause of the declaration, Partnership for Peace, reads: NATO will provide consultations for each active participant in the partnership in the event that they feel direct threats to their territorial integrity, political sovereignty, or security.

So then, a simple passive statement will not be enough and we are oriented toward active participation in this process. [end recording]

[Announcer] It is envisaged that Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs will sign a document on Latvia joining the Partnership for Peace program in Brussels as early as next week.

NATO Group To Meet With Working Group

WS0302172894 Tallinn BNS in English 1348 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Riga, Feb 03, BNS—A NATO delegation is coming to Riga Thursday [3 February] on a two-day trip to meet with the Latvian working group for the Partnership for Peace program.

The groups will discuss Latvia's signature to the cooperation program and concrete fields of Partnership activities for Latvia, like common maneuvers, defense planning, democratic control over defense forces.

The guests are scheduled to meet with Latvian Foreign Minister Georgs Andrejevs.

The mission includes Danish Ambassador to NATO Ole Bierring, German Ambassador to NATO Hermann von Richthofen, General Klaus Steinkopff and Colonel Richard Cohen. It visited Vilnius and Tallinn this week to discuss similar issues as planned for the Latvian visit.

NATO's gradual integration plan for former Cold War foes, Partnership for Peace, has already been accepted by Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic and Hungary.

Thatcher: Nation Should Seek Contacts Everywhere

WS0302173294 Tallinn BNS in English 1353 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Riga, Feb 03, BNS—British ex-Premier Margaret Thatcher voiced her support to the economic, administrative and court reforms in Latvia, Latvian Economics Minister Ojars Kehris told reporters Wednesday [2 February].

Kehris commented on the results of the Baltic conference in London and the World Economic Forum in Davos.

Latvia should reduce the state influence on economy and increase the role of private structures in the process of transfer to a market economy, Thatcher told Kehris.

Thatcher pledged to help Latvia to join international finance institutions what could also foster the economic development. She also accepted an invitation to visit Latvia, Kehris said.

In addition, Kehris met with representatives of the Cable & Wireless firm, which together with the Telecom Finland won the right to modernize the Latvian telecommunication system.

Cable & Wireless has made a commitment to make a major capital investment into the joint venture and help train qualified marketing specialists in Latvia.

The safety of British investments in Latvia is guaranteed by the bilateral treaty on the protection and promotion of investments, signed during the conference, Kehris said.

Speaking on politics, Kehris said that British officials denounced Russian Defense Minister Andrei Kozyrev's statement that placed Latvia in the sphere of Russia's vital interests.

Kehris also acquainted reporters with the conclusions of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

Latvia should look for economic contacts with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine and other eastern countries because consultations with these countries' envoys to the forum evidenced of their wish to cooperate with Latvia.

Russian delegates, for example, offered Latvia a market for farm produce in St. Petersburg, Kehris said. The deal could ensure a stable market for Latvian farm products through a couple of years, he said.

Kehris plans to travel to Kazakhstan and Ukraine soon to discuss economic cooperation.

On the other hand, Latvia needs the Western help to encourage export of local goods and "freely enter into the world market," said Kehris.

The world leaders fear that the already rampant inflation in Russia may rise out of control, Kehris said. Hyperinflation in Russia may provoke unpredictable consequences on the world economy, he said.

Lithuania

President's Alleged Politburo Membership Denied

LD0302184094 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1500 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] We have just received a report by Nerijus Maliukevicius, the president's spokesman for the press, concerning the weekly SOBESEDNIK [published in Russia]:

Pictures of former members of the CPSU Central Committee Political Bureau and candidate members of the Central Committee who are presently heads of CIS countries are published on the front cover of the Russian weekly SOBESEDNIK's fourth issue of this year. Among them, under the title "The CIS Politburo and The Central Committee" is a photograph of Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas.

I have been tasked to state the following concerning the above publication: Algirdas Brazauskas has never been member of the CPSU Politburo or a candidate member to the CPSU Politburo.

At the time when the CPSU Politburo was functioning the Lithuanian Communist Party headed by Algirdas Brazauskas left the CPSU at the end of 1989. Therefore, after this date, any search for cooperation with the above organization cannot be fruitful and is even illogical.

On 11 March, 1990 Lithuania restored its independence and in 1991 the people of Lithuania expressed their will through a referendum that Lithuania will never join any new political, military, or economic or any other kind of union or commonwealth which had been set up on the basis of the former Soviet Union. This concept has been reinforced by the Supreme Council Constitutional Act of 8 June, 1992. Therefore, to regard Lithuania and its leader within the context of the CIS is an evident case of ignoring historic facts and present day reality.

The foreign policy pursued by the president of the Republic does not give the slightest grounds to claim that there are intentions to change the articles of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. Therefore, there are no grounds to associate the leader of Lithuania, who was directly elected, either with the former Central Committee Politbureau or with the present CIS.

It is difficult to see what the objectives of the publication in SOBESEDNIK are. However, it is evident that it belittles the sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania and attempts to play up to those who would like to again draw Lithuania into the sphere of their interests.

President 'Very Concerned' by Brain Drain

WS0302154494 Tallinn BNS in English 0809 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Vilnius, Feb 02, BNS—Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas said he is very concerned that trained specialists are moving to private structures and thus weaken the scientific potential of research institutes and institutions of higher education.

Speaking at the annual Lithuanian Science and Industry conference in Kaunas Tuesday [1 February], the president emphasized the need to preserve the remaining scientific nucleus and to train new specialists for the country.

Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius admitted in his report that the state is unable to maintain all scientific personnel.

The number of scientific personnel decreased by nearly 30 percent over the past three years, but, in the premier's view, the country's higher education institutions do not experience a shortage of specialists yet.

The four-day conference in Kaunas will try to find solutions to problems of developing Lithuanian science and will search for a way out a crisis that was caused by the worsening economic situation. The conference is attended by members of the government, university rectors and scholars.

Premier: Negative Perceptions Abroad 'Vanished'

WS0402103694 Tallinn BNS in English 2044 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] VILNIUS, Feb 03, BNS - Skeptical and negative attitudes toward Lithuanian economic reforms have completely vanished, Lithuanian Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius said, commenting on the World Economic Forum that was held in the Swiss town of Davos last week.

At a press conference Thursday, Slezevicius said Lithuania's macroeconomic indexes started to approach Czech, Hungarian, Slovakian, Polish, Estonian and Latvian ones. The rate of inflation is the principal index, and "Lithuania is no longer considered a country with an average [as received] rate of inflation," he said.

Discussing his meetings in Davos, Slezevicius pointed out the meetings with Baltic and Scandinavian leaders.

He said Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt invited the Baltic premiers for a meeting with their Nordic counterparts in early March.

As regards the way Latvian and Estonian premiers assessed the Davos meeting, Slezevicius said he is unwilling to make any critical remarks on any statements by Lithuania's neighbors. Slezevicius said there were no discussions in Davos "purely about Estonia" or that Lithuania's economy depends on Russia.

But the Lithuanian premier admitted that Estonia does not depend on Russia as much as Lithuania. In his opinion, this is so only because Estonia gets around 65 percent of its energy from local shale, while Lithuania has to buy Russian oil and nuclear fuel.

Commenting on relations with Russia, which were on of the key issues in Davos, Slezevicius said Lithuania is unable to establish a normal dialog with Russia and to solve a number of problems. The premier said the Lithuanian government tries to arrange a meeting with Russian leaders, but all attempts have failed so far. "I have asked several times to speak to Mr. Chernomyrdin, but the instable situation in Russia really stops us."

The Lithuanian premier said the dialog with Poland and Belarus, on such problems as border delimitation, is very difficult, as well.

Premier: Relations With Russia Unsatisfactory

LD0302231494 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1939 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Lithuanian Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius told INTERFAX on Thursday that he is not satisfied with the latest relations with Russia.

In particular, the premier said, immediately after signing the treaty on most favored trading status with Russia a few months ago the Lithuanian side sent a note to Moscow. However, the Russian side has not yet responded, so the treaty cannot come into force.

Referring to unofficial reports, the premier said that the Russian side is trying to link these issues with other problems, in particular with "some aspects of relations between Lithuania and the Kaliningrad region of Russia."

Daily Claims Defense Ministry Employs KGB Agent

WS0302191494 Tallinn BNS in English 1614 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Text] Vilnius, Feb 03, BNS—A KGB agent works at the Lithuanian Ministry of Defense, the LIETUVOS RYTAS newspaper said Thursday [3 February].

The newspaper said the agent, known as Gnat, currently holds a high-ranking post in the ministry. He is reportedly a former activist of the Sajudis popular front and was awarded for defending the parliament and other state institutions during the Soviet military aggression in 1991.

LIETUVOS RYTAS implied that the pseudonym Gnat is used for Ignas Stankovicius, director of the ministry's International and Internal Relations Division.

There has been no immediate reaction from the leadership of national defense. The ministry's press service said Stankovicius is currently on vacation due to health problems.

Stankovicius, formerly an employee of the Physicotechnical Institute and regional environmental protection inspector, made a career leap to the rank of colonel in structures of national defense.

In the summer of 1990, Stankovicius was appointed as the assistant director of the then Department of Defense, but his further career was interrupted by then Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius, who dismissed Stankovicius for "neglect of duties, disregarding property and the basic needs of soldiers and officers."

But LIETUVOS RYTAS noted that soon before Stankovicius left the post, the leadership of national defense and the parliament's National Security Committee were informed by an anonymous "former KGB colonel" that KGB agent Gnat works in the system of defense.

Stankovicius returned to the Ministry of Defense in January 1992. He was promoted to the rank of colonel in early 1993.

Construction Minister Resigns; Replacement Named

LD0302154294 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1400 GMT 3 Feb 94

[Summary] Construction Minister Algirdas Vapsys has been released from his post at his own request by a 31 January presidential decree.

Julius Laitonas was appointed to the post by another presidential decree.

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